The Allied forces failed to leverage command and control with joint fires to achieve a decisive victory in Sicily. The ability to provide operational sustainment to the force ensured eventual success over the Axis forces. Alexander wasted an opportunity to gain a position of relative advantage over the Axis forces by failing to contain Axis forces in Sicily. This failure stemmed from not synchronizing and integrating all joint functions and utilizing effective command and control.
The essay addresses the dysfunctional command and control of Allied Forces Headquarters (AFHQ) at the various levels of leadership that permitted an orderly withdrawal of Axis forces. It will evaluate the command and control aspects of the Allied leadership by evaluating
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Alexander demonstrates this by failing to provide a clear Commander’s Intent to his planning staff prior to the operation. This failure created a dilemma for planners, forcing them to assume the Commander’s Intent based on limited guidance. Alexander does not provide purpose, key tasks, or an end state throughout the course of the operation. Clark highlights Alexander’s inability to provide intent and the “grand scale strategic plan for the campaign.” Axis leadership demonstrated a clear Commander’s Intent to Hube with the task of delaying the Allies and the preservation of combat power for the defense of Italy. Providing a clear Commander’s Intent empowers subordinate leaders to achieve success and not lose the initiative.
Actions in North Africa created mistrust in the ability of American forces by the British leadership. Alexander’s lack of trust in American ground forces prevented coordination horizontally and vertically in the planning of Operation HUSKY. The component chiefs distrust to provide control of resources to other components created the inability to seize the opportunities to destroy the Axis forces with joint forces. Alexander’s failure to control his subordinate ground commanders allowed the 15th Army Group to fight an uncoordinated attack providing the Axis time to
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The failure to mass air power over the landings and conduct a deep attack demonstrated the lack of understanding by Air Force leaders. Allied Air forces consistently allowed Axis forces to establish multiple defensive perimeters unopposed. An Allied plan to coordinated strategic bombing and air interdiction would have disrupted critical enablers for defensive operations.
Naval fires, although incorporated into the operation, failed to achieve the synchronization with the Air Force to mass effects across time and space. Naval fires proved decisive for success in retaining the beachheads but the Navy failed to incorporate the two aircraft carriers for the operation. The lack of a fires rehearsal with all the components, the inability to visualize the effects across the area of operation, resulted in unsynchronized joint fires to support the ground forces. Despite the failures in most joint functions, the Allies did excel in
COL Prescott’s role in the Battle of Bunker Hill, or more correctly know as the Battle of Breed’s Hill, is a great example of how to properly execute mission command. An overview from The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour (Moncure) reveals a number of operation and strategic objectives that the American militia had to consider. In this instance, COL Prescott takes charge of 1200 men with instructions to defend against incoming British forces that were seeking to occupy the surrounding hills during the Siege of Boston campaign. COL Prescott utilized a variety of steps in the operations process that contributed to his expert utilization of mission command over his forces. Through various sources from published works by experts on the subject, COL Prescott’s mission command demonstrates its effectiveness in his understanding of the situation against the British, his visualization to create an end state for t...
It is far easier for us in the present than it was for those at Gettysburg, to look back and determine the path that the leaders should have taken. As students, studying battles such as this, we have the advantage of hindsight, knowing the outcome. Nonetheless, we can still learn valuable lessons from it. To do so, this analysis will explore some of the decisions of the leaders at Gettysburg, and how they were affected by the operational variables. This essay will scrutinize some of the leaders at Gettysburg, and the impact of their actions. The outcome of this analysis will show that what was true in 1863 is still true today. While many variables are vital to a successful army on the battlefield, none should be neglected. Each variable discussed in this examination will prove to be important, but the information battle will be paramount in the battle of Gettysburg.
With careful planning, co-operation, good leadership and courage, Currie managed to bring out the characteristics of a well thought out success at Vimy Ridge in April of 1917 (Dancocks, 1985). Sir Arthur Currie’s responsibility was to command the 1st Canadian Division (Hyatt, 1987). He pushed his troops to undergo rigorous training and to prepare themselves by using a life-size course, with every trench marked by tape and a flag (Dancocks, 1985). Currie designed very accurate maps and he had a small-scale plasticine model built so that it could be studied by all soldiers. Arthur Currie insisted that his division’s knowledge of the enemy was excellent (Dancocks, 1985).
Even though German high commanders have received much praise, they relied on the ability of senior German generals. Many commanders lacked ideas for victory and often were indecisive which led to unwillingness of using modern technology and resources to conduct a successful war effort. Commanders had little understanding on what was really needed; many only thought more men would successfully defeat the allied forces, along with an increase in firepower all which strained the troubled home nation. Not only did the war effort rely on the efficiency of the army and armed forces, but it also relied on the homefront. The German homefront felt the brunt of the war and the British naval blockade was not helping.
In order to receive a victory in the Battle of the Bulge, General Patton used Mission Command Analysis in order to understand how he can be successful for this mission. The first thing of understanding t...
Throughout the battle, you see numerous Army Values and Warrior Ethos being used. “I will never leave a fallen comrade”, was the etho used the most, to reach the separated platoon. The battle also shows that not all tactical orders are effective, but as a leader you must never second guess yourself.
The positions that were held by the Americans were enviable, the line between the two Axis forces; von Arnim’s army in the north and Rommel’s in the south-central, were stretched thin and weak. The center of the Allied Forces with a significant strike would be able to pierce the defenses on the coastlines and separate them all the way to Sfax. The joint forces manned the line from the northern parts of the country to the south, with the British military undoubtedly the most prepared of the joint forces. The American military marched along with the joint forces all the way through the country of Algeria to gain control and hold strategic battle positions on the eastern part of Tunisia Dorsal Mountains. The American Army had never before engaged in any major encounters with the Germans, who would later be nicknamed “the first team”. The lack of experience will prevail once Von Angrnim’s army in the north attacks the center of the Allied Forces. A line that was enforced by the French and the American Forces failed to come to the aid of the French. The Joint Forces were not impressed by the lack of actions and effort the American Forces had shown, which created doubts within the British and French forces about their Allies of the New World. The lack of training on the maneuver and tactical side of the operations, not only left the American Forces
Early in the operations Alexander’s vague commander’s intent encouraged Patton to develop an independent understanding, different from Alexander’s, to the point that he assumed he would push north, beyond phase line blue, along with Montgomery to protect his flank all the way to Messina. (site) Mission Command crises culminated when General Alexander shifted the boundaries between the 7th and 8th Armies.(site) Alexander made his decision based on lack of trust in the 7th Army and his own clouded commander’s intent and incomplete understanding of the follow-on effects of a quick capture of Messina. His decision denied the Allies an opportunity to execute a quick breakout through the Axis defenses. But more importantly, it motivated General Patton to abandon his disciplined initiative and ignored Alexander’s directive to push north to protect Montgomery’s flank. Instead, he drove to Palermo seeking to reclaim this army’s prestige and later with a secure port of Palermo beat Montgomery to Messina. (site) The Allies’ poor foundation of Mission Command delayed a promising advance and replaced it with a rogue commander this allowed the German General Hube, a very competent combatant, time to concentrate and consolidate his forces to stiffen his defensive positions to delay the Allies until he was able to evacuate the bulk of his forces
The failure of the Bay of Pigs Invasion was due to a lack of planned strategy, miscommunication, and mismanagement of planning. Between these three components, the invasion was bound to come to an abrupt halt and even an impending failure. Even with the backup plans set in forth by the Presidential Administration, their intentions seemed to backfire when Castro’s Intelligence Forces knew well before hand about the near attack that the President Kennedy had set in motion.
Now for Britain?s leadership skills they acted slowly only when the troops were ready for the assault. Even though they had their tactical advantages, the president ordered not to use them. (Roberts 111)
It began to emerge the differences in tactics. The question was whether to continue so far the Supreme Allied Commander of the Allied Forces Europe, General Eisenhower’s tactics attacking on a broad front, or due to problems of supply to take just one mighty blow. In that period Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery developed a new operation plan, which would include the use of 1st Airborne Army (Lieutenant General Lewis H. Brereton), actually 1st Airborne Corps (Lieutenant General Frederick Browning). The Corps comprised of 82nd US Airborne Division (Brigadier General James M. Gavin), 101st US Airborne Division (Major General Maxwell D. Taylor), and 1st British Airborne Division (Major General Robert “Roy” E. Urquhart) supported with, under his command, 1st Polish Independent Parachute Brigade (Major General Stanislaw Sosabowski). These units should be dropped along the roa...
Successful leadership on a battlefield can be measured in different ways. It is possible for a good, successful leader to lose a battle. Conversely, it is possible for an ineffective leader to win a battle, given the right circumstances. What distinguishes a successful leader from an unsuccessful one is his/her ability to oversee an operation using effective mission command. In ADP 6-0, mission command as a philosophy is defined as “as the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations” (ADP, 1). William Henry Harrison, Governor of the Indiana Territory, executed good mission command in the Battle of Tippecanoe because of his ability to effectively utilize the doctrinal tasks of “understand, visualize, describe, direct, and lead” operations.
Have you heard of a man named Alexander the Great, the famous historical figure? There are many amazing stories about him explaining the courageous things he had accomplished. However, if you learn more about him and his accomplishments you will soon realized the real person Alexander was. Alexander the Great, ruler of his empire was in fact not great as his title states. The definition of great is a person who shows concern for others, has leadership and shows intelligence. Alexander didn’t show any of these characteristics therefore he doesn’t deserve the title of “great”.
A defined chain of command with equal representation from all the armed services coupled with standardized clear communication and training throughout the branches, results in an elite fighting force with endless capabilities. Efficiency is the major goal behind Joint Warfare and so long as the clear channels of communication throughout the services hold true, this goal is attainable. This efficiency, though almost impossible to fully achieve, was seen during Desert Storm. During the Desert Storm campaign, General Schwarztkopf was Commander and Chief of US Central Command (USCINCCENT). His first order of business was to name component commanders.
Alexander the Great is hailed, by most historians, as “The Great Conqueror” of the world in the days of ancient Mesopotamia. “Alexander III of Macedon, better known as Alexander the Great, single-handedly changed the nature of the ancient world in little more than a decade. Alexander was born in Pella, the ancient capital of Macedonia in July 356 BCE. His parents were Philip II of Macedon and his wife Olympias. Philip was assassinated in 336 BCE and Alexander inherited a powerful yet volatile kingdom. He quickly dealt with his enemies at home and reasserted Macedonian power within Greece. He then set out to conquer the massive Persian Empire” (Web, BBC History). It is important to note, which will maybe explain his brutal actions, that Alexander was only twenty years old when he became the king of Macedonia. “When he was 13, Philip hired the Greek philosopher Aristotle to be Alexander’s personal tutor. During the next three years Aristotle gave Alexander training in rhetoric and literature and stimulated his interest in science, medicine, and philosophy, all of which became of importance in Alexander’s later life” (Web, Project of History of Macedonia). “In, 340, when Philip assembled a large Macedonian army and invaded Thrace, he left his 16 years old son with the power to rule Macedonia in his absence as regent, but as the Macedonian army advanced deep into Thrace, the Thracian tribe of Maedi bordering north-eastern Macedonia rebelled and posed a danger to the country. Alexander assembled an army, led it against the rebels, and with swift action defeated the Maedi, captured their stronghold, and renamed it after himself to Alexandropolis. Two years later in 338 BC, Philip gave his son a commanding post among the senior gener...