Since the beginning of the retreat from Kabul, General William Elphinstone never provided a clear commander’s intent to his subordinate leaders and Soldiers. His lack of confidence and indecisiveness made the situation worse. He tried to stop the retreat as thousands of troops and camp followers were already half way leaving the cantonment. Elphinestone ordered one of his officers, Collin Mackenzie, to stop the retreat and make the retreating forces go back to the cantonment in Kabul. Mackenzie, tried to convince Elphinestone that this would be fatal. Half of the troops inside the cantonment and the other half out of the cantonment left them vulnerable to an enemy attack. Mackenzie ignored Elphinestone’s order and he kept moving the troops
Custer’s failure to exercise the operations process had strategic consequences. His initial understanding was incomplete and precipitated the chain of decisions that led to his defeat. He did not visualize a realistic approach, and failed to thoroughly describe his plan of attack to his subordinates. Finally, he was unable to effectively direct his forces during the battle due to poor communication and a complicated chain of command. Had he taken the time to develop a full understanding of the situation, Custer would have lost the opportunity for a decisive engagement but may have survived to fight in more favorable conditions. Instead of accepting prudent risk, he gambled his entire force and lost.
LTC George Armstrong Custer did not effectively apply the concept of mission command as a warfighting function during the Battle of Little Bighorn. While it is important to understand the context in which Custer made his decisions, those circumstances offer little in terms of excusing the fiasco that was Little Bighorn. Custer failed to follow orders, did not take pertinent intelligence into consideration, did not adequately plan or execute protection of his forces, and fought without essential fires equipment available to him. Custer did exercise good sustainment, but it was for naught, as the battle was brief.
The Battle of Antietam could have been a devastating and fatal blow to the Confederate Army if Gen. McClellan acted decisively, took calculated risks, and veered away from his cautious approach to war. There are many instances leading up to the battle and during the battle in which he lacks the necessary offensive initiative to effectively cripple and ultimately win the war. This paper is intended to articulate the failure of Mission Command by GEN McClellan by pointing out how he failed to understand, visualize, describe and direct the battlefield to his benefit.
... Regulars were misdirected by the locals and steered away from the smaller militia supply caches that remained in the town. While the searches were being conducted in the town of Concord, two companies of Regulars were trying to maintain the North Bridge. The Regulars were engaged by approximately 400 militiamen. After the engagement, the Regulars retreated back towards the town of Concord. Lieutenant Colonel Smith heard the gunfire coming from the North Bridge area and sent two grenadier companies to reinforce the infantry companies at the North Bridge. The two grenadier companies were able to link up with the three decimated infantry companies. This action left the companies of Regulars conducting the searches isolated and the road leading to Concord without protection. At this time Lieutenant Colonel Smith gave the orders to begin the march back towards Boston.
Anderson received a letter from Gen. Beauregard telling him to evacuate the fort or he will force them out. Anderson refused, even though the lack of supplies would force him to evacuate. He replied to Beauregard that unless he received instructions or supplies from Washington by noon April 15 he would evacuate.
The final plan for the operation called for a main drive against the Southern face of the salient, a second drive from the west and then holding attacks and raids at the tip. The I and IV Corps were going to be the main attack forces. I Corps, commanded by Major-General H. Liggett, included the 82nd, 90th, 5th and 2nd Divisions was set up on the Southern side of the salient, with the 78th, 18th and 33rd Division in reserve (see Map 2). The IV Corps, lead by Major-General Dickman was set up right along side and to the West of I Corps and contained the 89th, 42nd and 1st Divisions with the 3rd Division in reserve (see Map2).
According to Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-0, mission command philosophy is, “the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable discipline initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations.” Commanders execute mission command throughout all phases of the operations process. ADP 5-0 states that, “Commanders drive the operations process.” The six steps that allow Commanders to drive the operations process are: understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, and assess. I will discuss four of these steps used by COL Freeman’s analyze his ability to properly execute mission command in this Battle.
General William Childs Westmoreland is a figure that is inextricably linked with the Vietnam War and he is the man that embodies the event to the American people. To look at a timeline of his life is to look at a steady progression to his command in Vietnam. Beyond that he dealt with the aftermath. In effect, it was the defining feature of his life, and Westmoreland was the defining face of Vietnam. His were the policies that kept us in the war, and his were the policies that many claimed lost it. In his own words, “The President never tried to tell me how to run the war. The tactics and battlefield strategy of running the war were mine. He did not interfere with this. He deferred to my judgment, and he let me run the war or pursue tactics and battlefield strategy as I saw fit.” As a result, his decisions had a direct and long lasting effect on America, and its worldview. Three themes run through Westmoreland’s life and help to explain his role in the Vietnam War. His character, likeable, responsible, but conservative, stubborn, and even plodding, was certainly a salient aspect of his career. His upbringing, education, and military experience helped define that character and prepared him, for better or worse, for his eventual command. Finally there was what might be called the system itself, the institutions and their ideologies that steadily promoted him, often, it would seem, for reasons having little to do with merit, to a command in which he found himself in many respects overmatched at home and in the theater of operations. The execution, the outcome, and the ultimate effects consequences of the Vietnam War cannot be viewed as entirely the result of any one man’s actions, but William Westm...
On the eve of March 16th 1968 Captain Medina briefed his men on the mission into the region of Quang Ngai, specifically the town of My Lai.(Eckhardt) He gave the orders to go into the town of my lai and lay ground fire, meaning not to shoot at civilians but to shoot the ground or into the air to give a warning to civilians.(Eckhardt) The orders that he gave came from Lieutenant Colonel Frank Barker, who briefed Medina on the morning of the 16th and told him there would be no civilians in the town or vicinity of My Lai. Barker told Medina that Vietcong had retreated into the region of Quang Ngai, and especially into the town of My Lai....
page 175 “No help or backing was to be had then from his high-born comrades; that hand-picked troop broke ranks and ran for their lives to safety of the wood.” (Heaney)
but his escort was held captive and he was murdered. Akbar Khan paraded through Kabul with a bloodstained sword, boasting that he killed Macnaghten, but told the British that it was another person who had done it. To show his good faith, he returned the British Soldiers that were escorting Macnaghten. By the time General Elphinestone decided to retreat, his Soldiers were lacking food, ammunition and temperatures were dropping. Multiple negotiations were made between the British and the Afghans in order to have a safe retreat from Kabul to Jalalabad, but the British were betrayed by the Afghans. Elphinestone’s troops were witnessing these negotiations and noticing that they were being betrayal by the Afghans constantly. When troops and
The book Black Hearts by Jim Frederick is an in-depth narrative about the 1st platoon, Bravo Company 1-502nd Infantry 101st Airborne Division deployed to Iraq in 2005. The leadership failures documented in this book range all the way from the general officer level down to the lowest private. LT general Ricardo Sanchez failed to understand the climate his command group was entering as they were deployed into Iraq. From then on the entire leadership failures continued to compound upon each other with improper time to plan. It is customary to have a six month lead time to have a proper battle hand off when preparing to take over an AO from another unit. To compound this problem, the entire time the 502nd was in pre-deployment training, they were preparing for the rigors of urban combat. In reality, they were given six weeks to recon their new area of responsibility and were going to a countryside crafted by the heavens for guerilla warfare. As Colonel Ebel said in the book, “It is not going to be an easy road. They are not even sure of what they have in the area. It just feels bad. We can expect a real fight.”
... understood and emulated the tenets of mission command throughout the Battle of Bunker Hill, he was able to understand his orders and ensure that the orders he disseminated were concise and easily understood. He visualized where his weaknesses were on the hill and described to his engineers how to overcome their lack of soldiers and build a defensive position that could repel British forces. Throughout the entire battle COL Prescott would run the ramparts making assessments and adjustments to his lines and shouting orders to his soldiers. Facing an enemy he knew he could not defeat in a full fight COL Prescott accepted a high level of risk and moved to destroy as many British soldiers as he could before abandoning his post. While considered a loss by American forces, COL Prescott’s use of mission command attributes to later victories in the American Revolution.
I partially disagree with this statement, as it seems from the source that not all the generals were incompetent, but it was rather their higher ranking commanders that were forcing them to send out their men. It is, however, agreed that whoever was sending the order’s was an imbecile. It was clear to the English side that they were being slaughtered every time they sent a row of men into No Mans Land, and no progress was being made yet the commanders making the
When a soldier doesn’t follow the orders they were given it doesn’t only affect themselves, it also affects everyone in the team and the mission they were assigned. When a soldier does not comply with the order, the goal is hurt and the chance to win the war diminishes. When you're in the army you need to stop and think about it if it will hurt you or your battle buddies. When a soldier does not obey orders in combat zone, it makes the mission ineffective. If a single soldier is ineffective in the combat, it will lower the chances of winning the war. For example, if the Sergeant tells a private before going out for the mission that he needs to get the gun ready — so they can be ready and fully play their roles when it's needed in the combat – it does not matter if the private does not know why he has to do what he was told, the soldier needs to follow the order without any problems. When the soldier follows the instruction without any problems, it is very helpful and improves the likelihood of winning the war. Soldiers must be able to obey the order, and effectively accomplish these tasks because it helps release tension from the leader and other members of the team and it allows every soldier in the team to know what their tasks and goals are. Eventually, everyone will work as a team and get the job done