The Peloponnesian War was between the Greek cities of Athens and Sparta due to the growing tensions that continued to grow between the two cities that eventually came to a breaking point. The Peloponnesian War, which can be divided into three phases known as: The Archidamian War, The Sicilian Expedition and The Decelean War, is one of the greatest event in Greek history and an analysis of the causes and effects of this war will give us a better understanding for how the cities of Athens and Sparta came to war and the impact it left behind.
When examining the causes for the Peloponnesian War, which was between 431-404 B.C., there are a number of causes that factored into the cause of this war. However, one of the most important causes to this war was largely due to the fact that the Spartans feared the growing power and success of Athens. The Spartans were “particularly alarmed at the growing power of Athens” (Cartwright, “Peloponnesian War”). During the Persian war in 479 BC, Athens grew fiercely strong with power with help of its many allies and continued with their no mercy attacks on Persian territories. When the Persians left Greece, Athens further enraged Sparta when they built large and tall walls around its empire in the event of an attack, which was mostly thought to be from Sparta if it happened.
In the years following the Persian Wars in 479 B.C., Athens had come out on top being the most dominantly powerful of any Greek city with a navy that had superior strength that increased day by day. The Athenians “ruled with heavy-handed, even brutal force as well as with reason” (Kagan 2). This was due largely to the fact that Athens had a stable and effective government, which only increased their advantage in proving themselv...
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... 371 B.C. Sparta faced a critically wounding loss against Thebes. Eventually, all of Sparta’s empire would be destroyed when Philip II of Macedon conquered all of Greece, due to its instability, which “made them vulnerable to a takeover by Macedonia several decades later” (C.S “The Peloponnesian War”.)
The causes of the Peloponnesian War proved to be too great between the tension-filled stubborn Greek city-states of Athens and Sparta. As Thucydides says in Karl Walling’s article, “Never had so many human beings been exiled, or so much human blood been shed” (4). The three phases of the war, which again, are the Archidamian war, the Sicilian Expedition and the Decelean war, show the events that followed the causes of the war, while also showing the forthcoming detrimental effects that eventually consumed both Athens and eventually Sparta effectively reshaping Greece.
The effects of this go far beyond the imbalance of military power between Athens and her tributaries, however. The Old Oligarch lists four main areas where the existence of the Empire benefits the common people of Athens, thus giving impetus to radicalize democracy and justify the expansion and strengthening of the Empire, and giving is reason to find an ongoing justification for its existence. The first is the building of the disproportionately large Athenian navy. Second is the overall flattening of the Athenian social pyramid, raising the relative status of the lowest classes of society, and exemplified by the way that Athens becomes a magnet for aliens to live and work, and gives unusual freedom and opportunity to slaves. Third is that the allies are compelled to have their court cases tried in Athenian courts, bringing both prestige and financial reward to Athens. Finally, the centralizing effect of these things, and the obvious maritime nature of the Empire, make Athens a trading center, m...
The French Revolution, the American Civil War, the constant civil conflicts in certain parts of Africa in recent history and even today; these are all historical clashes of countrymen. They all also contain stories of immense atrocities. The violence, bloodshed, and ruthlessness that were seen throughout these events were appalling. They were made perhaps even more so by the fact that theses horrors were inflicted upon one another by countrymen, brothers and sisters, fathers and mothers. The civil war or stasis at Corcyra during the Peloponnesian War was no different. This paper will detail the events surrounding the conflict and attempt to give scope to it as a mirror into the rest of the conflict.
In the book Hanson presents that the Peloponnesian war was started and so savagely pursued by Sparta and her allies due to their fear of Athens’ military strength and idealism. This fear caused the cataclysmic collapse
Thucydides set out to narrate the events of what he believed would be a great war—one requiring great power amassed on both sides and great states to carry out. Greatness, for Thucydides, was measured most fundamentally in capital and military strength, but his history delves into almost every aspect of the war, including, quite prominently, its leaders. In Athens especially, leadership was vital to the war effort because the city’s leaders were chosen by its people and thus, both shaped Athens and reflected its character during their lifetimes. The leaders themselves, however, are vastly different in their abilities and their effects on the city. Thucydides featured both Pericles and Alcibiades prominently in his history, and each had a distinct place in the evolution of Athenian empire and the war it sparked between Athens and Sparta. Pericles ascended to power at the empire’s height and was, according to Thucydides, the city’s most capable politician, a man who understood fully the nature of his city and its political institutions and used his understanding to further its interests in tandem with his own. After Pericles, however, Thucydides notes a drastic decline in the quality of Athenian leaders, culminating in Alcibiades, the last major general to be described in The Peloponnesian War. While he is explicit in this conclusion, he is much more reticent regarding its cause. What changed in Athens to produce the decline in the quality of its leadership?
Dating back to 449 B.C., Sparta and Athens always had an alliance, but as time grew that balance slowly began to fall as one felt threatened by another. Before any sight of unsteadiness the Spartans and Athenians had a bound partnership. Beginning after their domination of the Persian war, the two states slowly became aware of one another’s growing power. More time went by, and the Spartans began to grow conscious of the other states, feeling wary and paranoid around them (Fox, 170). No state was particularly to blame for the strain on their peace treaty, nor for the war, it came as the two states developed. Eventually the two states had clashed enough and declared war. Although the Spartans gave the Athenians a chance to back down and temporarily stall war, the two states would never be equal, their allies resented one another far too much. The growing urge for power was bound to take over sooner or later. Finally, after 7 years of uneasy tension, Sparta could wait no longer and declared war against Athens (Fox, 167). Although the Athenians and Spartans lived together in peace for so long, they existed in a fragile balance that was bound to eventually lead to war.
Thucydides sets down the development of the relationship between the power of Athens and Sparta in the Archeology. Athens emerges from the Persian Wars as the undisputed commercial superpower in Greece. Where Sparta is located in the fertile Peloponnesus, and is thus able to sustain itself on agriculture alone, making trade unnecessary and allowing it to maintain its own laws and customs for “more than four hundred years” (I.18.1), Athens’ infertile land forces it to turn to olive oil for revenue, and it consequently develops a flourishing trade economy even before the Darius set his sights on Greece. The Persian invasion itself makes a sea power out of Athens, allowing it to establish a Mediterranean empire, and export its culture and government to the rest of Greece (I.18.2, I.6.3). This serves to unify the scattered Ionian and Doric cities under the umbrella of the Hellenes culturally where the Spartan campaign to remove tyrants unifies it politically by giving Greeks relative freedom and subordinating it uniformly to the law, and the joint coalition against the Persians ultimately secured it militarily (I.
While Simon Hornblower acknowledges the limitations of the alliance, he is perhaps the strongest proponent of the importance of Persia’s financial support. He recognizes that Sparta’s victory at Notion in 407 was as much the result of poor Athenian leadership as Persian money, and that this financial backing did not prevent the disastrous loss at Arginusai the following year. Despite these statements, Hornblower is adamant that “The Peloponnesian War had been won because of Persian money.” P.F. Rhodes continues this reasoning in A History of the Classical Greek World, 478-323. He contends that Persia’s assistance helped Sparta effectively combat Athens at sea, and allowed them to remain engaged until Athens could no longer continue. These theories all center around the question of why Sparta won the war. However, if we flip our perspective and examine why Athens lost the war, Persia’s money becomes considerably less significant. It is to this examination that we now turn our
Athens was an important contributor to the Persian wars. Its tremendous naval power along with their smart and innovative leaders, Miltiades and Themistocles, brought victory in situations which had thought to be impossible. An example of this is the battle at Marathon during the second invasion. The Athenians met the Persian?s large army among the hills, where their cavalry would ineffective, which was their strongest quality. Miltiades, informed by some Ionians that the Persian cavalry was absent, convinced Callimachus to strike. The battle had resulted in a win for Athens, without the help of Sparta and showed the superiority of the Greek hoplites compared to their Persian counterparts. Miltiades, knowing that the Persian?s strongest troops were placed in the middle and absence of cavalry, devised a strategy to encircle their enemy by strengthening their wings. This strategy is what brought victory, and in turn, was a moral victory for the Athens and eradicated the impression that Persians were unbeatable. Th...
The book written by Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, contains two controversial debates between distinguished speakers of Athens. The two corresponding sides produce convincing arguments which can be taken as if produced as an honest opinion or out of self-interest. The two debates must be analyzed separately in order to conclude which one and which side was speaking out of honest opinion or self-interest, as well as which speakers are similar to each other in their approach to the situation.
The roots of the Peloponnesian war can be traced long before 431 BCE, when it officially started. It can be traced back to as early as the Persian Wars, where the Athenians had found their home burned by the hands of the Persians. That disaster left the Athenians with no home and no sanctuary. Even though that was a defeated battle amidst a victorious war, they still had reason to believe that the Persians will come back for more. Apprehensive at the thought of having their city burned yet another time, the Athenians knew they had to do something. Naturally, they chose to get help. Gathering up the neighboring city-states around them, the Athenians formed the Delian League; an alliance working directly to defend the whole of Greece from Persian attacks (Kagan 8). In the beginning, this worked out well; everybody got their say on what went on in the league, and everybody was satisfied. However, the Athenians saw that if they were to take more power, the members of the league would not be strong enough to resist. Therefore, that was exactly what they did; they took more and more power until what was the Delian League became the Athenian Empire (Kagan 8). As they grew even more powerful and wealthy, their neighbors of Sparta and the Peloponnesian League, Sparta's alliance, could not help but notice (Kagan 13). In 431 BCE, lighted b...
In Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War, Pericles commends the ergon of Athenian heroes, which has placed them in the realm of logos, while directing the Athenians to follow these ideals of logos. The maintenance and continued success of Athens' political establishment relies on the prevalence of polis, rationality and discourse over family, emotion and reckless action. However, the indiscriminate turns of fate and fortune, often place logos in opposition with the base, primal nature of ergon. Both Thucydides and Sophocles recognize that when logos conflicts with the unexpected ergon, the preservation of rationality and unanimity among the citizens of the polis depend on the leadership of a single honest leader. In the History of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides presents Pericles as a man of logos, whom Athens needs to achieve its full potential as an empire and later to rescue her from disaster. Likewise, Sophocles presents Theseus, in Oedipus Colonus, as the perfect successor of Pericles, who returns Athens to its former glory before the end of the war. In these two examples, we see that the dominance of logos over ergon within a polis lies in the ability and logos of the city’s current leader.
In this essay, I am going to anaylise the Peloponnesian War. I will look at what appears to have caused the war, how it developed, and what the outcome of it was. As Thucydides is virtually the only surviving primary source of this event, I will also discuss the man and his method.
The Peloponnesian War (431-404 B.C.) was a conflict between the Athenian Empire and the Peloponnesian League led by Sparta that resulted in the end of the Golden Age of Athens. The events of the war were catalogued by the ancient historian Thucydides in The History of the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides’ writings showed the ancient Greek belief that there is a parallel between the city-state and the character of its citizens; in order for the city-state to be successful, its citizens must be virtuous. Thucydides did not believe that the true cause of the Peloponnesian War were the immediate policies of the Athenian Empire against the city-states in the Peloponnesian League but rather the fundamental differences in the character of the two city-states
The Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica. "Peloponnesian War (ancient Greek History)."Encyclopedia Britannica Online. Encyclopedia Britannica, 24 Dec. 2013. Web. 05 Apr. 2014
Beginning in 492 B.C., a series of wars erupted, appropriately entitled the Persian Wars, which lasted around thirteen years. Because of the constant battles between the Persians, led by Xerxes, and Greece, both civilization started growing weaker and weaker. When the wars ended, the Greeks were successful at defeating the Persians. However, being in a weakened state caused the Greek city- states (mainly Athens against Sparta) to fight amongst themselves in order to have more influence over the rest of the city-states. This type of war was termed the Peloponnesian War and continued from 431B.C. to 404 B.C. (History of Greece:The Golden Age of Greece) and