Paradoxical Trinity Summary

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No one can doubt the prominent and pioneer place that Carl Von Clausewitz occupies within the contemporary military thinkers. Even after almost 200 years since the publication of On War, his theories about war and strategies are still the anchor of discussions among many military historians and analysts. In one of his theories, the Paradoxical Trinity, Clausewitz describes the fundamental nature of war as an interplay between three tendencies: the irrational passion represented by hatred and enmity, the non-rational chance and probability, and the rational reason and policy . His Trinity is better defined as a three-legged stool with each leg representing respectively the physical factor of each tendency: the people, the armed forces, and the government. According to Clausewitz, this stool would be rendered useless if any leg is missing or is shorter than the others. In fact, this theory has been widely debated by many authors of military strategy because of the fundamental changes in war since Clausewitz times. Despite the drastic changes in warfare since the 19th …show more content…

The US Government had no clear political objective that could end the war. In fact, in 1954 President Eisenhower decided that going to this war was not worth the sacrifices that had to be made, but the US bureaucracy at that time failed to adopt a coherent policy . Thus, the US slipped toward war with half measures. Additionally, US commanders and soldiers were geared and trained for large scale combat and, as a result, found it difficult to adapt to the unique requirements of counterinsurgency . US military failed to consider the ideological motive and commitment of the Viet-Cong. The political and military leaders did not estimate the cost of this war, nor did they attempt to assess their opponent strategically

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