Explain the way in which Smart argues that brain-processes are identical to mental sensations with respect to what he says about topic-neutral sensation language.
Smart argues from the stance of identity theorist and believes that mental sensations are identical to a corresponding brain-process. Much of Smart’s paper is a counter argument against an identity theorist’s greatest rival, the dualist. Most of the human body has been explained by science in terms of biology, chemistry, and physics; though the brain remains largely mysterious. Recent technological advances regarding the research of the brain has allowed us to understand the mind in much better ways which is why Smart feels “that science is increasingly giving us a viewpoint whereby organisms are able to be seen as physicochemical mechanism” (61). He introduces the concept of Ockham’s razor and feels that scientists use it to introduce simplicity into their theories, which makes their explanations of concepts simpler. This simplicity is preferred because it also adds a sense of beauty to the laws discovered. With regards to his lightning example, Smart highlights how our experience of lightning is the physical process of discharged electrons from the ionization of water vapor in the atmosphere. Important to note here is that the two cannot be separated; you will not have a flash of lightning and then an electric discharge, rather lightning is electric discharge. This metaphor is crucial essay’s argument that sensations are identical to brain-processes. Ockham’s razor eliminates unnecessary nomological danglers from scientific theories, so why not apply the same concept to a theory of mind? We wouldn’t describe in our theory of lightning the ‘flashiness’ or ‘jaggedne...
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...tral terms, though we do not necessarily always pick topic-neutral terms for ourselves. For example, you may have said ‘that hurt like a ton of bricks’, yet you have never encountered a ton of falling bricks in your life. Only when one has to report their experiences to others do they have to express this in topic-neutral terms, so that others may have an idea that this experience is similar to what they may be experiencing mentally. However, we still cannot deny that sensations or mental states can be brain processes. We can only suggest that topic neutral terms are simply useful for reporting to others, and not always necessarily true. This is possibly why Smart believed the dualist objection was his biggest threat.
Works Cited
Chalmers, David John, comp. Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. New York: Oxford UP, 2002. Print.
Jackson’s Knowledge Argument, while relying on the validity of epiphenomenalism, manages to stand to arguments of physicalism. The ability of conceivable ‘zombies’ to register qualia without experiencing it responds to the claims of acquaintance arguments. Furthermore, beliefs that qualia would provoke physical changes and reactions are accompanied by flawed assertions of attempting to capture the nature of causation. Qualia and the necessity of non-physical knowledge to their existence provide valid arguments to upholding dualist beliefs.
Taylor, Richard. "The Mind as a Function of the Body." Exploring Philosophy. 4th ed. New York: Oxford UP, 2012. 131-138. Print.
To conclude this essay, I like to emphazise that Rosenthal's HOT is more of an empirical hypothesis, rather than an analysis of the term ‘consciousness.’ His aim is precisely to explain the phenomena of consciousness in relation to other mental states, such as thought and perception, and while achieving this, he has elaborated a theoretical structure for comprehending the functions of our mind.
“The nervous system of every living thing is but a bundle of predispositions to react in particular ways upon the contact of particular features of the environment. The neural machinery is but a hyphen between determinate arrangements of matter outside the body and determinate impulses to inhibition or discharge within its organs.” (James, W. 1884).
Historically, cognitive psychology was unified by an approach based on an resemblance between the mind and a computer, (Eysenck and Keane, 2010). Cognitive neuroscientists argue convincingly that we need to study the brain while people engage in cognitive tasks. Clearly, the internal processes involved in human cognition occur in the brain, and several sophisticated ways of studying the brain in action, including various imaging techniques, now exist, (Sternberg and Wagner, 1999, page 34).Neuroscience studies how the activity of the brain is correlated with cognitive operations, (Eysenck and Keane, 2010). On the other hand, cognitive neuropsychologists believe that we can draw general conclusions about the way in which the intact mind and brain work from mainly studying the behaviour of neurological patients rather than their physiology, (McCarthy and Warrington, 1990).
Jaegwon Kim thinks that multiple realizability of mental properties would bring about the conclusion that psychology is most likely not a science. Several functionalists, specially, Fodor, take up the opposing stance to Kim, supporting that the multiple realizability of mental states is one of the reasons why psychology is an autonomous and justifiable science. Essentially, Kim think that in order for mental states to be multiply realizable then psychology must be fundamentally broken; with human psychology encompassing properties realized for humans and alien psychology encompassing those mental states realized in the alien way etc. I will demonstrate that even if one supports and allows the principles behind Kim’s argument they do not result in his final conclusion of psychology failing to be a science. By attacking his principle of Casual Individuation of Kinds I will show that Kim has failed to find the correct conclusion. Furthermore, I will consider a possible objection that Kim might have to my stance and give a short rebuttle. I will conclude by explicating Jerry Fodor’s account of what is Kim’s essential problem is. By showing that Kim’s conclusion fails it will entail that Fodor’s conclusion is more viable in reality.
Functionalism is a materialist stance in the philosophy of mind that argues that mental states are purely functional, and thus categorized by their input and output associations and causes, rather than by the physical makeup that constitutes its parts. In this manner, functionalism argues that as long as something operates as a conscious entity, then it is conscious. Block describes functionalism, discusses its inherent dilemmas, and then discusses a more scientifically-driven counter solution called psychofunctionalism and its failings as well. Although Block’s assertions are cogent and well-presented, the psychofunctionalist is able to provide counterarguments to support his viewpoint against Block’s criticisms. I shall argue that though both concepts are not without issue, functionalism appears to satisfy a more acceptable description that philosophers can admit over psychofunctionalism’s chauvinistic disposition that attempts to limit consciousness only to the human race.
Describe what evolutionary psychologists mean when they employ the term ‘theory of mind’. Use examples and research studies from Book 1, Chapter 2 to show why this theory is important in evolutionary psychology.
A dualist may respond with a type of property dualism (epiphenomenalism or interacionism) by saying that mental states supervene on brain states. Therefore, if the brain is damaged, particular mental states will have no supervienence base, and the mind will be affected. This seems to save the duali...
To respond to this shortcoming of consciousness, some might attempt to find an absolute absolved from one-sidedness, from sheer relativity to the knowing subject. Others will not respond this way, however, instead spinning off into apathy, subjectivism, or nihilism (59). Those who do attempt to find an objective truth most often turn to science. Some have suggested that the intellect is an ...
Are minds physical things, or are they nonmaterial? If your beliefs and desires are caused by physical events outside of yourself, how can it be true that you act the way you do of your own free will? Are people genuinely moved by the welfare of others, or is all behavior, in reality, selfish? (Sober 203). These are questions relevant to philosophy of the mind and discussed through a variety of arguments. Two of the most important arguments with this discussion are Cartesian dualism and logical behaviorism, both of which argue the philosophy of the mind in two completely different ways. Robert Lane, a professor at the University of West Georgia, define the two as follows: Cartesian dualism is the theory that the mind and body are two totally different things, capable of existing separately, and logical behaviorism is the theory that our talk about beliefs, desires, and pains is not talk about ghostly or physical inner episodes, but instead about actual and potential patterns of behavior. Understanding of the two arguments is essential to interpret the decision making process; although dualism and behaviorism are prominent arguments for the philosophy of the mind, both have their strengths and weaknesses.
He suggests that when analyzing colors and their role in brain processes, we are misinterpreting the way it should be understood. When we speak about these sensations that are synonymous with the brain processes, it should be said as “There is something going on which is like what is going on when ____,” (149). In the case of seeing red as mentioned before, the statement would appear as “There is something going on which is like what is going on when I have my eyes open, am awake, and there is an emission of red cast from an object, that is, when I really see red." Ultimately, I do not believe this response is an adequate answer to the objection. It appears that Smart is merely altering the linguistic nature of the question rather than providing a solution to the problem. This “something” neutralizes the difference between a brain process and a sensation without giving a sound reason as to why or how they would be considered identical rather than
With each of our senses (sight, smell, touch, taste, and hear), information is transmitted to the brain. Psychologists find it problematic to explain the processes in which the physical energy that is received by the sense organs can form the foundation of perceptual experience. Perception is not a direct mirroring of stimulus, but a compound messy pattern dependent on the simultaneous activity of neurons. Sensory inputs are somehow converted into perceptions of laptops, music, flowers, food, and cars; into sights, sounds, smells, taste ...
Vygotsky, L. (1978). Mind In Society:the development of higher psychological processes. Cambridge, Ma: Harvard University Press.
...ocesses which are distinct from observable behavioral responses. Acts such as thinking, remembering, perceiving, and willing are defined by behavioral actions and by dispositions to perform behavioral actions. However, Ryle criticises Behaviorist theory for being overly simplistic and mechanistic, just as he criticizes Cartesian theory for being overly simplistic and mechanistic. While Cartesian theory asserts that hidden mental processes cause the behavioral responses of the conscious individual, Behaviorism asserts that stimulus-response mechanisms cause the behavioral responses of the conscious individual. Ryle argues that both the Cartesian theory and the Behaviorist theory are too simplistic and mechanistic to enable us to fully understand the Concept of Mind.