The relationship between a sign and the external world remains unexplained, which allows one to perceive a sign as a barrier in comprehension of the external world. A more complete justification is also required for both the relationship between object and meaning of the sign and the very arising of representation as a unity of three elements. The article analyzes the triadic relation of representation on the basis of the notion of information close to the one proposed by C.F. von Weizsacker. It is shown that representation can be understood as a specific, complex information flow.
This is the characteristic of language that Wittgenstein is clearly alluding to when he tells us that “A proposition must use old expressions to communicate a new sense” (TLP 4.03). The conflict between compositionality and the context principle is the matter of how we are able to form meaningful sentences out of words when words, when they stand on their own, do not have any meaning. Since Wittgenstein asserts a version of the context principle while acknowledging compositionality, it would seem that he is holding on to a problematic account of meaning. In this paper I will explain why Wittgenstein claims statement 3.3, and show that it is in fact possible to maintain his context principle in light of compositionality. I will argue that this statement is entailed by Wittgenstein’s account of meaningful propositions as pictures of facts.
The empiricism of specific language functioning in the form of bilingual language contamination brings us back to the assumption of the existence of uniform internal metalanguage structures of verbal thinking. The Internal Form as a Language Structure Ever since Bertrand Russell, analytical philosophy has searched for an inner logical form of the sentence that could be true with respect to the world. Obviously, the superficial external grammatical form of sentences that we comprehend is a weak expression of the true form of corresponding facts. "Poor grammar" introduced many errors in traditional metaphysics disallowing distinctions available exclusively in the new logic. There is a need for a "philosophical grammar" — a grammar, because we speak about the form of the sentences, and philosophical because it should address not only the external but also the internal grammatical structures and reflect their interactions and transmutations thus revealing forms and elements that create the reality of true sentences.
A Unified Theory of Names ABSTRACT: Theoreticians of names are currently split into two camps: Fregean and Millian. Fregean theorists hold that names have referent-determining senses that account for such facts as the change of content with the substitution of co-referential names and the meaningfulness of names without bearers. Their enduring problem has been to state these senses. Millian theorists deny that names have senses and take courage from Kripke's arguments that names are rigid designators. If names had senses, it seems that their referents should vary among possible worlds.
Davidson argues for "the folly of trying to define truth" and claims that Tarski's "accomplishment was accompanied by a proof that truth cannot (given various plausible assumptions) be defined in general" (Davidson, 1996:269). Tarski's plausible assumptions are that his "semantic conception of truth" can be formulated only for formal languages which are not semantically closed. But these assumptions are not so plausible as they seem since it can be shown that if we accept them it is impossible to formulate a theory of truth because the epistemological presuppositions of formal semantics undermine any theory of representation of reality in which our cognitions can be true or false representations (Nesher, 1996). Yet Davidson concludes from Tarski's theory of truth that "there cannot be definition of `For all languages L, and all sentences s in L, s is true in L if and only if ... s ... L'."
Idioms are another part of compositionality. Idioms are phrases with meaning that cannot be predicted based on the meaning of the individual words. The semantic rules for combining meaning does not apply to idioms because, when you take a group of words and try to understand them exactly as they are the meaning will not be the same as that intended by the phrase. For instance, “give a piece of my mind” means tell somebody off or bawl them out. A strict meaning of the phrase would mean that you opened up your skill and broke off a piece of your mind and
ese are the signifiers. e signifiers are built imperfectly, they summon up signs other than those intended based on frequency of usage, misusage and place contextually. ey are influenced by a multitude of extra-textual forces. It is from these axioms, that Structuralism and thence, Deconstructivism take form. Jacques Derrida introduces the misspelled ‘différance’ as concept to account for the deferred nature of Language.
Porter, M. I. (1977) Semanticist pretextual theory in the works of Mapplethorpe. University of North Carolina Press 11. Werther, V. ed. (1995) Reassessing Expressionism: Semanticist pretextual theory and cultural theory.
Literal translation is a procedure in which is reversible. Additionally, it is also regarded as an interlinear translation which is desirable to reproduce the linguistic features of the source text. It is highly essential for purposes related to the study of the source language (Larson, 1998, p.17). 2.4.2 Oblique Translation Oblique translation procedures allow translators to exert a strict control over the reliability of their efforts” (p. 61) Vinay and Darbelnet (1958) stated that oblique translation includes transposition, modulation, equivalence, and adaptation. However, there are two out of four oblique translation procedures which are discussed in this paper: transposition, and modulation.
Studying language reveals one aspect of culture which is organized systematically. The relationship between categories, cognition, language, culture, and truth can be analytically examined in Metaphors We Live By. George Lakoff and Mark Johnson argue that dictionary definitions do not adequately describe concepts, especially ambiguous concepts. Rather, we use concepts from a source domain (which are more basic and empirically real) to make sense of concepts within the target domain (which are less tangible and clearly defined ex: emotions, time, and morality). An experiential basis for both domains links the two together.