Mission Command Analysis

In 1943 the British and American Allies shared a common language and a common enemy, but they disagreed on the war’s grand strategy. (site) These strategic differences culminated in the Sicily Campaign, with Allied command and control exercise by Allied Commander, General Eisenhower, failed to employ the three essential attributes of mission command: commander’s intent, full understanding, and mutual trust among partners, as discussed in General Dempsey’s white paper. These failures in Mission Command also limited the Allies’ ability to effectively integrate the vital joint functions like Fires, Maneuver, and Protection. This essay will evaluate the Allies’ Command and Control and the other vital Joint Functions and expound on General Eisenhower

Early in the operations Alexander’s vague commander’s intent encouraged Patton to develop an independent understanding, different from Alexander’s, to the point that he assumed he would push north, beyond phase line blue, along with Montgomery to protect his flank all the way to Messina. (site) Mission Command crises culminated when General Alexander shifted the boundaries between the 7th and 8th Armies.(site) Alexander made his decision based on lack of trust in the 7th Army and his own clouded commander’s intent and incomplete understanding of the follow-on effects of a quick capture of Messina. His decision denied the Allies an opportunity to execute a quick breakout through the Axis defenses. But more importantly, it motivated General Patton to abandon his disciplined initiative and ignored Alexander’s directive to push north to protect Montgomery’s flank. Instead, he drove to Palermo seeking to reclaim this army’s prestige and later with a secure port of Palermo beat Montgomery to Messina. (site) The Allies’ poor foundation of Mission Command delayed a promising advance and replaced it with a rogue commander this allowed the German General Hube, a very competent combatant, time to concentrate and consolidate his forces to stiffen his defensive positions to delay the Allies until he was able to evacuate the bulk of his forces

(site) In many ways the Allied Navy’s execution Movement and Maneuver provides a model of join function inconsistency during Operation Husky. First, Task Force 88 a Joint amphibious task force designed to conduct amphibious operations to outflank the German defensive positions provides an excellent foreshadow of modern joint doctrine and proved useful to Patton’s drive to Messina. (site) Stands in contrast with perhaps the greatest joint failure of the campaign. True to the nature of Husky, the Navy refused to operate in the restricted waters of the Strait of Messina. This greatly aided the Axis retreat form