Identity Conditions for Indicator State Types within Dretske's Theory of
Psychological Content Naturalization
ABSTRACT: Within the context of Dretske’s theory of psychological content naturalization, as laid out in Explaining Behavior, the concept of an indicator state type plays a pivotal role. Providing a general (and non-circular) description of the identity conditions for being a token of an indicator state type is a prerequisite for the ultimate success of Dretske’s theory. However, Dretske fails to address this topic. Thus, his theory is incomplete. Several different approaches for specifying these identity conditions are possible; however, each is inadequate.
Of the various theories for psychological content naturalization put forward within the past two decades, I believe that a Dretske-style approach that explains the content of a mental state in terms of the causal history of past tokens of that state holds out the most promise of giving us a workable theory describing the role that content plays in learned behavior. While I favor this general approach, the particular theory laid out by Dretske in Explaining Behavior has a shortcoming that must be addressed before his theory can be applied to real systems: Dretske fails to provide an analysis of identity conditions for being a token of an indicator state type. The shortcoming is serious because of the critical role that past tokens of an indicator type play in fixing the content of a current token of the indicator type — without identity conditions, there is no way to specify which previously tokened states among the many that have been instantiated during the learning period of the organism are of that indicator type.
I begin with a very brief review of Dretske's theory from Explaining Behavior. Some organisms possess indicator states (i.e., internal states that indicate whether some external conditions hold). For example, organism O may token an instance of I (the internal indicator state type) whenever external conditions F obtain. Prior to learning, I indicates F does not mean F. Let's suppose that external conditions F are relevant in some manner to O's continued functioning, perhaps because environments in which F obtains are environments that are relatively inhospitable for O. Let's also suppose that O is capable of learning using reinforcement information (via operant conditioning), such that future tokenings of I come to cause movements that are appropriate to conditions F. (My use the evaluative term "appropriate" here rests on two assumptions: (1)
Behaviorist identify mental states with dispositions. A mental state is identical when, given the same inputs the disposition toward a particular output in the same. Unlike functionalism, behaviorism recognizes dispositions according to merely outward behavior. Alternatively, a functional system includes a typical behavioral outputs given a range of inputs, as well as a tendency to experience a property of a mental state. Functionalists want to individuate mental states causally, but since mental states have mental effects, functionalist advance on behaviorism by acknowledging some similar input and output systems have similar descriptions without entailing similar mental effects. Functionalism, as an advancement of behaviorism, also describes the function of the mental state.
Genetic phenomenology is Husserl's philosophical successor to his earlier eidetic phenomenology; it represents the highest development in Husserl's project. Husserl's eidetic phenomenology holds that both the structure of intentional acts and the intentional object are given (Detmer 165). Husserl later comes to doubt the givenness in eidetic phenomenology; these structures and objects of consciousness must have developed throughout history (Detmer 166). This is the process of sedimentation: patterns of understanding and expectations gradually influence later experiences (Zahavi 94). Intentional acts themselves have eidetic structures that are not immediately given; they must be analyzed if the phenomenological project is to continue. A close
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Fodor develops the idea of functionalism by combining certain parts of logical behaviorism and the central-state identity theory. From logical behaviorism, Fodor incorporates the idea that mental processes can be represented by physical if-then statements. As such, behavior and mental causation are no longer distinct and unable to interact. Also, logical behaviorism provides a way for mental causes to interact with other mental causes. This, in turn, may result in a behavioral effect. The last point is also a characteristic of the central-state identity theory. One doctrine of the central-state identity theory is called "token physicalism." Token physicalism states that all mental states that currently exist are neurophysiological. Thus, token physicalism does not place physical restrictions on the type of substance capable of having mental properties. When the points of logical behaviorism and the central-state identity theory, as described here, are combined, functionalism is the result. The theory of functionalism supposes that a m...
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Currently, physician-assisted suicide is illegal. Through numerous court cases, the United States Supreme Court acknowledged the fact that people have the constitutional “right to die.” The Court also realized that ass...
Learning in its most basic form is our minds associating one thing with another. Digging deeper reveals that there are trends in how human beings and animals learn by association, usually this is done by a brain connecting one event to another. The two different ways a brain tends to learn is through either classical conditioning or operant conditioning. Classical conditioning is learning to associate one stimulus with another stimulus, and Operant Conditioning is learning by associating a response or behavior with a consequence. Knowing how people and animals learn is an important piece of knowledge if one is to help benefit the greater good.
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Non-cyclic information by implication identifies with control, in the same way as setup and diagnostics.
Therefore, according to the above a general process learning theory is sustainable even in the presence of biological constraints as behaviour can be reinforced and manipulated in most cases to acquire a desired behaviour.
Behaviorism is the point of view where learning and behavior are described and explained in terms of stimulus-response relationships. Behaviorists agree that an individual’s behaviors is a result of their interaction with the environment. Feedback, praise and rewards are all ways people can respond to becoming conditioned. The focus is on observable events instead of events that happen in one’s head. The belief that learning has not happened unless there is an observable change in behavior. “The earliest and most Ardent of behaviourists was Watson (1931; Medcof and Roth, 1991; Hill 1997). His fundamental conclusion from many experimental observations of animal and childhood learning was that stimulus-response (S-R) connections are more likely to be established the more frequently or recently an S-R bond occurs. A child solving a number problem might have to make many unsuccessful trials before arriving at the correct solution” (Childs, 2004).