Falklands And Malvinas Essay

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The 1982 Falklands/Malvinas dispute between Great Britain and Argentina was inevitable because the two nations had such different views and priorities on land sovereignty. Britain’s constant postponements and withdrawals on conceding Argentina sovereignty over the land strengthened Argentinian feelings of nationalism and undermined any and all intentions of peaceful negotiations. The only plausible way that Argentina could have been convinced to withdraw before war broke out would have been during the initial stages of conflict. The only convincing tactic against Argentina would have been using force, but “a costly defence commitment to some remote imperial outpost” was the last thing either party wanted (37).
Both parties believed they had a rightful, historical claim over the Falkland Islands previous to 1982 when the conflict ensued. The United Kingdom’s justification was that an English explorer had been the first to set foot on and colonize the islands in 1690. Even when Argentinian inhabitants colonized the land in 1823, the British gradually replaced them and inhabited the land for over 150 years. In contrast, the Argentine’s claim rested on continuity from Spain, and on a 1771 Anglo-Spanish agreement where the British had made no claim of sovereignty (35). The modern history of this conflict began in 1965 with the UN’s involvement on the matter, but became prominent in 1981. The UN strongly advised that the two resolve the issue peacefully; paranoid reverberations from the Cold War were still universally existent at this time. Argentina and Britain both agreed that they did not want to combat; this was especially the case for Argentina, which was undergoing changes in power regime, and suffering from economic issues and a ...

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...suffered more as they also dealt with domestic civil unrest and imposed trade embargos on top of the Falklands/Malvinas dispute.
It was only a matter of time before Argentina finally resorted to physical action. It was impossible for this nation to renounce its sovereignty after all the time and effort it had spent on obtaining the islands, and Galtieri even admitted that he “could not withdraw both his military and his administrative presence from the Malvinas and last a week” (57). Surrendering the Malvinas would mean automatic devastation of the entire country—Argentina would never be the same as Galtieri would be overthrown from power and more civil unrest would ensue. Therefore, Argentina could not have been convinced to withdraw from war. The Argentinians did all they could to avoid war for a very long time, but there is only so much that someone can tolerate.

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