In this essay, I will discuss and define both speciesism and moral individualism according to Paola Cavalieri’s book, The Animal Question. Additionally, I will provide my opinion on which is the strongest argument for speciesism and why I still disagree with it. Speciesism is the belief that humans are inherently superior to all other animals, solely based on their species membership. This widely held belief is used to justify the blatant discrimination of nonhuman animals, resulting in a lack of moral rights and the exploitation of defenseless beings. This view, that humans are of special moral status, is constantly attempted to be rationalized in various ways. One such defense is that we are not morally wrong to prioritize our needs before the needs of nonhuman animals for “the members of any species may legitimately give their fellows more weight than they give members of other species (or at least more weight than a neutral view would grant them). Lions, too, if they were moral agents, could not then be criticized for putting other lions first” (Nozick, 79). This argument, that we naturally prefer our own kind, is based on the same fallacy used by racists while defending their intolerant beliefs and therefore should be shown to have no logical merit. Additionally, speciesists argue that human beings are the only creatures who are self-aware. They believe that due to this characteristic, they are able to think rationally while all other nonhuman animals cannot. Speciesists claim that this enables them to think and act morally, and so entitles them to a higher moral status. This argument, like many other speciesist arguments, fails when “the argument from marginal cases” is applied. The argument from marginal cases argues t... ... middle of paper ... ...ed as it demonstrates to be both hypocritical and oppressive to animal rights. Although I do find Cohen’s defence of speciesism to be the strongest, I do not find it to be strong. The speciesist philosophy, while extremely beneficial to humans, cannot be rationally justified to be morally acceptable. I do not claim that it is our responsibility to treat every animal as if it were human since this would be detrimental to modern medicine, agriculture, and human health. This is especially true in babies who cannot survive on a vegan diet due to a lack of many vital nutrients (Planck, 2007). What I do conclude is that we must treat cognitive nonhuman animals with much more morally relevancy and not abuse these beings for our own petty gains. To judge different species by different standards is an unjustified practice and a problem that must be more seriously addressed.
In contrast, does the respect be mutual toward non-animal beings, such as bacteria, or viruses? Subsequently, this particular question acknowledges the weaknesses in the new conclusion of the debate. From the vast species of the animal kingdom, few primates and rodent species are chosen because these creatures are not domesticated by humans. Evidently, it means that society does not have any cultural attachment to them, unlike other animals. As such, there isn’t any incentive to protect their rights.
Both in and out of philosophical circle, animals have traditionally been seen as significantly different from, and inferior to, humans because they lacked a certain intangible quality – reason, moral agency, or consciousness – that made them moral agents. Recently however, society has patently begun to move beyond this strong anthropocentric notion and has begun to reach for a more adequate set of moral categories for guiding, assessing and constraining our treatment of other animals. As a growing proportion of the populations in western countries adopts the general position of animal liberation, more and more philosophers are beginning to agree that sentient creatures are of a direct moral concern to humans, though the degree of this concern is still subject to much disagreement. The political, cultural and philosophical animal liberation movement demands for a fundamental transformation of humans’ present relations to all sentient animals. They reject the idea that animals are merely human resources, and instead claim that they have value and worth in themselves. Animals are used, among other things, in basic biomedical research whose purpose is to increase knowledge about the basic processes of human anatomy. The fundamental wrong with this type of research is that it allows humans to see animals as here for them, to be surgically manipulated and exploited for money. The use of animals as subjects in biomedical research brings forth two main underlying ethical issues: firstly, the imposition of avoidable suffering on creatures capable of both sensation and consciousness, and secondly the uncertainty pertaining to the notion of animal rights.
Speciesism, as defined by Peter Singer, “is a prejudice or attitude of bias in favor of the interests of members of one’s own species and against those of members of other species” (Singer, Animal Liberation, p. 6). The rationale for the preferential treatment encapsulated in this definition is simply the fact that those receiving the preferred treatment belong to the same species, and not on the basis of any grounds of higher intelligence or other attributes.
What do we, as humans have to do in order to give nonhuman animals the proper treatment and equal moral consideration as we owe for other humans? Some, such as Jeremy Bentham would address that, “The greatest happiness of the greatest number is the foundation of morals and legislation” (99). Other moral philosophers, like Henry Sidgwick, however reject the theory of utilitarianism thinking that is pleasure all that really matters and are consequences all that matters (111-112)? Humans use nonhuman animals for one purpose; pleasure from using their skins for luxury goods. In this paper, I will explain and examine what Jeremy Bentham is trying explain in his argument, and will attempt to show that his argument is a plausible one, by replying an objection against his utilitarian view.
Through an understanding of natural selection, I have come to accept that all creatures currently in existence are equal. However, for the purposes of this paper, I am limiting my question to the relevance of equality for human beings. I am narrowing my categories because morality is a human created concept couched in language, the use of which differentiates humans from other organisms. Dennett claims:
To ascribe an entity with moral status ― whether an adult human, infant, foetus, or non-human animal ― is to declare that its treatment by other moral agents is mo...
...that human morals are a result of evolutionary tendencies. Based on his study in animal behavior, chimpanzees and bonobos in particular, he records evidence of moral behavior in chimpanzees. A significant point that de Waal makes if that animals have not developed to morality to the level exhibited in humans. They do however exhibit behaviors that make up the roots of morality. “Are animals moral? Let us simply say they occupy several floors of the tower of morality” (181). On the contrary, scientists against morality in animals argue that the alleged moral behaviors in animals are due to anthropomorphism and that morality results from religion. The question of morality in animals will most likely remain a complex and controversial question even with increase in research. This is because the argument is based on perspective which is influenced by cultural biases.
The fact that humans can take the lives of animals depicts their lack of moral value in relation to humans. However, if moral value is tied to moral rights, how does one compare the moral rights of humans and animals and why do humans possess more moral rights than nonhuman species? The main reason why some may say that humans possess more moral rights than animals is because they are not self aware and lack cognitive capacities. In Empty Cages: Animal Rights and Vivisection, Tom Regan states that those who deny animals of their rights usually emphasize on the uniqueness of human beings by stating that, "...we understand our own mortality and make moral choices. Other animals do none of these things. That is why we have rights and they do not (p. 100)." However, in The Mental Powers of Man and the Lower Animals by Charles Darwin, he states that animals, or at least nonhuman mammals, share the same cognitive abilities as humans. For instance, nonhuman mammals are able to "learn from experience, remember the past, anticipate the future (p.102)." Additionally, nonhuman mammals are also capable of experiencing fear, jealousy, and sadness. With these cognitive abilities, nonhuman mammals should then be qualified to obtain moral rights, which are
Being able to think and reason should be a primary requirement for deserving dignity and respect. With no ability to think or reason how could an animal even understand that it is being treated differently than other animals. Fukuyama argues this point as well, “Human reason…is pervaded by emotions, and its functioning is in fact facilitated by the latter.” Clearly moral choice cannot exist with out reason but it can also be seen in other feelings such as pride, anger, and shame. Humans are conscious of their actions, in spite of acting on instinct as other animals do. Animals do not contemplate any deeper meaning of life or justify complex mathematical equations or even think about the question ‘why’; Humans, however, do think about those things. It is our conscious thought that sets us apart from any other animal in the world. Yes animals have perception and problem solving abilities, but unlike they are not able to understand complex knowledge based concepts, although they can solve problems within their normal parameters. Every animal on the planet should have the ability to solve problems but only to a certain extent, the extent of survival. When a situation becomes a matter of life or death animals must to be able to learn to live. Survival of the fittest has ultimately
Three objections that could be raised against my argument are; (1) Animals cannot be considered to have inherent value, (2) Only some animals can have value only due to indirect value to humans, and (3) According to Regan’s criterion permanently comatose humans would no longer have moral rights.
A certain state of nature existed for much of the history of the earth where ecosystems and species competed and selected for/against each other, causing evolutionary change. At the point where humans started to domesticate other creatures (by selecting based on simplified understandings of characteristics which was different from those previously selected for), a new era began. This new era created new ethical questions because we developed an inter-species relationship previously non-existent. J. Baird Callicott’s extension of Aldo Leopold’s land ethic addresses a possible ethic toward wild and domestic animals, but doesn’t sufficiently examine why we should treat domestic animals differently than humans and wild animals. Accepting Callicott’s ethic toward wild animals, I argue that domestic animals have evolved to become members in the human ecosystem and should be treated in that way, rather than eliminated (Callicott), treated poorly (factory farms), or liberated (animals libera...
“The assumption that animals are without rights and the illusion that our treatment of them has no moral significance is a positively outrageous example of Western crudity and barbarity. Universal compassion is the only guarantee of morality.”(Arthur Schopenhauer)
Micheal Pollan , a writer for the New York Times magazine published an article on November 10, 2002. “An Animals place”, Concerning the moral issue whether or not its right to consume meat as humans. Pollan also introduces a Peter Singer’s argument, which is very straightforward. Based on equality, We humans are not all equal: “Some are smarter than others, better looking, and more gifted. (Pollan 2). The main idea is to comprehend that “Everyone’s interests should receive equal consideration regardless of what abilities they may posses. (Pollan 2). This is where a question arises and a parallel problem swings along. If one individual has more intelligence and uses another individual for his own purpose, how can we not use animals for the same exact purpose? Not Only did a Pollan’s thesis acknowledge the problem of animal cruelty, but it also proposes a solution that fortified his article. The argument which Pollan bought to our attention were how to treat animals.
Singer’s argument is certainly persuasive. However, his argument only goes so far as to say that speciesism is arbitrary and we should replace one arbitrary measure with another – that of sentience. I think that more needs to be done to show why sentience, not any other quality, should be the defining characteristic for moral consideration.
I think the claim that animals have no rights because they are not moral agents is untrue. I think this is untrue because human concepts cannot be applied nor expected from non-human species.