Medical Law Research Paper

ISSUES:

Under what conditions may an adult reject an emergency medical treatment, especially due to religious concerns?

Under what conditions may a minor object to an emergency medical treatment, especially due to religious concerns?

DISCUSSION:

Adults

Where Competent

Generally speaking, a competent adult may reject any medical treatment. This power emerges from their common law right, First Amendment religious right via the Fourteenth Amendment. Important to Illinois’ law, the common law right to refuse medical treatment and the “religious right to refuse treatment, which is based upon the free-exercise clause of the first amendment (U.S. Const., amend. I)” are separate rights. Curtis v. Jaskey, 326 Ill.App.3d 90, 99 (2001) (citing In

Of the right to competent self-determination “No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.” In re Estate of Longeway, 133 Ill.2d 33, 44 (1989) (quoting Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)). The preservation of life is meant to aid the State is determining the desires of the patient. Specifically, the court should only consider the desires of the patient alone excluding the consideration of others under this interest. In re Brown, 294 Ill.App.3d 159, 172 (1997) (explaining that appointing a GAL for a fetus before birth that could benefit from blood transfusions being refused by the mother was improper because only the rights of the decision maker are considered).

The State’s interest in the prevention of suicide is strong but limited. It is not to be used where the choice of the patient is merely to withdraw from a treatment regimen. In re Estate of Greenspan, 137 Ill. 2d 1, 17 (1990) (citing Hodgman & Frazer, Withholding Life Support Treatment in Illinois, 73 Ill.B.J. 106, 108 (1984)). Additionally, there is no prevention of suicide interest where a patient agrees

In two cases, decided three years apart, blood transfusions were decided to be invasive and therefore greatly violative of bodily integrity. In re Brown, 294 Ill.App.3d 159, 171 (1997). Logically this would cause the parens patrie power of the State to be less effective. However, Brown has not been cited for the blood transfusion determination since it was handed down. It even conflicts with a case in the same appellate district that found blood transfusions to be a “relatively non-invasive and risk-free procedure” especially as compared to a caesarean section. In re Baby Boy Doe, 260 Ill.App.3d 392, 402 (1994). While the case law is conflicting, giving grounds for a judge to possibly choose between the determinations, Baby Boy Doe did leave the determination of whether or not a non-invasive blood transfusion may be forced upon a religiously objecting person by a court. Id. Depending on how the court wishes to proceed, Brown might have answered that