Primate Virtues: A Cross-species Study of Morality

Primate Virtues: A Cross-species Study of Morality

In his 1881 book, Daybreak, Friedrich Nietzsche wrote,

We do not regard the animals as moral beings. But do you suppose the animals regard us as moral beings? –An animal which could speak said, ‘Humanity is a prejudice of which we animals at least are free’.[1]

This passage expresses Nietzsche’s belief that animals do not judge human actions as morally good or bad. Only humans think in moral terms, Nietzsche believes –a prejudice of which “animals at least are free”. That is, animals do not believe in morality; and modern philosophers, as well as behavioral biologists, would have to agree. Nobody suspects their dog of trying to maximize utility, follow categorical imperatives, or do penance for his sins. Moral agency is uniquely human in this respect; only we maintain that our actions have some greater—moral—significance.

Ethical theories try to provide us with a coherent and rational account of precisely this moral aspect of human thought and action. But no matter how coherent and rational a given moral system may be, if it becomes too detached from our regular deliberations and actions, we do not consider it a correct account of our normal moral reasoning. But what exactly constitutes this “normal moral reasoning” that humans allegedly possess?

In this paper, I argue that human “moral reasoning” is actually a normal biological phenomenon that we share with the rest of the animal community, most noticeably with our closest primate relatives. I demonstrate this by using the standards provided by a normative moral theory to evaluate the actions of one of our animal relatives –Pan Troglodytes, or the African chimpanzee, illustrating the fact that these ...

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Massachusetts, and London, England: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

1986. (p. 378).

[7] Aristotle. The Nicomachean Ethics. Trans. David Ross. Revised by J. L. Ackrill

and J.O. Urmson. Oxford / New York: Oxford University Press. (p. 64).

[8] Ibid. p. 70.

[9] Ibid. p. 69.

[10] Ibid. p. 35.

[11] See Pears, David. “Aristotle’s Analysis of Courage”. Midwest Studies in

Philosophy 3: 273-285. 1978.

[12] See “Modern Moral Philosophy”, esp. p. 354.

[13] Mackie, John. “A Refutation of Morals”. In 20th Century Ethical Theory. Ed.

Steven M. Cahn and Joram G. Haber. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall. 1946.

[14] See Regal, Philip J. The Anatomy of Judgment. Minneapolis: University of

Minnesota Press. 1990.

[15] “A Refutation of Morals”, p. 146.

[16] Ibid. p. 146.