Many believe that there is something inherently irrational about accepting each element
of an inconsistent set of propositions. However, arguments for this doctrine seem lacking
other than those that appeal to the principle that the set of propositions that one rationally
accepts is (or should be) closed under logical consequences, or those that note that error
is made inevitable when one accepts an inconsistent set. After explaining why the
preceding sorts of arguments do not succeed, I consider a novel attempt by Keith Lehrer
to undermine the chief argument in favor of the claim that it can sometimes be rational to
accept inconsistent sets. For reasons that will be described, Lehrer’s argument fails.
I. Inconsistency and Deductive Closure
One cannot accept both that it is rational to accept inconsistent sets, and that the set of
propositions that one rationally accepts is closed under logical consequences. Together
these two propositions imply that it is rational to knowingly accept a logically
contradictory statement. But clearly it is not rational to knowingly accept a contradiction.
Thus, we must give up the principle that our rational acceptances are closed under logical
consequences, or else deny that it is ever rational to accept an inconsistent set. This
dilemma is sometimes appealed to as a premise in an argument for the claim that it is
irrational to accept each element of an inconsistent set. According to this argument, since
our rational acceptances are closed under logical consequences, it must be irrational to
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accept inconsistent sets. Versions of this argument have recently been offered by Ryan
(1996) and Evnine (1999).
The preceding sort of argum...
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conjunction is at least as informative as its least informative conjunct will permit us to
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construct an inconsistent set whose elements are both highly informative, and highly
probable. Moreover, any acceptable theory of informativeness will have the consequence
that a conjunction is always at least as informative as its least informative conjunct.
Works Cited
Evnine, Simon. (1999) ‘Believing Conjunctions’, Synthese 118, 210-227.
Lehrer, Keith. (1974): ‘Belief and Error’, in Gram, M.S., and Klemke, E.D., the
Ontological Turn, University of Iowa Press, 216-229.
Lehrer, Keith. (1990): ‘Reason and Consistency’, in his Metamind, Clarendon Press,
148-166.
Pollock, John. (1995) Cognitive Carpentry, MIT Press.
Ryan, Sharon. (1996) ‘The Epistemic Virtues of Consistency’, Synthese 109, 121-141.
In order to understand the concept of Moore’s Paradox, we must first assess and understand the behavior of logical and performative contradictions. Credited for devising and examining this paradox, George Edward Moore, a British philosopher who taught at the University of Cambridge and studied ethics, epistemology, and metaphysics describes the paradox in its omissive and commissive forms in which we will discuss thoroughly. I will then express my standpoint on which solution is the most optimal choice for Moore’s Paradox in order to analyze and explain why I believe my solution is superior to other solutions. I will also discuss any issues that arise
a dilemma is taking place due to its content. Based on moral obligations, the action to coming to
But do we choose what we want to dismiss and only have what we think
Rationalism is based on the assumption that all human beings are innately rational. French and German rationalist philosophers, such as Decartes, Spinoza, Leibniz and Kant believed that basic metaphysical questions can be answered by reason alone. In his work Discourse on the Method, Decartes attempted to arrive at a set of principles that are fundamental, and in this way to arrive at true knowledge; to do that he methodologically rejected everything that he can doubt. Decartes summarised his conclusion in saying “I think therefore I am” (Decartes, 1637); he concluded that only thought exists, and because thought could not be separated from him, he also concluded that he exists. This conclusion that only the existence of thought cannot be doubted led to the view that reason and thought are the nature of the soul, and that humans are basically rational, is the foundation for rationalist thought. According to rationalist philosophers, reason is what separates hum...
In “The Fixation of Belief”, Charles S. Peirce attempts to explain his four methods of establishing belief, in which he says all people have. These methods can be put to the test with any subject matter, and one shall always fit.
The heuristics and biases research towards human rationality expresses that humans are not rational because completely arbitrary factors influence an individual’s reasoning. Humans are unable to avoid a significant flaw in the rationality system which is known as invisible contamination. This exists as a problem because arbitrary or irrational factors influence human reasoning without the possibility of
rational grounds, as in matters of passion, desired out come and choice. James claims that belief
are often in favor of throwing logic out the window. In many ways, this question
provoking issues that can be interpreted in a variety of different ways. Two selections which
Appeal to the Person – the individual rebuts an argument by criticizing the other person rather than addressing the issue (how can you believe Mr. Smith’s claim about reincarnation because he is an atheist so what would he know about it).
Our assurance that certain sets of conditions are sufficient to produce certain effects is based on past experience that like has been conjoined with like. The belief in necessary connection entails (Hume will conclude that it amounts to) a belief that events similar to those experienced in the past will be accompanied by similar conjuncts. Such a belief may only be arrived at inductively, and induction does not discover necessity.1[1]
This paper will dispute that scientific beliefs are not the right way to accept a belief and it will question if we should let one accept their rights to their own beliefs. In Williams James article Will to Believe, we accept his perspective on how we set and fix our beliefs. This paper will first outline his overview on the argument that someone does not choose their belief but rather one just has them. Following, it will outline my perspective on how we set our beliefs and agreement with purse. Then it will explain how other methodologies such as science cannot conclude to one’s true beliefs. Science has been seen as a way to perceive life and taken to consideration as the truth. This paper should conclude that humans define ourselves by
arguments. Anyone who cannot tell a good proof from a bad one may easily be
Robinson, R. R. (1994). Some methodological approaches to the unexplained points. Philosophy 2B/3B (pp. 27-34). Melbourne: La Trobe University.