From the standpoint of risks and rewards, an Allied cross-channel invasion in 1943 rather than 1944 would have been more effective for the following reasons. First, German defenses were not capable of repelling a 1943 invasion. Second, the Allies had the requisite resources and capability to carry out a successful amphibious invasion. Finally, a more efficient and effective use of resources could have ended the war earlier and on more favorable geopolitical terms for the British and Americans. I. THE TIME IS RIGHT The comparison of German forces in France in 1943 versus 1944 provides a compelling argument that allied forces should have transitioned from defense to offense at a decisive point in Western France. Clausewitz states that, “A sudden powerful transition to the offensive - the flashing sword of vengeance - is the greatest moment for the defense” (Clausewitz, 370). Handel also emphasizes “timing is everything” in relation to the optimal transition from defense to offense (Handel, 190). The Americans and British did transition in 1943 to the offensive with the invasion of Sicily and the Italian campaign (Murray, 375). However, they did not capitalize on the opportunity in 1943 to attack the weaker German forces in France to brandish the “flashing sword of vengeance” that Clausewitz advocates. The 1944 Allied landing at Normandy met a strong, networked German defense that initially disrupted the timing of the invasion, slowed down the Allied advance, and inflicted extensive casualties. The German shore defenses were a result of extensive preparations that began when the German High Command appointed Field Marshal Rommel to defend the western European coast. Rommel believed the best strategy against an Allied inv... ... middle of paper ... ...e time frame, it would have (1) caused huge damage to German strategic posture, (2) required major German force redeployments away from the Eastern Front, and (3) enabled a more rapid British and American occupation of Germany, leading to more advantageous German surrender conditions and negotiations with the Soviets. The result would have been a different post-war geopolitical framework aligned more positively towards the U.S. and Britain. Clausewitz emphasizes that “war is a branch of political activity, that it is in no sense autonomous” (Clausewitz, 605). This principle is especially applicable to the post-war period of World War II. The political struggle between the ideologies of democracy and communism would entail global focus for the next 50 years, and the events that brought about the defeat of Germany shaped the landscape of this political struggle.
Von Clausewitz, Carl. Translated and edited by Sir Michael Howard and Peter Paret. On War. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976.
In 1943, the decision was made to attack the Germans in the spring of 1944. It was called Operation Overlord. On June 6, 1944, Allied troops invaded Normandy on the northern coast of France. The invasion was originally planned for June the fifth, but due to bad weather it was postponed until June the sixth. The Allies consisted of the United States, Britain, France, and Canada.
War is the means to many ends. The ends of ruthless dictators, of land disputes, and lives – each play its part in the reasoning for war. War is controllable. It can be avoided; however, once it begins, the bat...
Even though Germany was very committed to World War II, Operation Valkyrie would have altered the course of the war, had it been successful. Had Operation Valkyrie been successful Germany could have made peace agreements with the Western Allies, and the war would have been over before they got completely destroyed. Germany could have annexed and kept some of its conquered territories. The coup of the Nazi party would kick all Nazis out of the government. And most importantly Adolf Hitler would be dead.
The battle of Stalingrad is argued to be one of the most significant strategizing battle for the Germans. If Germany had won Stalingrad there would have been no fight left for the Russians to have. Instead, Germany made a hasty decision to attack in order to prevent Russia from coming up with a strategy which put Germany at a disadvantage. By the end of Stalingrad the Russians had managed to push back the Germans and put them on the defensive. If Russia had lost in their battle against Nazi Germany the United States and Great Britain would have faced a much harsher fight against Nazi Germany. Some would even argue that it would have been next to impossible for America to win against Nazi
In 1943 the British and American Allies shared a common language and a common enemy, but they disagreed on the war’s grand strategy. (site) These strategic differences culminated in the Sicily Campaign, with Allied command and control exercise by Allied Commander, General Eisenhower, failed to employ the three essential attributes of mission command: commander’s intent, full understanding, and mutual trust among partners, as discussed in General Dempsey’s white paper. These failures in Mission Command also limited the Allies’ ability to effectively integrate the vital joint functions like Fires, Maneuver, and Protection. This essay will evaluate the Allies’ Command and Control and the other vital Joint Functions and expound on General Eisenhower
The invasion may have even failed completely, which could have affected the final outcome of the war. Bletchley Park became a guiding and important asset to the allies throughout the war. Without it the outcome of the war, and therefore our lives, may have been very different.
“The Battle of the Bulge, fought over the winter months of 1944 – 1945, was the last major Nazi offensive against the Allies in World War Two. The battle was a last ditch attempt by Hitler to split the Allies in two in their drive towards Germany and destroy their ability to supply themselves” (Trueman).
Prior to the invasion of France there had been 7 months of “Phoney war”; However the French had anticipated the attack and established “The Maginot line” which was a line of defence designed to hold the German army back. Despite this the Battle of France began on the 10th May 1940 when German Army group B subdued Holland and advanced rapidly westwards through Belgium.
However, when confronted with a strict policy of appeasement, by both the French and the English, the stage was set for a second World War. Taylor constructs a powerful and effective argument by expelling certain dogmas that painted Hitler as a madman, and by evaluating historical events as a body of actions and reactions, disagreeing with the common idea that the Axis had a specific program from the start. The book begins with the conclusion of the First World War, by exploring the idea that critical mistakes made then made a second war likely, yet not inevitable. Taylor points out that although Germany was defeated on the Western front, “Russia fell out of Europe and ceased to exist, for the time being, as a Great Power. The constellation of Europe was profoundly changed—and to Germany’s advantage.”
World War II was a devastating event for both the Allies and Axis powers that cost millions of lives. Nazism was growing along with the tensions between the Allied and Axis powers. The Germans were trudging through battles, defeating large and strong French and Belgian resistance because the German army had developed a system called ‘Blitzkrieg’ which overwhelmed their opponents with heavy armor. This new concept eventually led to the Fall of France in the year 1940. The main debate of the Fall of France was whether it was caused by “strategic errors” or the “Nazi Blitzkrieg.”
Warfare was in a state of transition. Older commanders and generals in the French and British militaries were very cavalry and infantry focused. These commanders believed that cavalry, infantry, and artillery would assure victory in any circumstance, against any foe. They clung to the static tactics of the bygone World War I era. World War I had been fought primarily on French soil, and the military as well as the government never wanted that to happen again, therefore they wanted to reinforce their main border against any future German. Little did they know that only twenty two years later they would be bested by German forces in a way that would shock the world. This research will be analyzing many important assumptions, oversights,...
Carl von Clausewitz, “What is War?” On War. Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, 89-112. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976.
O’Neill, William L. World War II A Student Companion. 1 ed. William H. Chafe. New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.
In this essay I argue that despite transformational changes in the character of war the nature of war has remained unchanged and therefore Clausewitzian concept on relationship between “war” and “politics” remain a viable tool that contributes to our understanding of contemporary warfare. First, I will evaluate Clausewitz’ trinity concept, then present the arguments of...