An invasion strategy arose naturally out of Spain’s need for a short war; it had limited financial resources and a vulnerable empire. French strategy was not to concentrate on Europe, and Vergennes preferred to attack British trade in home waters, but he had little choice. The allies drew up plans for an occupation of the Isle of Wight and an attack on the fleet base at Portsmouth. The invasion of England was not to be, but one consequence of Spanish priorities would be more difficulty for France in concentrating naval forces overseas. This European strategy did, on the other hand, help to weaken Britain itself overseas, with the Royal Navy guarding against invasion, trying to protect trade, and having to relieve Gibraltar. At the same time, …show more content…
He could “strike hard after sufficient preparation, as he showed at Charleston. But in general his failing was caution. While he might wait as patiently as Washington, he lacked his enemy's gift for a quick change from waiting to attack. He was a competent defensive strategist, at a time when only an audacious and skillful offensive could have won the war.” This was part of the problem. Cornwallis moved into Yorktown in what he thought would be a defensible position and waited for Clinton to support him. Clinton promised to support him, but doubtfully never fully grasped the criticality of the situation. Cornwallis tried to essentially “circle the wagons” and wait for support from Clinton, but by the time Clinton arrived it was too …show more content…
This goes both for Loyalist and Indian policy. What they took for loyalism was no more than the reluctance of many Americans-in the Middle Colonies probably a majority—to take sides. They never understood how the very arrival of the British army (and especially its loyalist, Hessian, and Indian auxiliaries) drove neutrals into alliance with the patriots.
Their place in British strategies for suppressing the American rebellion and winning the war seems to have changed as often as Britain’s commanders-in-chief and their hopes and plans for winning the struggle. Indeed, even within the minds of the broad mass of Loyalists, their role was uncertain, their motives diverse, and actions anything but united. Above all, they feared the disorder that would be wrought by revolution and the subsequent overturning of traditional, ordered ways. To a very large degree, therefore, the Loyalists were a screen upon which British strategists projected their hopes and
Nash’s argument regarding to how the American Revolution portrayed “radicalism” throughout the American Revolution has been supported from the previous pieces of evidence. Moreover, the pieces of evidence listed to support Gary B. Nash’s argument are supported in embodying the true manner on how the American colonists fought to let go of their submission with the British and try to throw down Parliaments Policies. The evidence presented illustrate how the radical-lower class politics erupted to other citizens that favored British policies and caused riots that led to the account for the Revolution itself. The issues regarding to how these radical-lower class demanded British favorites demonstrated how far reaching the people would go to demolish but historically demonstrate their pride and purpose in freeing themselves from Parliament rule. These evidential claims help proclaim what argument Nash is making suggesting that radicalism was performed indeed to a very extreme point but rather to an effective point in which led to the creation of the American
... combat power against a numerically superior, well armed, and highly motivated enemy. His unwillingness to adapt to changing conditions was unrealistic and proved fatal.
The beginning of 1763 marked one of the major events that would contribute to the end of British colonial relations. On February 3, 1763 the French and Indian War finally ended in British victory, but while the British celebrated the French’s defeat, colonists feared the oncoming reverberations the war would have on them. The main motive behind the war was for possession over the French fur trade territory in North America. To the colonists, the war was being fought by and for Britain not the colonies. The benefits of the victory only pertained to Britain. The after effect of the war for the colonies was the trampling on their need for expansion. During the war, Native Americans had fought with the French because of how well they treated them. Britain was notorious for abusing the Native Americans, therefore once the French were defeated; they began attacking western settlements of colonists. To avoid confrontation, the Proclamation of 1763 was passed by Parliament. The Proclamation established a limit to the greatly needed colonial expansion. Specifically, the Proclamation forbid settlement beyond the Appalachian Mountains. The passing of the Proclamation of 1763 infuriated colonists ...
“Their differing perceptions of the nature of war form the backbone of the difficult relationship between these two men.” Lee, an older soldier, values much of an offensive warfare approach, while Longstreet values a defensive warfare approach. Both men consistently argue about the best option for the Confederacy. However, “no matter how much he might disagree, Longstreet defers to Lee’s decisions.” In an argument as to who was right, none of the developed tactics provide clear evidence as to what was going to work, especially with a military of lesser men, considering the war in 1863. Although General Lee’s tactics did not work during the Battle of Gettysburg, there is no evidence that General Longstreet’s defensive strategy would have worked significantly better. Therefore, neither of the generals exceeded the other when it comes to military strategies, which rather debunks Shaara’s depiction of Longstreet’s advanced knowledge of modern warfare. Despite of the importance of the Battle of Gettysburg, often marked as the turning point of the war, General Longstreet should not obey an order that results in a significant loss of men that would be extremely difficult to replace at this time. Already limited by the amount of men still able to fight, pushing additional forces in an open battle would just nearly deplete the confederate soldiers completely, and
...didn’t over step his authority or attempt to subvert the army for his own purposes. Instead, George Washington sets the example of the military commander who was subservient to civilian political leadership. He also showed patience and coolness in the face of adversity. On many occasions in the book, the author cites Washington’s expressions of doubt and fears of failure, yet Washington never showed fear or doubt in action in front of his troops.
GEN McClellan may not have been a great war time General but he excelled at training Soldiers, getting his men ready to fight and raising the morale of the Armies he commanded. Multiple historians and various political leaders agreed on this point about McClellan. In a statement, President Lincoln told John Hayes,” There is no man in the army who can man these fortifications and lick these troops into shape half as well as he” . As it can be seen from a statement from a prominent figure such as the President during the war, GEN McClellan was a Soldiers General, but the ability to get political leaders on his side was another story. His cautious attitude towards war soured his reputation with both congress. McClellan’s biggest political obstacle was Edward Stanton, the Secretary of War. He started to work on a petition that would end McClellan’s career.
Therefore, neither of the generals exceeded the other when it comes to military strategies, which rather debunks Shaara’s depiction of Longstreet’s advanced knowledge of modern warfare. Despite of the importance of the Battle of Gettysburg, often marked as the turning point of the war, General Longstreet should not obey an order that results in a significant loss of men that would be extremely difficult to replace at this time. Already limited by the amount of men still able to fight, pushing additional forces in an open battle would just nearly deplete the confederate soldiers completely. Since this battle was one that went on until a majority of ones sided were depleted, the south should have played it safe against the Unions nearly surplus supply of
On the brink of revolution, the colonies were divided amongst themselves. Two factions with different ideologies “The Patriots” & and the “The Loyalist”, to know these factions we must first know another. Because both parties played a pivotal role in the “American Revolution”.
Jefferson Davis, president of the Confederate States of America, showed weaknesses within his leadership which may have contributed to the confederacy’s loss and the unions win . Davis failed in three vital ways. These ways were: his relations with other confederate authorities and with the people, as well as in his fundamental concept of his job as president and in his organization and specific handling of his role as commander in chief . Davis failed in maintaining communication with leaders and with his people, often unable to admit when he is wrong which led to lack organization in his role . In addition, Davis was a conservative leader, not a revolutionary one which meant that his strength was often in protocol and convention rather than in innovation . Studying each of these aspects that represented a weakness in Jefferson Davis’s leadership, Lincoln in comparison provided more admirable and outstanding qualities within his leadership which in many ways affected the outcome of the war
Washington's selection to be the leader of the Continental Army was the wisest choice that the newly formed Continental Congress could have made. Washington's selection as Commander of the Continental Army did more to win the Revolutionary war than any other decision made during the conflict. His personal character epitomizes perfectly the five traits required in a successful general: wisdom, sincerity, humanity, courage, and strictness. (Sun Tzu p. 65) These five crucial traits will become apparent and Washington's strategy to win the War of Independence is elaborated on further
Union officer William Tecumseh Sherman observed to a Southern friend that, "In all history, no nation of mere agriculturists ever made successful war against a nation of mechanics. . . .You are bound to fail." While Sherman's statement proved to be correct, its flaw is in its assumption of a decided victory for the North and failure to account for the long years of difficult fighting it took the Union to secure victory. Unquestionably, the war was won and lost on the battlefield, but there were many factors that swayed the war effort in favor of the North and impeded the South's ability to stage a successful campaign.
Washington understood that what lies ahead would be difficult, considering he would be facing the most powerful country in the world. But he probably didn't expect his worst problems to come from his own army, which was an undisciplined and untrained group that would eventually tamper with his great patience. Through it all, he would stay determined and always try to stay one step ahead of the enemy. In the summer of 1775, the Americans prepared to attack the British in Boston. But Washington was informed that they were shorthanded on gunpowder.
...hermore, going to war was an act of cowardice. He had to put aside his morals and principles and fight a war he did not believe in.
Late in the war, 1778, was the point of Britain being close to defeat. Current commander of British forces was Lt. General Henry Clinton trying to stop this rebellion. He was thinking on how to do this with the North of America under Patriot control. Clinton then decided on turning to the South of the United States (www.theamericanrevolutiong.org). Fighting was becoming heavy between the militia and the United Kingdom’s forces (www.theamericanrevolution.org). However, General Clinton had once been to the South of the U.S. before, but failed in taking a key city (Charleston, South Carolina) by sea on June 28, 1776 (www.theamericanrevolution.org).
...e gun, it seemed, the greater the owner‘s pride in it.” (McCullough 33) The Continental army certainly did not look like an army yet these people were brought together in this fight for freedom and prevailed even winning the support of Americans who had no hope the British would be defeated.” Merchant Erving had sided with the Loyalists primarily because he thought the rebellion would fail. But the success of Washington‘s army at Boston had changed his mind as it had for many” (McCullough 108). The reader must comprehend the power of this accomplishment for the rag-tag army. “Especially for those who had been with Washington and who knew what a close call it was at the beginning-how often circumstance, storms, contrary winds, the oddities or strengths of individual character had made the difference- the outcome seemed little short of a miracle.” (McCullough 294).