Free Carl von Clausewitz Essays and Papers

Carl Philipp Gottfried von Clausewitz was born June 1, 1780 in Burg bei Magdeburg, Prussia. Drawing from influences such as his professor of theology grandfather as well as philosopher Immanuel Kant, Clausewitz is regarded as a very experienced military strategist and the father of war philosophy. Due to my Army ROTC commitment and future career path, I chose him to suit my interests and aspirations. He grew up as the youngest son of a middle class family and became a cadet in the Prussian military

and implications, Carl von Clausewitz assumes a place among the most prominent figures. With his book On War, he demonstrated his capability to provide thorough historical analysis and conclusions of the conflicts in which he was engaged, and as a philosopher he reflected about all encompassing aspects of war. Today, Western armies conduct modern warfare in a dynamic environment composed of flexible and multiple threats in which civilians form a substantial part. Studying Clausewitz provides current

military theorists emerge in the period after the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic War: the Prussian Carl von Clausewitz and the Swiss Antoine-Henri Jomini. In modern military philosophy, the theoretical traditions established by each of these military theorist has significantly impacted our military thinking and their teaching has become essential in the education of modern military leaders. Clausewitz and Jomini have become required reading for today's military professional officer. Frequently, these

in a structured, scientific manner. Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) took a more fluid, open-ended approach to his philosophy of war. The fact that they lived during the same time period in Europe is also fascinating in that they likely knew of each others’ writings as well as potentially influenced and were influenced by the philosophy of the other. Jomini’s scientific approach is more applicable to the tactical and operational levels of war while Clausewitz approaches war as more of an art or

today’s chaotic warfare are strengthened. General Carl von Clausewitz is such a past military enthusiast that contributed to the ideals of the present. Carl von Clausewitz was born in 1780 at Burg. He eventually entered the Prussian Army in 1792. While he had a successful military and writing career, Clausewitz’s fame rests most heavily upon the three volumes of On War, which was not published until after his death,(Graham). In this work, Clausewitz organizes military ideas, theories, and lays the

Question 6: Clausewitz wrote “in war the result is never final.” Under what conditions and through what actions can belligerents make their victory more permanent? Carl Von Clausewitz theorized that “in war the result is never final” and that “the defeated state often considers the outcome as a transitory evil…” (Clausewitz, 80) There are many examples that support his theory that defeated belligerents will wait for another opportunity to achieve their objectives. There are also examples of

American Civil War changed the face of warfare. The theories of both Antione-Henri Jomini and Carl von Clausewitz, the two most prominent military theorists of the 19th Century, can be seen in many aspects of the conflict. While Jomini’s tactics played a large role on the battlefield, the strategic concepts of Carl Von Clausewitz best characterize the nature of the Civil War. The writings of Clausewitz proved prophetic in three distinct areas: the strength of the defense over the offense, the concept

notorious scorched-earth policy. On June 23, 1812 Napoleon's Grande Armee, over 500,000 men strong, poured over the Russian border. An equal amount of Russian forces awaited them. The result of the campaign was a surprise. Two authors, General carl von Clausewitz and Brett James, show similarities in reasons why Napoleon had lost this campaign to Russia. Napoleon believed that after a few quick victorious battles, he could convince Alexander to return to the Continental System. He also decided that

states limited the importance of moral factors. The core of realism remains: national interest trumps all other interest. Necessity and reason supersede morals and ethics. Thus, morality as it relates to strategy is relative, not universal. Carl von Clausewitz describes the essence of war as “the act of force to compel the enemy to do our will.” States have no limits in the amount of force each side will use to reach “absolute victory”. The amount of force must match the effort of the enemy to produce

Clausewitz Clausewitz advocates attacking enemy “schwerpunkt” or centers of gravity. How does this compare with Sun Tzu’s prioritization for attacking important elements of national power? Which theorist provides the most useful guidance for determining the object of a strategy or strategies? Introduction Clausewitz’s attack of enemy centers of gravity and Sun Tzu’s prioritization of attack of important elements of national power provide contrasting approaches to the development of effective