Johnson and the Vietnam War

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Johnson and the Vietnam War

He was determined that he would not be held responsible for allowing Vietnam to fall to the Communists. Johnson believed that the key to success in the war in South Vietnam was to frighten North Vietnam's leaders with the possibility of full-scale U.S. military intervention. In January 1964 he approved top-secret, covert attacks against North Vietnamese territory, including commando raids against bridges, railways, and coastal installations. Johnson also ordered the U.S. Navy to conduct surveillance missions along the North Vietnamese coast. He increased the secret bombing of territory in Laos along the Ho Chi Minh Trail, a growing network used to transport supplies into South Vietnam. On August 2, 1964, North Vietnamese coastal gunboats fired on the destroyer USS Maddox, which had infiltrated North Vietnam's territorial boundaries in the Gulf of Tonkin. Johnson ordered more ships to the area, and on August 4 the Maddox and the USS Turner Joy reported that North Vietnamese patrol boats had fired on them. Johnson then ordered the first air strikes against North Vietnamese territory and went on television to seek approval from the U.S. public. The U.S. Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which handed over war-making powers to Johnson until such time as "peace and security" had returned to Vietnam. The CIA was forced to admit that the strength of the NLF was continuing to grow. Johnson began to steadily escalate U.S. bombing of North Vietnam, which began to send out well-trained units of its People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) into the south. The NLF guerrillas coordinated their attacks with PAVN forces. Between February 7 and February 10, 1965, the NLF launched surprise attacks on the U.S...

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...forces from the area. By 1967 the ground war had reached a stalemate, which led Johnson and McNamara to increase the fierceness of the air war. In 1966 the bombing of North Vietnam's oil facilities had destroyed 70 percent of their fuel reserves, but the DRV's ability to wage the war had not been affected. Planners wished to avoid populated areas, but when 150,000 sorties per year were being flown by U.S. warplanes, civilian casualties were inevitable. These losses provoked revulsion both in the United States and internationally. In 1967 the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Earle Wheeler, declared that no more "major military targets" were left. Unable to widen the bombing to population centers the U.S. Department of Defense had to admit stalemate in the air war as well. The damage that had already been inflicted on Vietnam's population was enormous.

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