The Lack of Unity of Command During Operation Anaconda
Throughout military history one of the principles of war is the Unity of Command. Unity of command is the ability to lead campaigns and battles by a single Senior Officer. Although Operation Anaconda was a success it was hindered during its first days of contact due to the lack of Unity of Command. The Unity of Command initially failed due to different commands operating within Afghanistan, a long distance leadership style, the lack of control over all Special Operations Forces, exclusions of the United States Air Force (USAF), and not having a proper Joint staff.
U.S. Forces in Afghanistan
The command and control (C2) element had some flaws. The first being a failure in long distance
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General Franks, who was leading Central Command (CENTCOM) in Florida, had two Component Commands working in Afghanistan. The first was Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) led by Army LTG Mikolashek located at Camp Doha, Kuwait and the second was led by Air Force LTG Mosley Coalition Forces Air Component Command (CFACC) located at Prince Sultan Air Base, Saudi Arabia. Both commanders where operating thousands of miles away from Afghanistan. With both commanders being geographically dislocated from the battle field, this led to a long distance leadership style that was not conducive to the Unity of Command during a time of war (Marzano, …show more content…
military decided to conduct an assault on the Shahikot Valley in Afghanistan using a sizable amount of U.S. ground forces. This was due to the Taliban having control over the Shahikot Valley. However, there was no Unity of Command established. Due to this sizable ground force, General Franks appointed the 10th Mountain Division Commander, Major General (MG) Hagenbeck as the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) commander. MG Hagenback was appointed only days before the operation was to take place. As with COL Mulholland, MG Hagenback did not have control over all of the SOF and CIA Operatives. This lead to the lack of planning within the command and control element of the Operation. Therefore, there was not a defined command structure for Operation Anaconda, resulting in a poor Unity of
Mission Command as defined by the United States Army consists six distinct and critical principles. During World War II there were many examples of exemplary mission command that led to stunning victories for the Allies but also many examples of failure. The Battle for Arnhem or Operation Market-Garden was such a failure. Major General Robert Elliot Urquhart, the Commander of the 1st Airborne Division failed in not only in tactics but the ability to lead his division to victory. He did not completely misunderstand the principles of mission command, but four main areas in which he made critical mistakes were; Build a Cohesive Team Through Mutual Trust, Create a Shared Understanding, Accept Prudent Risk, and Exercise Disciplined Initiative.
The 23rd RCT received the mission to defend Chipyong-Ni in an attempt to bait the CCF to attack with a large force that could be defeated, but the RCT was at 70% strength following the battle at Twin Tunnels (some units were at 60%). The RCT received intelligence reports of multiple CCF Divisions marching towards Chipyong-Ni. COL Freeman requested the RCT be allowed to pull back 15 miles to prevent encirclement and was approved by MG Almond, but was overturned by LTG Ridgway. LTG Ridgway, the newly assigned Eighth Army Commander, did not allow retreat and always wanted to make contact with the enemy. He relieved his G-3 on the spot for giving him retreat contingency plans.
Mission command is the commander's use of authority and direction to empower adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations. It helps subordinates exercise disciplined initiative when operating within their commander’s intent. To facilitate effective mission command, commanders must accomplish four consecutive stages of the operations process. They must thoroughly understand the problem, visualize a solution that achieves a desired end state, and then accurately describe this visualization in order to direct the organization. Commanders continually lead and assess their organizations and provide input and influence to their subordinates and staff.
The award-winning novel by Stephen Ambrose, Band of Brothers: Easy Company, 506th Regiment, 101st Airborne from Normandy to Hitler's Eagle's Nest, discusses one of the greatest examples of mission command in the form of 1st Lieutenant Richard Winters and his role in the Brecourt Manor Assault. This battle is a textbook example of how to fight against a superior enemy force that outnumbered the unit by four times as much. Facing overwhelming odds with just 16 paratroopers against over 60 German Soldiers, 1LT Winters nevertheless prevails and succeeds in achieving his objective while minimizing casualties to just three Soldiers lost. Looking back further into the American Revolution, the Battle of Bunker Hill on the American side is one of the earliest examples of Mission Command under the command of COL William Prescott.
The mission command philosophy helps commanders counter the uncertainty of operations by reducing the amount of certainty needed to act. Commanders can build teams and achieve their final goals through adapting the six principles of mission command to warfighting situation. I analyzed and compared the performance of General Sherman and General Hampton in four of six mission command principles.
Operation Anaconda was an offensive operation conducted by Coalition Forces during the first invasion of Afghanistan. It was the last major operation to take place during the campaign (). While the operation was successful, there were many arduous battles that had to be fought in order to secure victory. One of these battles in particular stands out due to the sheer number of difficulties and setbacks that occurred during the engagement. This battle has become known as the Battle of Roberts Ridge. For the purpose of this Battle Analysis the Battle of Roberts Ridge will be analyzed with regards to the characteristics of an offense, in particular Surprise, Tempo, and Audacity.
3 Colonel John T. Carney Jr., No Room for Error, 273. 4. Richard Kugler, Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan, 3. 5. General Tommy Franks, American Soldier, 1988. 6 Todd Marzano, Criticisms Associated with Operation Anaconda, Can Long Distance Leadership Be Effective, 4. 7 Todd Marzano, Criticisms Associated with Operation Anaconda, Can Long Distance Leadership Be Effective, 6. 8 Sean Naylor, Not a Good Day to Die, 121.
The performance of Major General Ambrose E. Burnside at the helm of the Army of the Potomac can be characterized as less than stellar. His failures to understand, describe, lead, and assess during the Battle of Fredericksburg ultimately led to his army’s defeat and the death of tens of thousands of Federal soldiers. The fate of the mission and our soldiers rely on our ability to conduct mission command activities. It is essential we learn from the grave mistakes of the commanders of the past and become prepared to carry out these activities when we are called to do
The 2nd Brigade of 101st Airborne Division found out in the summer of 2004 that they had to prepare for the war in the Middle East more particularly for Iraq. With Colonel Todd Ebel in Command of the 2nd Division with a year to prepare over 3,400 men and woman he got right to work. Colonel Ebel started by choosing his staff and who he thought was fit to take charge and lead this ever more complicated war. It was a huge religious civil war taking place in Iraq at the time with the Sunnis at war against the Shi’ite and after the capture of Saddam insurgency started uprising immediately. This uprising along with the uprising of Muqtada al-Sadr a key leader that had lots of violent followers that soon grew into a form of a militia called Mahdi Army which became another huge problem for the U.S. because the line between a legitamite populist movement and a huge theocratic organized-crime and terror ring was a thin one. The 2nd Brigade Infantry Battalions consisted of 1-502nd (First Strike) and 2-502nd (Strike Force) and 2nd brigade as a whole is known as the “Black Hearts”. Ebel’s mission was to deny insurgent’s access to Baghdad through his AO and as intelligence increased to uproot and destroy insurgent safe havens, while also training the IA so they could ensure the stability of the region later on. Ebel chose Lt. Col. Kunk as commander of “First Strike” 1-502nd and Lt. Col. Haycock as commander of “Strike Force” 2-502nd. By Ebel’s personality evaluations of Kunk and Haycock he decided that Kunk would work in the area that involved him being more engaging where populist centers were and work with local officials and Haycock more in the fighting areas. Kunk was in command of 3 rifle companies, 1 weapons company, 1 logistics company...
COL Freeman’s first step in the operations process was to understand the operational environment and the problem he was facing. The mission of the 23rd RCT at Chipyong-ni was to dominate the road intersection at the center of the village and occupy the high ground ringing t...
The commander’s intent is a critical part of mission command. The commander, through the commander’s intent, must blend the art of command and the science of control that integrates all joint warfighting functions. ADM Wesley McDonald, Commander US Atlantic Command (LANTCOM), failed to convey the commander’s intent to the joint force for Operation Urgent Fury. This failure promoted misunderstanding and mutual trust issues among the joint force that affected the integration of joint functions such as intelligence and sustainment.
The book Black Hearts by Jim Frederick is an in-depth narrative about the 1st platoon, Bravo Company 1-502nd Infantry 101st Airborne Division deployed to Iraq in 2005. The leadership failures documented in this book range all the way from the general officer level down to the lowest private. LT general Ricardo Sanchez failed to understand the climate his command group was entering as they were deployed into Iraq. From then on the entire leadership failures continued to compound upon each other with improper time to plan. It is customary to have a six month lead time to have a proper battle hand off when preparing to take over an AO from another unit. To compound this problem, the entire time the 502nd was in pre-deployment training, they were preparing for the rigors of urban combat. In reality, they were given six weeks to recon their new area of responsibility and were going to a countryside crafted by the heavens for guerilla warfare. As Colonel Ebel said in the book, “It is not going to be an easy road. They are not even sure of what they have in the area. It just feels bad. We can expect a real fight.”
Since the beginning of the retreat from Kabul, General William Elphinstone never provided a clear commander’s intent to his subordinate leaders and Soldiers. His lack of confidence and indecisiveness made the situation worse. He tried to stop the retreat as thousands of troops and camp followers were already half way leaving the cantonment. Elphinestone ordered one of his officers, Collin Mackenzie, to stop the retreat and make the retreating forces go back to the cantonment in Kabul. Mackenzie, tried to convince Elphinestone that this would be fatal. Half of the troops inside the cantonment and the other half out of the cantonment left them vulnerable to an enemy attack. Mackenzie ignored Elphinestone’s order and he kept moving the troops
Successful leadership on a battlefield can be measured in different ways. It is possible for a good, successful leader to lose a battle. Conversely, it is possible for an ineffective leader to win a battle, given the right circumstances. What distinguishes a successful leader from an unsuccessful one is his/her ability to oversee an operation using effective mission command. In ADP 6-0, mission command as a philosophy is defined as “as the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations” (ADP, 1). William Henry Harrison, Governor of the Indiana Territory, executed good mission command in the Battle of Tippecanoe because of his ability to effectively utilize the doctrinal tasks of “understand, visualize, describe, direct, and lead” operations.
A defined chain of command with equal representation from all the armed services coupled with standardized clear communication and training throughout the branches, results in an elite fighting force with endless capabilities. Efficiency is the major goal behind Joint Warfare and so long as the clear channels of communication throughout the services hold true, this goal is attainable. This efficiency, though almost impossible to fully achieve, was seen during Desert Storm. During the Desert Storm campaign, General Schwarztkopf was Commander and Chief of US Central Command (USCINCCENT). His first order of business was to name component commanders.