To paraphrase the quote attributed to Trotsky, “We may not be interested in insurgency but insurgency is interested in us.” The United States faces this dilemma. The question remains how to prepare for this amidst competing interests and threats. The U.S. military should prepare for both conventional and irregular warfare, while prioritizing conventional warfare, recognizing irregular warfare as the most significant short term threat to national interests and conventional warfare the most threatening in the long term. This paper will compare and contrast the considerations for these types of warfare, explain why the U.S. should prioritize conventional operations while preparing for both, and describe the short and long term threats to national interests.
Before examining recommended U.S. strategic priorities and challenges, a discussion of definitions and current strategy is appropriate. Irregular warfare can be defined as a “violent struggle among state and non state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations,” contrasted with conventional warfare – a conflict between two or more states with conventional weapons in open confrontation. Warfare in the 21st century thus far marks a shift to more irregular forms. However, the long-term is more uncertain.
The key U.S. strategic military documents highlight irregular warfare. The 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, titled “Priorities for 21st Century Defense,” lists 10 priority missions in “loose, not strict” priority order. Of note, the first mission listed is “counter-terrorism and irregular warfare.” The 2014 QDR builds these priorities into a broader strategic framework with three pillars: protect the homeland, build security globally, an...
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...eland. Hoffman would agree, while saying it is best to prepare for everything: “Over the long term, I would contend we must maintain the ability to wage successful campaigns against both large conventionally-armed states and their militaries and against widely dispersed terrorists — and against everything in between.”
In conclusion, preparing for conventional and irregular warfare is a challenge, particularly when developing national strategy and considering resources. Colin Gray rightly points out that strategic force planning has two cardinal rules, prudence and adaptability, a lesson that may be useful in this situation. The U.S. military should prepare for both conventional and irregular warfare, while prioritizing conventional warfare. This demands an examination of the irregular short term threats in addition to long term conventional warfare threats.
Strategy depends on numerous analytical factors and some of these present challenges to planners. This essay will identify some of these challenges that strategists encountered during WWII. Moreover, it will present strategy as a fluid process requiring refinement throughout.
War finds success and failure inescapably linked to how well the Combined, Joint, and Multinational Commander ensures the Joint War Fighting Function “Sustainment” planning is linked to strategic, operational and tactical objectives. General Eisenhower’s Operation OVERLORD, the Allied cross channel, air, and seaborne invasion of France during World War II provides an excellent case study to show successful integration of the principles and the spirit of the Joint War Fighting Function “Sustainment.” OVERLORD required synchronizing, coordinating, and integrating the logistics capabilities of coalition forces, their equipment as well as civilian manufacturing capabilities to meet the strategic end state (e.g. the defeat of Germany). This article will review the purpose and definition of Joint Sustainment, its imperatives and logistics planning principles and examine how Eisenhower and his planners incorporated these imperatives and principles into Operation OVERLORD.
Berkowitz, Bruce D. The New Face of War: How War Will Be Fought in the 21st Century. New York, NY: The Free Press, 2003.
Maxwell, Hilary. “Warfare Plans of Countries.” Monta Vista High School, Cupertino. 26 Jan. 2014. Lecture.
The world’s history is majorly shaped by mega wars that happen both inside and outside the boundaries of individual nations. Almost every sovereign state in the world had to forcefully liberate itself from its colonizers and oppressors mainly through warfare. For instance, America had to fight a long and exhausting revolutionary war against the British before it could attain its independence in 1783, likewise is the fate of many other nations. It is important to understand the two distinct types of wars that exist and their implications. Guerrilla warfare and the conventional military warfare are two types of war that are very different in their execution and military approach. The purpose of this paper is to highlight the similarities and differences existing between the American war in Vietnam and the American Revolution (Vetter, 1997).
Leaders today need to have an appreciation for the operation process, understand a situation, envision a desired future, and to lay out an approach that will achieve that future (Flynn & Schrankel, 2013). Plans need to be created that can be modified to changes in any factors considered. However, plans should not be dependent on specific information being precise or that require things to go exactly according to schedule. Instead, the staff NCO should be flexible where they can and always be prepared for the unexpected. Today’s military members are fighting an unconventional war in Iraq and Afghanistan. The enemy constantly changes their tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP’s) to counter the United States technological advances, making planning very difficult for leaders. There are multiple tools at a staff NCO’s disposal to try to anticipate an outcome of a current operation, but also assist with the development of concepts in follow-on missions. The Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) is just one tool a staff NCO can utilize. In order to stay ahead of the enemy, create effective plans and orders, it is critical for a staff NCO to assist the commander, and understand that the MDMP and planning are essential in defeating the enemy and conserving the fighting force.
Although there is a level of complexity, an inherent and deterministic logic underpins traditional warfighting operations. Planners can apply certain principles to contingency planning for traditional warfighting. Once planners understand relationships between the parts of the problem, they recognize that every action has a consequence, and although some actions reinforce the adversary system’s power, others degrade that power. The typical wargaming method of action, reaction, and counteraction significantly contributes to this oversimplification of combat, which, after all, is a human endeavor and thus subject to fog and friction. Traditional wargaming is an extremely useful tool, but planners must understand that whereas the wargaming outcome is deterministic, combat is not. In complex, ill-structured problems, wargaming is still required, but the real benefits do not necessarily come from the results. The far greater benefits are derived from the discussions of possibilities and probabilities from the interaction of systems and actors within and between
Armed with numerous studies, and intensive public hearings, Congress mandated far-reaching changes in DOD organization and responsibilities in the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. This landmark legislation significantly expanded the authority and responsibility of the chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Included in this expanded authority and responsibility was the requirement for the chairman to develop a doctrine for the joint employment of armed forces. As operations Urgent Fury, Just Cause, and Desert Storm have vividly demonstrated, the realities of armed conflict in today's world make the integration of individual service capabilities a matter of success or failure, life or death. Furthermore, the operation Desert One demonstrated the need for a strengthened Joint Warfare Doctrine and the consequent change in Joint Warfare Employment. It is plain to see the benefits of having the greatest navy integrated with the world's greatest army and air force. However, even in the wake of a relatively successful joint operation in the Middle East (Desert Storm), certain weaknesses are evident in the current joint employment tactics and/or capabilities. By analyzing past operations such as Urgent Fury and Desert Storm, we are able to see sufficient evidence that the Joint Warfare Concept can be disastrous in one instance and virtually flawless in another.
Current military leadership should comprehend the nature of war in which they are engaged within a given political frame in order to develop plans that are coherent with the desired political end state. According to Clausewitz, war is an act of politics that forces an enemy to comply with certain conditions or to destroy him through the use of violence. A nation determines its vital interests, which drives national strategy to obtain or protect those interests. A country achieves those goals though the execution of one of the four elements of power, which are diplomatic, informational, military and economical means. The use of military force...
a comprehensive research service. Retrieved May 2, 2004, from Terrorist Attack by Al Qaeda: http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/033104.pdf. Gunaratna, R. (2005, September). Retrieved September 2005, from http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/articles/05spring/henzel.pdf. Gunaratna, R. (n.d.).
Readiness is of the utmost importance with training being the most significant aspect that contributes to Readiness. Each Soldier needs an individual training plan. The plan should take the Soldier from enlistment to discharge or retirement. It is each Soldiers responsibility to be proficient in their field craft. This includes being fit mentally and physically, and trained to win in a complex world. It is the responsibility of the NCO to train these Soldiers. Unit training plans will address the readiness and resilience of individual Soldiers to ensure their fitness to accomplish their mission. Units must conduct realistic training at the individual, squad, platoon and company levels focused on Mission Essential Tasks (METs) for their
Thinking historically while conducting counterinsurgency in the 21st century poses questions regarding how to develop political and strategic plans. This bibliographic essay will examine the political and military aspect of fighting counterinsurgent warfare by 20th century theorists Galula’s, “Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice” and Trinquier’s, “Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice”. Strategy in fighting guerilla wars will be discussed by comparing conflicts in battles and ideologies from the past to current day. Moreover, ways to avoid the one size fits all war mentality when combating modern day insurgents will be recommended.
In today’s operational environments, the U.S. Army is facing a range of problems and mission sets that are arguably more complex than previously encountered. Forces face an array of demands that encompass geo-political, social, cultural, and military factors that interact in unpredictable ways. The inherent complexity of today’s operations has underscored the need for the Army to expand beyond its traditional approach to operational planning. In March 2010 in FM 5-0: The Operations
Obviously when talking about global security, there needs to actually be the security aspect of it. Such aspect comes from the military itself. The military’s role is to protect both the people of the public and private sectors. Due to this, the military can play the most important role of the three. With being the most important of the three, there also comes the time that needs to be put within it to make sure that this part can function at its maximum potential. Allowing the military to function at its maximum potential allows the public and private to feel at ease with their safety. This does not only constitute for the United States, but all over the entire
In order to protect national security interests as outlined in the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, the U.S. armed forces must rebalance and be capable of conducting operations across the spectrum of conflict in order to win against both a regular and irregular adversary, combating a wide scope of tactics and strategies ranging from terror tactics to full scale, multi-phased conflict against a peer or near peer by maximizing the capability of the force and nation. When comparing and contrasting U. S. military operations and capabilities with regard to regular versus irregular warfare, it is important to understand the definition of irregular and the spectrum of conflict. In recent history, the term “irregular warfare” has been used interchangeably with or alongside insurgency and counterinsurgency warfare. This usage and comparison is too narrow.... ...