The Improvised Explosive Device ( Ied )

1349 Words6 Pages
The Improvised Explosive Device (IED) became the Iraqi insurgents’ primary weapon against the Coalition Forces. General John Abizaid declared IEDs “No. 1 threat” in Iraq in June 2003. From June 2003 to December 2008, other than two periods of Battles of Fallujah and the “Surge,” IEDs caused majority of U.S. fatalities. Some U.S. defense officials stated that “countering IEDs was an operational, political, and even strategic imperative.” The MRAP program ended up occupying an overlapping position in the national and operational strategy. A plausible U.S. national strategic objective for Iraq could have been to create a stable Iraqi government that is friendly to the United States. One of the ways could have been establishing a secure environment with law and order. One of the means could have been the Coalition Forces. A plausible U.S. operational objective for Iraq could have been defeating the insurgency. One of the ways could have been to defeat the IED threat. One of the means could have been MRAPs. But, MRAPs became bigger than an operational mean. In 2006, President Bush declared that “defeating the IED threat was a top priority.” As a strategic leader President Bush’s priorities should have been the defeating the insurgency, not focusing on a tool used by the Insurgent. In 2007, Secretary Gates “made MRAP the top DoD acquisition priority.” The MRAP program is a good case study of the rapid acquisition process. The MRAP program followed the normal defense acquisition process, but there were several factors that cannot be duplicated easily. Conatser and Grizio outlined four requirements for a rapid acquisition process – mature technical solution, user’s acceptance of a short term solution, full support by the leadership,... ... middle of paper ... ...ed setting the priority, the defense acquisition program can adjust to send “11,500 mraps to Iraq in 27 months” and “8000 all terrain mraps for Afghanistan in only 16 months. However, although the requirement to provide better armor protection for soldiers was identified as early as 2003, the involvement by strategic leaders did not happen early enough. The MRAP procurement process should not be repeated for other major defense acquisition programs without meeting the requirements outlined by Conatser and Grizio. The MRAP procurement process can be replicated for urgent warfighting requirements. However a rapid acquisition process is ill suited to accommodate long-term modernization requirements, joint requirements, and emerging capabilities requirements. The defense acquisition process needs to improved and strategic leaders must has ownership of the whole process.

More about The Improvised Explosive Device ( Ied )

Open Document