Argument For Deontology

Argument for Deontology One of the cornerstones of deontology is the strength it gives to the idea of a value of a thing. For one, something with intrinsic value is something with dignity, i.e. something with a value that cannot be measured. And while this is typically thought to be chiefly the concepts of morality or rational beings, I would argue that nature additionally has an intrinsic value, this we will further examine momentarily. Theoretically, one does not even need to look at the consequences of hurting the environment (while empirically they of course should be contemplated) because according to deontology, the action is wrong simply because the act itself is not good, and has nothing to do with the turnout of the action.

P1: In

Because a dignity is something with immeasurable, or intrinsic value (like morality), it would be impermissible for someone adhering to the ideals of a good will to harm one. A good will is a will that follows the moral law, and it probably goes without saying that impairing something morally priceless and invaluable would not be doing that.

Premise 3: If humans have intrinsic value, then that which humans need to function has intrinsic value. As humans are, obviously, not self-sustainable creatures, by definition, they are dependent on other components to survive. In the event that humans were to be characterized as having intrinsic value, the fact of their dependence would still remain. Because of these matters, it would follow that that which humans depend on would also have intrinsic value because without them, humans would quite literally be nothing.

Premise 4: Humans have intrinsic value. Assuming again that this argument is operating through the ideals of deontology, Kant explicitly states humans as having intrinsic value (Kant 337). Along with morality, rational beings – here being human beings – are acknowledged to be things with dignity rather than a measurable

In attempting to predict possible contentions one could have to what has been said, the stability of the argument will be emphasized.

Premise 1 of the Utilitarian argument reads that if something beneficial results in overall happiness, and it does no harm to anything else of importance, then you are morally obligated to advocate for it. If one were to for some reason or another oppose this, my best guess would be that they would have a problem with the obligatory factor in it. Perhaps they would think that while it may be good for a person to advocate for something that helped them, that it would not then be entirely necessary to, and thus supererogatory (going beyond the requirements of duty, or greater than what is needed). To contest, I would start by reminding of the central values of utilitarianism, mainly on the idea of the greatest happiness principle and of the greatest overall happiness. Morally, the correct decision is the one that brings about the most happiness. And while thinking small I could see how one could assume that that might only mean the happiness of those directly involved, in actuality it tells us that it refers to all people equally and does not put any extra emphasis on people that are significant to the person, or even the person themselves. Therefore, if something was of some benefit to you and it could potentially be of some benefit