On the basis of philosophy and the claims of science to know, only philosophy, in its yearning for certainty, has tried to suggest that there is such a thing as a law of cause and effect. Science rests content in making predictions based on experience without claiming any kind of certainty or privileged reasoning to back these predictions up. Hume might then also defend his own philosophy, saying that he proceeds according to a similar method. So, in the terms of causal relation, we are left with uncertainty unless we rely on these laws that describe cause and effect. And what of these laws then?
Whether reasoning can expose truth is determined... ... middle of paper ... ... that can ever be certain is a philosophical idea called “Solipsism”. This theory determines that the only thing that can be known for sure is the self. I can be sure that I exist, and that I think. However, this theory also has its complications, because there can only be one solipsist. Therefore, there is no means of proving this hypothesis.
I think that we have to look at the foundations first. And we have to look at the foundations that we know and if they’re where some reasons to doubt, then I will have to doubt the principles. And I think that knowledge does not depend upon things of whose existence I don’t have knowledge yet. So how can we say that if there isn’t enough evidence to support a claim, why is it considered wrong? I find it illogical because just because there still isn’t enough evidence, doesn’t mean its wrong, its just not considered right or wrong.
You might ask yourself, “What are the things that are in this certain world?” Well, basically everything that is not the mind is considered to be part of this world. Lastly, skepticism are against the idea that you can know things from the material world, therefore they believe that you cannot be sure about anything that you perceive. In “The principles of human knowledge” George Berkeley responds to the skeptics view about the external world. As we already talked about, skepticism is against the belief that you can know anything because even saying that you “know” something is a big contradiction itsel... ... middle of paper ... ...intellect, nothing will be able to exist without a mind. If minds did not exist to perceive things then how could anyone know anything?
Skeptics believe that is impossible to verify truth, thus we can have no knowledge since do not have truth(Henry 2002,101-102). They do believe that we can have beliefs, as seen by the fact that they believe we cannot have ... ... middle of paper ... ...e was an agreement. But if it was only a second than it cannot be considered knowledge as knowledge is always a true and can be maintained as such. Therefore the agreement is not knowledge as it is not able to remain true, even if such an agreement had been made. Due to this Henry’s argument is incorrect.
Truth in the eyes of the redundancy theory introduces an even more radical approach with claims that since there is no such thing as truth, nothing is there to be considered valuable. Lynch fell short in responding to this approach by simply dismissing it as a series of blind generalizations and proclaiming that all attributions of truth are not redundant as claimed. An additional theory called minimalism is also introduced with the basis that truth is not a substantive property in nature and “it is good to believe the truth because we are disposed to accept little belief norms.” Minimalism recognizes the fact that truth is valuable, but is based off of propositions: “it is true that p if and only if p”. Lynch responds by saying that minimalists fail to provide explanations to why people accept all the instances of belief norms in terms of good-making property of the beliefs. The last major theory that is introduced in this chapter is particularism, or the belief that there is no rule to determine what is good or bad therefore, normative judgments are the
Which would mean that this person was greater than God. But nothing can be greater than God. Hence it is not true that God exists in the understanding but not in reality. In conclusion, the formulation of the argument from a metaphysical assumption and both philosophical and theological argument takes its false standpoint that builds up an entire edifice on assumptions that weren’t questioned back in Anselms’ day. Anselm then could not question whether “being” was continuous or discontinuous across cultures which philosophers developed much later.
How often do we question what is real or true? Descartes believed that doubting everything that he knew to be truthful knowledge was the only way to find out what was actually true and real. He turned doubting into a key principle for his methods of philosophy. Descartes would ask what we really knew beyond the shadow of a doubt. To do this he resolves to search within himself (Descartes 9).
Davidson's "The Folly of Trying to Define Truth" Davidson’s argument against the possibility of defining truth draws upon the work of Tarski. However, Tarski’s assumption that the semantic conception of truth holds only for formal languages which are not semantically closed is not as plausible as it seems to be since it can be shown that this would result in the impossibility of formulating a theory of truth, because the epistemological presuppositions of formal semantics undermine any theory of representation of reality in which our cognitions can be true or false representations. Yet Davidson concludes that "there cannot be a definition of ‘For all languages L, and all sentences s in L, s is true in L if and only if . . .
He argues that there is no way to show that any of our basic sources of belief is reliable without falling into epistemic circularity. There is no way to show that such a source is reliable without relying at some point or another on premises that are themselves derived from that source. So we cannot have any non-circular reasons for supposing that the sources on which we base our beliefs are reliable. Alston thinks, however, that there is a way of evaluating the reliability of our sources of belief that is independent of the beliefs based on those sources and that does not therefore fall into circularity. I will argue that Alston's attempt to find such an external support for our sources of beliefs fails.