Morality In Mary Anne Warren's Thesis Of Personhood

“I argue that it is personhood, and not genetic humanity, which is the fundamental basis for membership in the moral community” (133). This is the central idea in Mary Anne Warren’s argument on the personhood of a fetus. She argues that in order for a genetic human being to be considered a person, he or she would have to possess all of the six criteria’s of personhood which include sentience, ability to reason and emotionality. In order to determine the viability of the personhood of a fetus she argues two things. Firstly, Warren argues that even on the surmise that a fetus has a strong right to life, abortion can still be seen as morally permissible. Warren demonstrates this by using Judith Johnson’s Violinist analogy, which asks the basic

Warren argues that unless a mother had a special commitment towards the fetus she is in no position to make personal sacrifices toward its survival. Secondly, Warren argues that moral accountability should be the basis of personhood. She explains that the fetus does not possess the characteristics of persons at this stage of their development, even though they hold the potential to become persons. She contends that since a fetus is not a person yet, a mother should not be morally obligated to keep it especially if she has no control over its conception. Warren also notes that infanticide and abortion are not the same thing. She claims that killing an infant is not ideal because it does not interfere with the physical integrity and life of persons in the way abortion does. Generally, Warren defends abortion by stating that a Fetus is not yet a person, and even if it were the mother is not morally obligated to keep

Hursthouse does not consider the personhood of a fetus or the lack of it and the rights of women. Hursthouse asserts that an action is morally acceptable if a virtuous agent would take that action. Also, the virtuous agent is assumed to have all the virtues that help to achieve eudemonia. Hursthouse claims that deontology and act utilitarianism both share the same difficulty in accurately determining what terms such as happiness, rationality and eudemonia really mean. Furthermore, she claims that virtue ethics is not “trivially circular”, committed to reductionism and it does not have strict rules or principles. Hursthouse, dismisses the major criticism of virtue theory that says it cannot solve moral dilemmas because it relies on virtues and the concept of “worthwhile”. Hursthouse responds to this criticism when she writes, “Acting rightly is difficult and calls for moral wisdom. Virtue ethics captures this by relying on rules whose application manifestly may require the most delicate and sensitive judgment” (162). In her defense of abortion, Hursthouse focuses on how biological facts might affect the reasoning of a moral agent on the issue of abortion. She claims that these facts bring us to the realization that abortion is not just another physical process, but a condition that entails strong emotional