Introduction Even though, at times it seemed that joint functions appeared in chaos, the end-state was a unified effort. There were obstacles that precluded this in the beginning and that are why the joint function of Operation Anaconda nearly failed. The shortages of staff, lack of detailed information flow, and the slow movement on Operation Anaconda D-day was the key factors that nearly led to the failure. Shortage of Staff United States Army prompted and selected Major General Hagenbeck to command the 10th Mountain Division to establish forward Headquarters. Major Gen. Hagenbeck had some significant hurdles to cross. The thinly stretched and highly stressed division headquarters was undermanned because their manpower was already …show more content…
Gen Hagenbeck’s staff informed him of the strength problem so Gen Hagenbeck gave his staff his commander’s intent to improve on getting more troops for the mission. The 10th Mountain left to deploy to Uzbekistan while 101st Airborne Division held in reserve for possible operations in Iraq. The most mindboggling was 101st Airborne Division, with no deployments ongoing and able to perform conduct helicopter air assaults, CENTCOM could have been solve manning problem by deploy the 101ST as a Forward Headquarter. Lack of Information The flow of information was in chaos because commanders of task forces in the field was doing their own reporting information, also not sharing information …show more content…
Staff of 10th Mountain Division took over the planning for Operation Anaconda around middle of February. Writing plan and operation order of the Operation Anaconda “D-day was originally set for February 25, but it fell during a religious holiday, it was moved to February 28. Once CENTCOM approved the operational concept on February 25, planners from all the task forces worked quickly to finalize the details.” operation orders said, “the operation was supposed to last roughly 72 hours total, Gen Hagenbeck received a surprise grift, the weather forecast were bad, so Gen Hagenbeck had to delay the mission until March 2. The weather was so bad, gave 10th Mountain Division time to get more manpower to engage into the fight. By CENTCOM reinforce 10th Mountain Division is made the fight little easy, but it was difficult in Afghanistan because of the terrain and weather. The reinforce manpower came from Fort Campbell, Kentucky and aircraft carrier, John F. Kennedy arrived ready to fight in theater. Operation Anaconda was success because all U.S. and coalition troop work as a unity forces to defeat the adversary. On March 16 10th Mountain Division Commander declared the end of Operation
Unfortunately for the entire army group, Operation Market Garden was to be planned in 7 days. Major General Urquhart’s report on Operation Market states that there was adequate time for the planning of the mission but that due to the necessary risk of multiple airlifts over three days led to the divisions fighting strength to be that of a brigade. In his planning of this Operation, Major General Urquhart had requested more Allied gliders and planes, but seemed content enough to go ahead with the
The war in Afghanistan sparked numerous operations conducted by the U.S. military and its coalition forces. One of the most influential operation until today was Operation Anaconda. Fought in the Shahi-Kot Valley during early march 2002, it was the largest American battle since the Gulf War, and their first high altitude battle ever encounter. The goal of the Operation Anaconda was to eradicate the remaining Taliban and al Qaeda foothold within the eastern region of Afghanistan. Although, originally intended to last three days, Operation Anaconda lasted seventeen days instead, with seven days of intense battle. The U.S. operation Commander, Major General Franklin Hagenbeck, schemed the “hammer and anvil” plan in order to achieve his objective. However, this plan
The award-winning novel by Stephen Ambrose, Band of Brothers: Easy Company, 506th Regiment, 101st Airborne from Normandy to Hitler's Eagle's Nest, discusses one of the greatest examples of mission command in the form of 1st Lieutenant Richard Winters and his role in the Brecourt Manor Assault. This battle is a textbook example of how to fight against a superior enemy force that outnumbered the unit by four times as much. Facing overwhelming odds with just 16 paratroopers against over 60 German Soldiers, 1LT Winters nevertheless prevails and succeeds in achieving his objective while minimizing casualties to just three Soldiers lost. Looking back further into the American Revolution, the Battle of Bunker Hill on the American side is one of the earliest examples of Mission Command under the command of COL William Prescott.
The Battle of Antietam could have been a devastating and fatal blow to the Confederate Army if Gen. McClellan acted decisively, took calculated risks, and veered away from his cautious approach to war. There are many instances leading up to the battle and during the battle in which he lacks the necessary offensive initiative to effectively cripple and ultimately win the war. This paper is intended to articulate the failure of Mission Command by GEN McClellan by pointing out how he failed to understand, visualize, describe and direct the battlefield to his benefit.
The fight on Hamburger Hill took place during Operation Apache Snow, the second part of a three-phased campaign intended to annihilate North Vietnamese Army (NVA) bases in the treacherous A Shau Valley. Five infantry battalions were leading the attack under Major General Melvin Zais, Commander of the 101st Airborne Division. Three units were American (the 1/506th, 2/501st, and 3/187th Infantry) and two came from the 1st Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) Division (the 2/1st and 4/1st ARVN). Colonel Joseph Conmy, Commander of the 3rd Brigade of the 101st Airborne, controlled and lead the main effort of the attack. His plan called for each of the five battalions to "air assault" into the valley by helicopter on 10 May 1969 and to search its assigned sector for enemy troops and...
In order to receive a victory in the Battle of the Bulge, General Patton used Mission Command Analysis in order to understand how he can be successful for this mission. The first thing of understanding t...
3 Colonel John T. Carney Jr., No Room for Error, 273. 4. Richard Kugler, Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan, 3. 5. General Tommy Franks, American Soldier, 1988. 6 Todd Marzano, Criticisms Associated with Operation Anaconda, Can Long Distance Leadership Be Effective, 4. 7 Todd Marzano, Criticisms Associated with Operation Anaconda, Can Long Distance Leadership Be Effective, 6. 8 Sean Naylor, Not a Good Day to Die, 121.
COL Freeman took pride in communicating with his battalion commanders . This was extremely beneficial when it came to the day of 14 February 1951. On this day, COL Freeman called all his commanders in and briefed them on the mission ahead and gave them the warning that he believed the enemy would attack them at the weakest moment, at night. Included in his brief was information about the Chinese would attack their perimeter in overwhelming numbers as soon as night fell. The intelligence was beneficial for commanders so they could plan accordingly for the events of the evening . The Soldiers were even aware of the activities planned . One Soldier wrote “I have been told to keep my carbine on semi-automatic” which shows he knew the order and was awaiting to see the enemy to begin the engagement. The Soldiers knew the mission was to stand their ground and not waiver. When morning would come the air strikes would begin pushing back the Chinese and giving them time to
The battle I will be discussing is the battle of Tora Bora. The engagement took place in the mountains of eastern Afghanistan from December 12, 2001 to December 17, 2001. The units involved were from the CIA, numerous Special Forces groups, Pakistani soldiers and local anti-Taliban fighters. The mission given to the forces was to kill Osama bin Laden from the caves, leave the body with the Taliban and disrupt the Al Qaeda organization by removing their leader. The intent was to infiltrate the cave system, remove bin Laden and return home.
inadequate communication; lack of supporting firepower; and in the final hour before the raid, absolute
Amid the snow-covered hills in the tiny village of Chipyong-Ni, Korea, a battle ridden 23rd Regimental Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division made a decisive stand from February 13-15, 1951 that would lead to the first operational win against a much stronger and larger force. In what some considered being the Gettysburg of the Korean War, the Battle of Chipyong-Ni was a bitterly contested engagement between the X Corp, 23rd Regimental Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division, under the command of COL. Paul Freeman the North Korean People’s Army and the Chinese Communist Forces’ (CCF). This analysis will demonstrate that COL Paul Freemans’ ability to properly use mission command ultimately led to the first operational defeat of the enemy since the Korean War had started.
My opinion CENTCOM did not have adequate control of the US forces in Afghanistan. Once 10th Mountain Division commander realized the problem, therefore; staff of Gen Hagebeck starts putting a plan into effect to establish C4I command, control, communication, and Intel and computer networks. The biggest problem was getting information flowing. The terrain makes it extremely hard for US forces to communicate and perform their command and control functions. With limited communications and many forces in heavy contact, the level of high-priority radio traffic exploded with spot reports. This was a very slow process for sending spot reports back to 10th Mountain Division. More problem can forward, that 10th Mountain needed to have Tactical Control (TACON) so everyone could share information, therefore organizations would report to 10th Mountain Division commander not directly to CENTCOM Commander. By doing it this way, 10th Mountain would report all activity in country. Order to bring cohesion in the command structure, 10th Mountain commander appointed two generals as deputies, which BG Gary Harrell and BG Mike Jones, both experienced as Special Forces Officers, well known among the special operation group. This gave the 10th
military decided to conduct an assault on the Shahikot Valley in Afghanistan using a sizable amount of U.S. ground forces. This was due to the Taliban having control over the Shahikot Valley. However, there was no Unity of Command established. Due to this sizable ground force, General Franks appointed the 10th Mountain Division Commander, Major General (MG) Hagenbeck as the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) commander. MG Hagenback was appointed only days before the operation was to take place. As with COL Mulholland, MG Hagenback did not have control over all of the SOF and CIA Operatives. This lead to the lack of planning within the command and control element of the Operation. Therefore, there was not a defined command structure for Operation Anaconda, resulting in a poor Unity of
It began to emerge the differences in tactics. The question was whether to continue so far the Supreme Allied Commander of the Allied Forces Europe, General Eisenhower’s tactics attacking on a broad front, or due to problems of supply to take just one mighty blow. In that period Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery developed a new operation plan, which would include the use of 1st Airborne Army (Lieutenant General Lewis H. Brereton), actually 1st Airborne Corps (Lieutenant General Frederick Browning). The Corps comprised of 82nd US Airborne Division (Brigadier General James M. Gavin), 101st US Airborne Division (Major General Maxwell D. Taylor), and 1st British Airborne Division (Major General Robert “Roy” E. Urquhart) supported with, under his command, 1st Polish Independent Parachute Brigade (Major General Stanislaw Sosabowski). These units should be dropped along the roa...
A defined chain of command with equal representation from all the armed services coupled with standardized clear communication and training throughout the branches, results in an elite fighting force with endless capabilities. Efficiency is the major goal behind Joint Warfare and so long as the clear channels of communication throughout the services hold true, this goal is attainable. This efficiency, though almost impossible to fully achieve, was seen during Desert Storm. During the Desert Storm campaign, General Schwarztkopf was Commander and Chief of US Central Command (USCINCCENT). His first order of business was to name component commanders.