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For the outside observers it is still difficult and complicated to distinguish Iran’s program as the rightful development of nuclear technology (as Iranian authority’s claim) or the building of nuclear weapons (as the outside world’s suspicion) (Chubin, and Litwak, 2003).

Iran’s nuclear program has started since the realm of Shah in the 1970s and slowly developed till today, but during its builds of nuclear facilities the Shah also signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1968 (Khan, 2010). At the same time, Tehran has continuously called for a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East, such as Shah’s initiative to the UN General Assembly in 1974 and Islamic Republic’s advocation in 1986 (Pirseyedi, 2013). Despite the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in June 2003 officially revealed that Iran has violated its obligation for not reporting its secret storage of nuclear material and the process of uranium enrichment, however, none of these reports from IAEA has officially accused Iran for violating the NPT or proved it being weaponizing its nuclear program (Chubin, and Litwak, 2003).

Tehran’s ambiguities have been considered by many scholars as part of its ‘Nuclear Dual Policy’ (Khan, 2010): at one hand, Iran has declared continuously on its policy advocating the global or regional abolition of nuclear weapons (Pirseyedi, 2013); but on the other hand it has insisted its program of high level uranium enrichment and secretly built the heavy-water reactors in order to keep its nuclear alive (Khan, 2010).

This Dual Policy, if indeed the Iranian regime is advancing for the bomb, could have been ended in three different outcome:

Nuclear Weapon Testing: Iran would eventually test its n...

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...e deterrence power of nuclear weapons but avoid violation of the NPT and direct confrontation with the international society (Waltz, 2012). However, as Saira Khan has indicated, the key point of nuclear deterrence and prestige is ‘a function of crossing the nuclear threshold and acknowledge of the possession of nuclear capacity’. If Iran could not show its opaque warhead ‘clear enough’ to the world, then this opacity is of no use in providing prestige for Iran (Khan, 2010).

The different approaches to build its nuclear capability would directly impact Iran’s position to the Middle East and vise versa. A blunt and aggressive declaration of the nuclear capability of Iran would no surprise provoke hostile responses from the region, but a more reserved opacity attitude might also impact the political reality in the Middle East as well as the power balance of the world.

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