The rapid development of the BDF from a single rifle company to the current force did not have corresponding formulation of defense policies and strategies to define its roles, force levels, and ways of sustainment. Policy makers neither kept abreast of the BDF’s growth nor changing world events. Consequently, they failed to promulgate requisite defense legislation and policies beyond creating a founding act. The BDF was formed out of and around the logical imperative of the time. It came out of a police branch; hence, it lacked a military history or strategic leadership experience. Thus, it adopted a culture of expediency and tactical solutions at the expense of long term strategic planning.
The Botswana Defence Force Act of 1977, as observed by R. Dale, does very little to define the construction and role of the military. Apart from force employment privileges of the President and the Commander, the BDF Act provides little guidance on the regulation of force size, equipment, and organization. Under the section for the establishment and maintenance of the defense force, the act merely states “There shall be established and maintained in Botswana a force to be known as, "The Botswana Defence Force", which shall consist of the Regular Force of the Defence Force; and the Defence Force Reserve”. It suggests the broad employment of the BDF as “defence of Botswana and with such other duties as may from time to time be determined by the President.” Apart from referring to a Navy (in a landlocked Botswana), Air Force and Army in explanation of “disciplined forces,” the constitution is silent on the construct of the military. This ambiguity and lack of strategic guidance led University of Botswana academic Dr Molomo to observe, “The r...
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...s; an integrated civilian/military effort converts national resources into military capabilities with due regard to political, military, and economic dimensions. Botswana is not yet there in this top down approach to building military capabilities; the MDJS does not have a robust defense management structure to inform policy, plan force development, and execute defense acquisition. Deficient of this type legislative and bureaucratic guidance, the BDF’s vision becomes an unrealistic internal exercise; another part of a futile bottom up, stove-piped approach to the country’s security challenges, lacking coordination and synergy with other national sources of power. Because of this practice, the BDF’s inventory has become a perfunctory capability to address every security challenge of a landlocked country surrounded by war tested, dominant, and more populous neighbors.
The purpose of this paper is to provide a brief analysis of the United States Army’s organizational structure and its culture and how these two elements impact its workers, associates and affiliates. This paper will first examine the Army’s history, development and structure to highlight the origins of the Army’s culture. Secondly, a brief history of the Army’s organizational development will be followed by a close examination of its philosophy and supporting beliefs. Lastly, this paper will discuss the role of the Army’s leadership, their response to critical issues and the organizational structure of the Army. An analysis of the army’s top leaders will help the reader to understand the Army culture more thoroughly in the context of the Army’s organizational structure. More specifically this section of the paper will examine the Army leadership’s response to the current geo-political environment and other related issues. In conclusion, this paper hopes to highlight the Army’s overall functioning from an organizational standpoint and emphasize that idea that the Army is like a functional corporation. This will be accomplished by addressing various key questions throughout this text.
As the incoming brigade commander, LTC (P) Owens, I see the critical leadership problem facing the 4th Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) is the inability or unwillingness of Colonel Cutler to lead and manage change effectively. In initial talks with Col Cutler and in reviewing the brigade’s historical unit status reports, the 4th ABCT performed as well as can be expected in Afghanistan, but as the onion was peeled back there are numerous organizational issues that were brought to the surface while I walked around and listened to the soldiers of the 4th ABCT, in addition to reviewing the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) report. One of the most formidable tasks of a leader is to improve the organization while simultaneously accomplishing
...ented by decision-makers in crises. First, every group meeting should have a designated devil's advocate, who will point out potential risks. Second, special care should be taken so that no one agency or coalition of experts can monopolize the flow of incoming information. Janet Reno, by allowing the FBI to monopolize the information coming to her, made it almost inevitable that she would eventually do what the FBI wanted. Finally, the virtues which make the military such an effective international killing force--such as uniformity, obedience, and group cohesion--make it especially susceptible to groupthink. For this reason, the military should have no participation in law enforcement; quasi-military units such as the FBI's HRT and the BATF SRT should be thoroughly demilitarized, and should play, at most, a very subordinate role in law-enforcement decision-making.
In this section, I will provide a brief history of U.S. military involvement on the African continent, starting with the Barbary Wars and working up through the current date. This historical documentation will highlight the change in the role the United States has played in Africa [post 9-11???]. Prior to 9-11, the United States’ interactions were mainly [capture summary here]. Since [?], however, the continent has faced a marked increase in violent extremism and terrorism leading the United States to partner with many African nations in counterterrorism initiatives. These, and other initiatives, mean an increasing number U.S. service members are deploying to Africa to take part in training, humanitarian issues and military operations. These military activities are run by United States African Command, a recently created combatant command.
The Army has experience, during wartime, peacetime and during period of persistent conflict, in addressing the challenges of developing, maintaining and adapting its professional practices and areas of expertise. It has been able to produce and utilize ethical combat power throughout its history because of the priority it has placed upon the development of Professional Soldiers, prepared to defend the Constitution and the American people. The Army and its leaders remain focused on the roles that institutional, operational, and self-development play within the ongoing evolution of the operating environment. As it does so, the Army will remain a Profession of Arms for centuries to come.
This essay discussed the current US military approach to the irregular challenges, the irregular challenges that the US most likely will face in the near term, and offered arguments of whether the US government and military focus is on the most important threats with the right mix of capabilities. Only time will tell if the policies set forth in the 2010 National Security Strategy, 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, and 2011 National Military Strategy hit the mark. Current and near-term irregular challenges facing the US military requires creative approaches that maximizes people, resources, and capabilities.
Should the government decrease military spending or should it increase military spending? This is a question that many Americans wrestle with, and politically speaking, is a point of great contention since to many, military might evokes a sense of security. However, when considering this question from a foreign policy standpoint, does current military spending really match the current level of threats faced by the United States, or are too many dollars being allocated for an unnecessary level of military strength? There are certainly cons in making the decision to drastically lower military spending, but they are minimal when compared to the positive ramifications such a decision would have. This paper aims to explore these pros and cons
Armed with numerous studies, and intensive public hearings, Congress mandated far-reaching changes in DOD organization and responsibilities in the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. This landmark legislation significantly expanded the authority and responsibility of the chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Included in this expanded authority and responsibility was the requirement for the chairman to develop a doctrine for the joint employment of armed forces. As operations Urgent Fury, Just Cause, and Desert Storm have vividly demonstrated, the realities of armed conflict in today's world make the integration of individual service capabilities a matter of success or failure, life or death. Furthermore, the operation Desert One demonstrated the need for a strengthened Joint Warfare Doctrine and the consequent change in Joint Warfare Employment. It is plain to see the benefits of having the greatest navy integrated with the world's greatest army and air force. However, even in the wake of a relatively successful joint operation in the Middle East (Desert Storm), certain weaknesses are evident in the current joint employment tactics and/or capabilities. By analyzing past operations such as Urgent Fury and Desert Storm, we are able to see sufficient evidence that the Joint Warfare Concept can be disastrous in one instance and virtually flawless in another.
Current military leadership should comprehend the nature of war in which they are engaged within a given political frame in order to develop plans that are coherent with the desired political end state. According to Clausewitz, war is an act of politics that forces an enemy to comply with certain conditions or to destroy him through the use of violence. A nation determines its vital interests, which drives national strategy to obtain or protect those interests. A country achieves those goals though the execution of one of the four elements of power, which are diplomatic, informational, military and economical means. The use of military force...
The Uniform Code of Military justice (UCMJ) is a federal law, enacted by congress. It defines the military justice system and lists criminal offenses under military law (military). The president enacts rules by executive order known as Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM). The Manual for Court Martial details the rules and regulations for military court-martials and provides for maximum punishments for each military offense listed in the punitive articles of the UCMJ (Military). There is also a Non-Judicial Punishment, which consist of an article 15.
Kugler, Richard L. 1995. “Defence Program Requirements”. In NATO Enlargement: Opinions and Options, Jeffrey Simon (Ed), Washington D.C. National Defence University Press, Fort McNair, 184-207.
Using initiatives towards irregular warfare is a broad spectrum. It can range from evolving to facilitate the full spectrum of operations in multinational operating environments to ongoing transformational changes in leadership development and training that will provide us as a fighting force with the multi-skilled leaders to take on the initiatives that are involved and required to take on irregular warfare and the threats that are facilitated with it. Without initiative where are we? It’s the trait that we take
The Yugoslav Army played a disastrous role not only as an enforcer of political decisions but as an independent. In Tito’s time, the army had only a subordinate role. In those days, the Communist Party and the army were the glue that held the country together. When the Communist Party separated, the army remained the sole power that guaranteed the union. After the secessions, it became an army without a country. With Tito’s death in 1980 and the death of the Communist party in 1990, the national army was cut adrift with an idea with noone to control it. They eventually made themselves powerless.
Botswana Government (2011) Economic Diversification Drive Medium to Long-Term Strategy 2011 – 2016, Ministry of Trade and Industry, Gaborone.
This essay seeks to discuss participatory budgeting and the need to enhance budget participation in Botswana. Participatory budgeting is promoted over the world as a tool for a well functioning democratic government by different institutions like World bank, OECD , budgets practitioners (expects), civil society organizations, (Tanaka, 2007) . Participatory Budgeting is necessary as it is through it that a more transparent and accountable government can be realized. Budget Participation is refers to opportunities that government avail to the civil society organizations and citizens at large about government policies and operations to deliberate, debate and influence the allocations of resources,