I have gone to the future, and I have seen the vast changes that will be made to the world in the next twenty-four centuries. The political nature of the current situation between Athens and Sparta of absolute power and security will be replaced by a more complex system because of technology and globalization. With the knowledge I have learned in the twenty-first century, the war would have a very different outcome. Power will still play a role in politics, but its role is very different.
War between Athens and Sparta under the current system was inevitable, as both were competing for absolute power, or to become hegemons. Because the concern was for absolute gains, the Peloponnesian War was one of limited cooperation. This is demonstrated by the violent incident in Melos. Because the Melians were neutral and not directly on the side of the Athenians, it was in the Athenians’ interest for absolute power gains to outright destroy the Melians. I have learned in the twenty-first century that such a demonstration of power is not always efficient. Instead of using hard power, Athenians could have used soft power like diplomacy, cultural exchanges, and political leadership to gain the Melians trust and support. Instead of being seen as a large power bullying a small power but as a compromiser that would gain other countries’ respect. The use of soft power is also generally much cheaper than using force. Though soft power is less tangible, it is more useful to Athens in the long run. Though Athens is at the brink of losing the Peloponnesian War against Sparta, if it had built up a repository of goodwill through its use of soft power, it would still have a lasting and important influence in world affairs.
A benefit that the twenty-first ...
... middle of paper ...
... than a small one. When the peacekeeping presence is limited, the priority is more about the safety of the forces than the safety of the citizens of the country, and unlike the limited forces, it is difficult to back a large contingent into a corner, which is what occurred for the Belgian UNAMIR troops.
The best way to solve humanitarian crises is not to send peacekeepers at all, but to send peace enforcers instead. Peace enforcers have the power to protect the oppressed victims in a way that peacekeepers do not, since peace enforcers do not have the same obligation to remain neutral. The peace enforcers can also survive with limited forces because they have the ability to overwhelm the other side and stop the conflict. Ultimately, sending peace enforcers in any number is the best option, as peacekeeping operations generally put more people at risk than they help.
Thucydides set out to narrate the events of what he believed would be a great war—one requiring great power amassed on both sides and great states to carry out. Greatness, for Thucydides, was measured most fundamentally in capital and military strength, but his history delves into almost every aspect of the war, including, quite prominently, its leaders. In Athens especially, leadership was vital to the war effort because the city’s leaders were chosen by its people and thus, both shaped Athens and reflected its character during their lifetimes. The leaders themselves, however, are vastly different in their abilities and their effects on the city. Thucydides featured both Pericles and Alcibiades prominently in his history, and each had a distinct place in the evolution of Athenian empire and the war it sparked between Athens and Sparta. Pericles ascended to power at the empire’s height and was, according to Thucydides, the city’s most capable politician, a man who understood fully the nature of his city and its political institutions and used his understanding to further its interests in tandem with his own. After Pericles, however, Thucydides notes a drastic decline in the quality of Athenian leaders, culminating in Alcibiades, the last major general to be described in The Peloponnesian War. While he is explicit in this conclusion, he is much more reticent regarding its cause. What changed in Athens to produce the decline in the quality of its leadership?
Dating back to 449 B.C., Sparta and Athens always had an alliance, but as time grew that balance slowly began to fall as one felt threatened by another. Before any sight of unsteadiness the Spartans and Athenians had a bound partnership. Beginning after their domination of the Persian war, the two states slowly became aware of one another’s growing power. More time went by, and the Spartans began to grow conscious of the other states, feeling wary and paranoid around them (Fox, 170). No state was particularly to blame for the strain on their peace treaty, nor for the war, it came as the two states developed. Eventually the two states had clashed enough and declared war. Although the Spartans gave the Athenians a chance to back down and temporarily stall war, the two states would never be equal, their allies resented one another far too much. The growing urge for power was bound to take over sooner or later. Finally, after 7 years of uneasy tension, Sparta could wait no longer and declared war against Athens (Fox, 167). Although the Athenians and Spartans lived together in peace for so long, they existed in a fragile balance that was bound to eventually lead to war.
While Sparta was “admired in peace and dreaded in war”(102), Athens was admired for their values of education and intellect. The two cities surely obtained different values and lifestyles, but did so with one ultimate goal: to attain as much power as possible, which led them to conducting drastic procedures, such as Spartan’s being trained from birth to become hoplites and Athenian girls being devalued and even eliminated from their inability to earn power. In conclusion, both cities framed their culture and system with the sole purpose of gaining power.
The stunning Greek defeat of the Persians, the specter of which lurks behind the events of the Peloponnesian Wars, was for Herodotus proof of the superiority of Hellenic form of government and way of life, and Herodotus ends his history at this pinnacle of Greek history. Thucydides then accepts the task of chronicling Greece’s unraveling from a position as the dominant power of the Mediterranean, and a center of cultural, technological, and political development to the final result of the Peloponnesian Wars—a fractured, demoralized, and dependent Greece that lies wide open to foreign conquest. This result is, for Thucydides, apparent from the beginning of the conflict. Greece can only dominate when the balance of power between Athens and Sparta is maintained, and the destruction of either is tantamount to the destruction of the whole. An accurate understanding of the national characters of Athens and Sparta makes it clear which of the two will ultimately be the victor of a long, arduous military struggle, but the same understanding of national character makes it equally apparent that the one which can dominate militarily cannot lead Greece. The speeches made at the First Lacedaemonian Congress emphasize not only the character of the two nations in conflict, but more broadly, the inevitability of Hellenic demise as a result of this conflict.
An understanding of these very different cultures is illustrative of their leaders' ultimate strategies and projections before the conflict. At the time of the war, Greece was divided into two great alliances. Sparta dominated the Peloponnesian League, an alliance in the Peloponnese region. These "allies" included small states close enough to the militant Sparta to be easily controlled; stronger (and more remote) states over which Sparta still had considerable influence; and the truly strong, independent cities of Thebes and Corinth.
One change they wish to fulfill is how they communicate locally and globally. They believe that communication is essential in achieving strategic plans effectively. In the past, ineffective communication has negatively impacted the peace keeping for a number of reasons including limited understanding of a culture or diverse views of the population. This has resulted in failures of expectations along with being unable to to sustain local support. Global communication is just as important as local communication because global communication builds public support internationally. If the media shows the conflict happening abroad, there is a better chance that the people of the world will intervene. In the documentary film, “Hotel Rwanda,” a journalist named Jack says to Paul Rusesabagina that it is not likely that people will intervene in the conflict because no one will care enough, “I think if people see this footage they 'll say, ‘Oh my God that 's horrible,’ and then go on eating their dinners.” Without global communication, people will not intervene or help out with the conflict, which is why the DPKO and DFS are aiming to develop public information activities to guarantee the awareness of information that has to do with peace keeping operations. Training and equipment is another factor in peace keeping that must be improved. Under-prepared personnel deploys to the field all the time, and as a result it often shows in challenging and remote environments. The Member States are trying to strengthen UN peace keeping’s training strategies by having experienced personnel to help. Equipment can be just as important in the field as well, it is essential to be fully equipped for building future capacity. Examples of equipment that could better the UN peace keeping strategies would be night vision equipment and naval vessels. Setting mission objectives and strategy is another change the UN plans
The arrival of multinational troops could bring more violence, destruction, and chaos to East Timor. On the other hand it could also bring protection to the many people who have fled the violence from the Indonesian Militia. Force should not have to be used to make or keep peace in any country; therefore it is not necessary for American troops to have to risk there lives trying to make peace in a country that won’t make peace until they get what they want, INDEPENDENCE. Sending troops into Dili, East Timor may help persuade the people to make peace, but it is not necessary to send all of those troops. Just a few mediators would be sufficient to help make peace. If the nations at battle would just talk they might be able to negotiate a peace treaty and there would be cooperation without more violence.
The Peloponnesian War and the Cold War are no exceptions in that they were trying to see which nation and which types of government were the best way to rule. In the Peloponnesian war, Athens and Sparta were battling over whether Athens’s democracy or Sparta’s oligarchy was the best way to rule literally. Sparta had specifically started the war over the fact Athens was expanding rapidly and Sparta wanted the Greek city states to not expand and stay in the size that they were over a century ago. In essence be the small communities that they had started out as. Sparta’s worry over the fact that Athens was growing and the fact that greatness was the measure for who was on top was a common theme during the Cold war. The Cold War was not only the space race and the arms race, but also America was trying to contain the Soviet Union’s influence over its neighbors because they feared the spread of communism. The space race and the arms race were battles of greatness during the Cold war. Not only did these races try to prove grandeur in their governments but also in many of the other aspects of their countries like industrial power, advances in science, and the importance of education. Also during the Cold War, America wanted to stop the spread of communism that was one of the main goals of the Soviets for either allies or their mission to make all the governments of the world
The human condition and its significance to International Relations have been in debate for centuries. Classical Realist thought has focused on the inherently aggressive and selfish nature of man and assumed that it is these qualities that ensure war and conflict are inevitable aspects of human society. Alternatively, neo-realism emphasises the system structure of international politics. R.J. McShea discusses the significance of the human nature tradition throughout the study of international relations. The endeavour to rid the world of the evil of war and the advancement of the conditions for peace have been developed from the assumption that the interaction of the states, and the way they ought to conduct relations among themselves, are dependent upon the nature of man. Thucydides' "History of the Peloponnesian War" is such a study of international relations. Not a philosophical work, it is considered of great importance within political and philosophical enquiry. In the "History," Thucydides attempts to disclose the underlying causes of the war between Athens and Sparta. He looks beyond the explicit clash of interest and Imperialist gains and endeavours to outline the implicit human motivations of fear, glory, and honour. The explicit motivations made war a continual threat; the implicit motivations and human interactions made it inevitable. It is this discussion within Thucydides' "history" that realists have taken as proof of his status as a founding father of realism; indeed, casual reading of the "History" may suggest this to be the case. However, it is my hypothesis that Thucydides was more optimistic of man, society and the possibility for peace. It is my intention to discuss Thucydides' assumptions of war and human na...
Considering how difficult to keep the humanitarian space in the conflict on-going place, there is a widespread belief among academic scholars that indicates insecurity for humanitarian aid workers leads shrink of humanitarian space under the civil war situation. Although public interest and budget for humanitarian aid have been growing in the world post-9/11, and following this, humanitarian space has been widened at the same time. However, it has been argued that keeping humanitarian space is still not easy to achieve. Especially in the situation of civil war, number of humanitarian aid workers lost life incidentally. Indeed many analytic researches show the evidence that humanitarian space is not declining in total. Contrary some literature highlights that a humanitarian space in particular situation such as conflict must be reduced. Especially countries such as Afghanistan and Iraq where have been struggled with the conflict for several years, keeping humanitarian space has not been so successful. In this essay, it will be argued that why humanitarian organisation must to be faced to the risk of terror and what makes so difficult to keep the humanitarian space under on-going conflict. Despite the fact that humanitarian workers see that keeping humanitarian space in the war-ongoing place is difficult, it does not necessarily mean that they should stop their aid. They sometimes face the dilemma of making assistance along with military forces but it is unavoidable in such dangerous situation. I would like to argue that flexibility and taking balance of such dilemma are important for them to continue their humanitarian activities.
When two great and powerful city-states ban together for a common cause the results will in turn will have great expectations. Those expectations were met when an undermanned Greek army defeated the large Persian Army throughout the course of the Persian War. The problem occurs when each of the city-states’ own ego gets in the way of the cause. They handily defeated the Persians, but the Athenians took the credit for it, and paid homage to themselves, through elaborate celebrations of victory. In their minds, they were at the head of Hellas. The Spartans took exception to this and rightfully so. The credit has to go to them as well, for the large part that they played in the victory over Persia. This dissension in the end had a lot to do with the Peloponnesian War. Never mind the military structures and governments that each set up, which made their differences clear cut. There was no way to avoid the war between these two great powers, it was inevitable, just as Thucydides had predicted.
Consequences of intervention can include the loss of lives from an otherwise uninvolved country, the spread of violence, and the possibility of inciting conflict over new problems, just to name a few (Lecture, 11/15/16). For example, John Mueller considers the potential negative consequences of intervention prove that they are insignificant to the cause of humanitarian intervention as a whole. Moreover, with intervention into ethnic conflicts, the outcome, no matter how positive, is overshadowed by a gross exaggeration of negative consequences (Mueller). In both Yugoslavia and Rwanda the solution, to Mueller appeared simple, a well ordered and structured militarized presence was all that was required to end the conflict (Mueller). If this is the case, when discussing whether or not intervention is necessary the political elite must not over-exaggerate the difficulty.
When examining the causes for the Peloponnesian War, which was between 431-404 B.C., there are a number of causes that factored into the cause of this war. However, one of the most important causes to this war was largely due to the fact that the Spartans feared the growing power and success of Athens. The Spartans were “particularly alarmed at the growing power of Athens” (Cartwright, “Peloponnesian War”). During the Persian war in 479 BC, Athens grew fiercely strong with power with help of its many allies and continued with their no mercy attacks on Persian territories. When the Persians left Greece, Athens further enraged Sparta when they built large and tall walls around its empire in the event of an attack, which was mostly thought to be from Sparta if it happened.
Athens and Sparta were both city-states in Classical Greece. While Athens embraced democracy, Sparta was a dictatorial fierce warrior state. Sparta was a militaristic community, Athens was a freethinking, and commerce minded city-state. Modern societies have modeled their government organizational structure and military discipline practices from lessons learned of these ancient city-states. There is much is to be praised regarding Classical Greece for their courage, their progressive thinking and the birth of democracy. However, I think it is important to remember that in both cases, Athens and Sparta were able to sustain their lifestyle on the backs of countless slaves, non-citizens and women and that there is a darker and less romantic side to the past.
” Pluralist approach would include something we call the "garbage-can" model. Cohen, M.D., March, J.D. and Olsen, J.P(cited Hansen, H 2011) defines that the Garbage-can model is a combination of possible solutions and a string of problems all mixed together for a decision. Hayes, S. L., & McGee, P. B. (1998) also agreed that garbage-can are issues, feelings, problems and opportunities tossed together for a decision. However the problem and solution may not be related and therefore ultimately the decision might not solve the problem but create others. Dallaire came up with decisions that were forced for solutions, solutions that he did not wanted to come up with. He faced a large number of unresolved issues or problems which eventually still went unsolved and led to the genocide. Driver et al (cited Eberlin, R. J., & Tatum, B. C 2008) show that individuals who look for minimal amount of information or resources can be categorized as "satisfiers. Peacekeeping in the UN was under the charge of DKPO. Dallaire knew he needed to win over the Security Council’s approval, but he could only recommend a solution that was small and inexpensive due to budgetary concerns. Being restricted and limited to the criteria, although Dallaire wanted a much larger peacekeeping force but