Petraeus Mission Command

Petraeus’ Mosul

The exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders is the Army’s book definition of mission command (ADRP 6-0, 2012). This theory empowers subordinate leaders with the ability to exercise disciplined initiative to execute unified land operations. The philosophy of the term fosters an environment of mutual trust and encourages a staff and subordinates to accept prudent risk, so that delays in communication do not hinder the ability to seize opportunities. The warfighting functional aspect of mission command deals specifically with systems and tasks that enable a commander to balance command and control of other warfighting capabilities. This is important because commanders and their staff seek to

Commanders that serve in a forward deployed environment inherit a greater duty to perform under more pressure, while adhering to six additional principles. The principles of mission command are Build Cohesive Teams through Mutual Trust, Create Shared Understanding, Provide Clear Commander’s Intent, Exercise Disciplined Initiative, Use Mission Orders, and Accept Prudent Risk (ADRP 6-0, 2012). Major General David Petraeus took command of the 101st Airborne Division in 2002. In March 2003, he was leading the division into Iraq. He built his team on mutual trust, having two of three maneuver brigade commanders previously serve together in Bosnia, Kosovo, and stateside (Atkinson, 2007). The 18,000-Soldier force shared an understanding based on Petraeus’ intent and their mission orders. The remaining principles would come to the forefront, following the

Petraeus began to conduct another reconnaissance. One that included rebuilding the province from the ground up. He was well aware of the public opinion of the United States, but Major General Petraeus saw no reason how he could avoid committing to conducting stability operations, having taken on the task just a year earlier in Kosovo (Dickey, 2004). Ideally, a civilian entity, known as the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), would manage post-conflict rebuilding, but no one anticipated the swiftness of the invasion. Major General Petraeus and his staff devised a strategy with “three goals: provide a secure environment, restore basic life services, and facilitate a return to normalcy” (Lundberg, 2006). Along with the aforementioned goals, Petraeus established several priorities of work, including restoring public safety forces, food distribution, water and electricity, and the reopening of schools. He was most interested in providing Mosul with a stable and functioning government (PBS,