The Army has transformed several times during its history. Adapting to the operational environment is a necessity for the force called upon to prosecute its adversaries. The Army must do what is necessary to protect the U.S. against all enemies, and advance the national interests of the American people. To accomplish this, anticipation of threats is crucial and victory against its adversaries is an imperative. The nation relies on the military for strategic level deterrence and expects that it will be decisive in combat operations. For the military to be successful, it is important that transformation adapt to meet these expectations by conforming to the requirements of a successful force of the future in order meet any new threats in any environment around the world.
Introduction
The whole of military activity must therefore relate directly or indirectly to the engagement. The end for which a soldier is recruited, clothed, armed, and trained, the whole object of his sleeping, eating, drinking, and marching is simply that he should fight at the right place and the right time. (Clausewitz, 1976)
Past military events have demonstrated the importance of anticipation and preparation for a wide spectrum of missions and capabilities. To conduct these operations, the U.S. Military must prepare to move and conduct them anywhere in the world. The Military must also have the capability to conduct low intensity wars against an ill-defined enemy as well as major conventional style conflicts against major states.
Early in World War II, Germany decisively demonstrated the devastating effect of a new paradigm in military power. The allies had to play catch up and adapt quickly in order to survive. Germany’s early success quic...
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...strategic force that is both joint and expeditionary capable for any future contingency. As indicated by past military events, the anticipation and preparation for a wide spectrum of missions and capabilities will continue to ensure that the Army is the force for the 21st century.
Works Cited
Army Transformation Roadmap. (2004). Retrieved from: http://asc.army.mil/docs/transformation/2004_Army_Transformation_Roadmap.pdf
Clausewitz, Carl von. (1976). On War. Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter
Paret. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Murray, Williamson. (2001). Army Transformation: A View From the U.S. Army War College.
Retrieved from: http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ssi/armytran.pdf
Stewart, R. W. (2005). American Military History Volume II. Washington D. C.: Center of
Military History of the United States Army.
As the incoming brigade commander, LTC (P) Owens, I see the critical leadership problem facing the 4th Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) is the inability or unwillingness of Colonel Cutler to lead and manage change effectively. In initial talks with Col Cutler and in reviewing the brigade’s historical unit status reports, the 4th ABCT performed as well as can be expected in Afghanistan, but as the onion was peeled back there are numerous organizational issues that were brought to the surface while I walked around and listened to the soldiers of the 4th ABCT, in addition to reviewing the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) report. One of the most formidable tasks of a leader is to improve the organization while simultaneously accomplishing
...in technology and tactics have made Special Forces units more reliable. For example, the raid on Osama bin Laden’s compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan and the incident with the Somali pirates of the coast of Somalia show the capabilities of today’s Special Forces. The author asserts that, in the future the United States will shift away from major combat operations. These large engagements have proven to be costly in lives and treasure. For that reason, she infers that the US Military will choose the “go small, go long” model for future engagements in the Middle East. Special operation forces are uniquely suited for this model. Their conspicuous nature and low cost make them politically and strategically ideal. The author also suggests that future large scale operations may look like the conflicts in Libya and Somalia rather than the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The comparison of German forces in France in 1943 versus 1944 provides a compelling argument that allied forces should have transitioned from defense to offense at a decisive point in Western France. Clausewitz states that, “A sudden powerful transition to the offensive - the flashing sword of vengeance - is the greatest moment for the defense” (Clausewitz, 370). Handel also emphasizes “timing is everything” in relation to the optimal transition from defense to offense (Handel, 190). The Americans and British did transition in 1943 to the offensive with the invasion of Sicily and the Italian campaign (Murray, 375). However, they did not capitalize on the opportunity in 1943 to attack the weaker German forces in France to brandish the “flashing sword of vengeance” that Clausewitz advocates.
War finds success and failure inescapably linked to how well the Combined, Joint, and Multinational Commander ensures the Joint War Fighting Function “Sustainment” planning is linked to strategic, operational and tactical objectives. General Eisenhower’s Operation OVERLORD, the Allied cross channel, air, and seaborne invasion of France during World War II provides an excellent case study to show successful integration of the principles and the spirit of the Joint War Fighting Function “Sustainment.” OVERLORD required synchronizing, coordinating, and integrating the logistics capabilities of coalition forces, their equipment as well as civilian manufacturing capabilities to meet the strategic end state (e.g. the defeat of Germany). This article will review the purpose and definition of Joint Sustainment, its imperatives and logistics planning principles and examine how Eisenhower and his planners incorporated these imperatives and principles into Operation OVERLORD.
During World War II, Germany’s military was superior to anyone else in the world, with far more advanced technology, tactics, and weaponry. They had a fearless leader who would stop at nothing to make his country great again. Their closest rival, the Soviet Union, was almost out of the picture with a death toll of over 26 million. On top of that, Germany had nothing to lose, and would not conceivably stop. So how then, with all odds against them, did the Allies win the war? A combination of factors affected Germany’s downfall, such as lack of morale, unwieldy weapons, and failure to work with its so-called allies.
British forces were close to defeat everywhere in 1942. The American economy was a peacetime economy, apparently unprepared for the colossal demands of total war. The Soviet system was all but shattered in 1941, two-thirds of its heavy industrial capacity captured and its vast air and tank armies destroyed. This was a war, Ribbentrop ruefully concluded, that 'Germany could have won'.
Sir, I am honored by the privilege to once again serve in 4th Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT). Over of the last 30 days, I had an opportunity to reconnect, and reflect on the current state of the Brigade. The 4th ABCT has a rich history of success and glory. It is my goal to put in place the systems and practices for this great organization to exceed all past and present accomplishments. As a result of my assessment, I identified three areas of focus that will improve our organization: a unit vision, a change in organizational culture and climate, and building organizational teams. I have no doubt that with the implementation of these three areas of focus, I will be the transformational leader that 4th ABCT needs as we prepare for the upcoming National Training Center (NTC) rotation and tackle the task of the Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) mission.
In the post Afghanistan period, the Army will focus on regaining readiness to support the full range of combat operations and would be a key part of any large scale offensive or security requirement. A rebalance within the active and reserve components will achieve significant cost savings by placing a large percentage of the forces only necessary for extended ground campaigns in the reserves. The Army is essential to any large-scale force projection operation and functions as an integrated force with partners and allies
However, when confronted with a strict policy of appeasement, by both the French and the English, the stage was set for a second World War. Taylor constructs a powerful and effective argument by expelling certain dogmas that painted Hitler as a madman, and by evaluating historical events as a body of actions and reactions, disagreeing with the common idea that the Axis had a specific program from the start. The book begins with the conclusion of the First World War, by exploring the idea that critical mistakes made then made a second war likely, yet not inevitable. Taylor points out that although Germany was defeated on the Western front, “Russia fell out of Europe and ceased to exist, for the time being, as a Great Power. The constellation of Europe was profoundly changed—and to Germany’s advantage.”
With the rise of the Axis Powers came the outbreak of World War 2 and a potent evil that threatened the wellbeing and tranquility of the people in Asia, Europe, and Northern-Africa. One by one, countries fell into the grasp of the Axis Powers. With each fallen country, it became easier for the Axis P...
If each country wanted to live they would have to keep up with all the new upgrades. In document J it shows how the military grew in its armed forces and as the war went on it shows that the technology and the effectiveness of weapons increased. The German military needed to expand and grow in their weapon power to win. That is why militarism is the number one cause for the war.
The Strengths and Weaknesses of Joint Warfare Armed with numerous studies, and intensive public hearings, Congress mandated far-reaching changes in DOD organization and responsibilities under the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. This landmark legislation significantly expanded the authority and responsibility of the chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Included in this expanded authority and responsibility was the requirement for the chairman to develop a doctrine for the joint employment of armed forces. As operations Urgent Fury, Just Cause, and Desert Storm have vividly demonstrated, the realities of armed conflict in today's world make the integration of individual service capabilities a matter of success or failure, life or death. Furthermore, the operation Desert One demonstrated the need for a strengthened Joint Warfare Doctrine and the consequent change in Joint Warfare Employment.
Current military leadership should comprehend the nature of war in which they are engaged within a given political frame in order to develop plans that are coherent with the desired political end state. According to Clausewitz, war is an act of politics that forces an enemy to comply with certain conditions or to destroy him through the use of violence. A nation determines its vital interests, which drives national strategy to obtain or protect those interests. A country achieves those goals though the execution of one of the four elements of power, which are diplomatic, informational, military and economical means. The use of military force...
Zink, Harold. (1957) The United States in Germany, 1944-1955 [online]. Princeton, NJ: D. Van Nostrand [cited 12th September 2011]. Available from:
Because the leaders and commanders of WWI forever changed the nature of war, it influenced the later Nazi leaders decisions, and forced the next set of Allies to adapt to an entirely new concept of total war as i...