Spartan Expedition Analysis

1150 Words3 Pages

When embarking upon an expedition for war certain preparations should be made to guarantee success of the expedition. We, as formidable senior leaders and strategic military planners evaluate criteria as we plan for these “expeditions” using a system to assist us in satisfying the political objective (ends), devising the method for achieving the objective (ways), and gathering resources (means) to meet that objective. Upon close examination of the Athenian Sicily Expedition during the Peloponnesian War (431 BCE- 404 BCE), Athens experienced severe difficulty in astutely applying the ends-ways-means construct. Senior Athenian leaders hastily framed the political ends and largely succumbed to the appeal to fear fallacy of Spartan expansion to …show more content…

The ends for the Sicily campaign went awry due to Athens greed for expansion spurred by false claims of war financing from the Egestaens and the assumption that the Peace of Nicias would endure, thus reducing the Spartan threat to the homeland. Athenian leaders were lulled initially into the expedition due to the fallacy of appeal to fear by the Egestaens. Athens should intervene otherwise the Syracusans would conquer Sicily, reunite with Sparta, and become a formidable future threat to Athens . The Sicily campaign was an attractive offer to Athens, an outside party financed the war effort and success would reduce a future threat. These ends were wholly unachievable because they were based on two fatal flaws, the Egestaens did not truly have the financing available to fund additional triremes and hoplites, and the fragile Peace of Nicias would not hold due to its fallibility to return cities to Sparta and Athens . Although the ends were clearly defined, to acquire Sicily to expand the Athenian empire, they were derived under false pretenses and required considerable means to …show more content…

In this regard, Athens failed. Athens was not prepared to conduct warfare against an unknown opponent. Athens was unsure of how fervent the Syracusans would fight having never faced them in battle. Little was known about the terrain of Sicily and where it was vulnerable . In the face of uncertainty, a sensible military leader would heavily weight his attacking force. Mass becomes the crucial factor to ensure victory is achieved. Athens had trouble in formulating a military strategy to guarantee success. The three Athenian generals had differing opinions in dispatching Syracuse. Alcibiades pursued a path of alliance followed by attacking the dissenters, Lamachus favored a surprise attack on Syracuse to crush political will, and Nicias preferred a demonstrative show of force to deter Syracuse from further action . Each of these actions required varying levels of means from lowest to highest concentrations of military force. An unclear, disjointed strategy cannot be adequately resourced. Nicias realized this early on in preparing for the Sicilian campaign, and had thus heavily weighted the Athenian military in the pursuit of the campaign . The military was appropriately resourced to execute each of the three Generals’ strategies, but at a great cost. For success and holding Sicily, the Athenian military would most likely

Open Document