The commander’s intent is a critical part of mission command. The commander, through the commander’s intent, must blend the art of command and the science of control that integrates all joint warfighting functions. ADM Wesley McDonald, Commander US Atlantic Command (LANTCOM), failed to convey the commander’s intent to the joint force for Operation Urgent Fury. This failure promoted misunderstanding and mutual trust issues among the joint force that affected the integration of joint functions such as intelligence and sustainment.
ADM McDonald failed to clearly and concisely convey his commander’s intent express to the joint force. The commander must clearly and concisely express what the force must do and the conditions the force must establish to accomplish the mission. ADM Mcdonald received guidance from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) for Operation Urgent Fury. ADM McDonald issued the guidance to the LANTCOM staff that began the planning process for the operation. Based his guidance, the staff developed a phased operation that establishing the endstate and the conditions to meet that end. However, LANTCOM excluded staff planners from other services during the early stages of planning. The exclusion resulted in a joint force unsure of the commander’s intent and the part each service would play during the operation. For example, the LANTCOM held a pre-deployment conference a few days before the invasion. The 82nd Airborne Division planners departed the conference unsure of the division’s role for the operation. LANTCOM plan for Operation Urgent Fury resulted in a navy plan for joint operations instead of a joint plan for joint operation. The failure to convey the commander’s intent ensured a joint force conducting indep...
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... of Staff, Joint Operations, Joint Publication 3-0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 11 August 2011),III-10
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations, Joint Publication 2-01 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 5 January 2012).pg II-6
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operations, Joint Publication 3-0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 11 August 2007), pg III-35
. Richard W. Stewart, Operation Urgent Fury: The Invasion of Grenada, October 1983 (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2008),pg12
Richard W. Stewart, Operation Urgent Fury: The Invasion of Grenada, October 1983 (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2008),pg28
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mission Command White Paper (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 3 April 2012),pg 3
COL Prescott’s role in the Battle of Bunker Hill, or more correctly know as the Battle of Breed’s Hill, is a great example of how to properly execute mission command. An overview from The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour (Moncure) reveals a number of operation and strategic objectives that the American militia had to consider. In this instance, COL Prescott takes charge of 1200 men with instructions to defend against incoming British forces that were seeking to occupy the surrounding hills during the Siege of Boston campaign. COL Prescott utilized a variety of steps in the operations process that contributed to his expert utilization of mission command over his forces. Through various sources from published works by experts on the subject, COL Prescott’s mission command demonstrates its effectiveness in his understanding of the situation against the British, his visualization to create an end state for t...
Desert Vets. 06 March 2011 <www.desertvets.org/main-pages/desert-storm.htm>. Finlan, Alastair. The Gulf War 1991. Great Britain: Osprey Publishing, 2003.
United States (2006). The Multi-service tactics, techniques, and procedures for technical intelligence, Army field manual 2-22.401, Washington, DC: Headquarters, Dept. of the Army.
13 Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, China’s National Defense in 2010 (Beijing, China: Information Office of the State Council, March 31, 2011), 6, http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_7114675.htm (accessed February 10, 2012).
The complexities inherent to Command and Control (C2) of a large homogeneous armed force can be overwhelming even to the most experienced. Adding other countries’ leadership, experience, requirements, training and tactics to a combined and multi-lateral endeavor adds even more complexity to unity of command and control, not to mention all other functional requirements. This essay will evaluate the deficiencies associated with the joint functions during Operation Husky using the three attributes of mission command from joint doctrine: commander’s intent, understanding, and mutual trust. It will also evaluate two additional joint functions, intelligence and movement and maneuver, for an Allied force that was created to deliver an Axis defeat
In April of 1980, U.S. military forces comprised of elements from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines attempted, a now infamous operation, to rescue fifty-three hostages in Tehran, Iran – Operation Eagle Claw.2 Unlike Operation Acid Gambit, Eagle Claws failures in intelligence, rehearsals, integration, and Command and Control proved catastrophic. The failures in intelligence caused an increase in the required personnel and aircraft. Although branch specific rehearsals were conducted well above standard, there was little to no joint training that occurred. Moreover, there was no clear chain of command. A participant who remains unnamed, but was involved in this operation is credited with the following remarks, “Even when the best opinions are put together, the page is littered with dotted lines of coordinati...
Throughout my twenty-five year career I have been witness to many mistakes that I have seen time and time again. It can be hard for some individuals to learn from these mistakes and then keep making them. One experience we cannot allow to happen again is the failure in leadership that allowed Task Force Smith to go into combat and not be able to complete its mission. In this paper, we will examine what lead to the escalation of force in Korea, the poor readiness, leadership, training, and equipping of the Soldiers of Task Force Smith. Task force Smith was not a failure because of its men, it was a failure at many levels due to the lack of funding and foresight into our future enemies, and where our Soldier would fight our nation’s battles.
The command structure in the early stages of Operation Enduring Freedom evolved, rapidly changed, and contributed to the lessons learned that shaped the command structure model for both post Operation Anaconda Operations Enduring and Iraqi Freedom. This evolution however, did not come without a price. More specifically frustrations with inefficiencies and confusion created by the multiple dislocated command structures during Operation Anaconda. Furthermore, due to a lack of authority over assets and key role players, competing commands hindered efficiency and effectiveness during Operation Anaconda.
Phythian, M 2009, ‘Intelligence analysis today and tomorrow’, Security Challenges, vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 67-83.
A defined chain of command with equal representation from all the armed services coupled with standardized clear communication and training throughout the branches, results in an elite fighting force with endless capabilities. Efficiency is the major goal behind Joint Warfare and so long as the clear channels of communication throughout the services hold true, this goal is attainable. This efficiency, though almost impossible to fully achieve, was seen during Desert Storm. During the Desert Storm campaign, General Schwarztkopf was Commander and Chief of US Central Command (USCINCCENT). His first order of business was to name component commanders.
I have organized this paper into five distinct sections; mission, task organization, capabilities, limitations, and finally the conclusion. After the reading and comprehension of this paper, you should have gained a basic understanding of the Special Forces (SF) Chemical Reconnaissance Detachments (CRD). The following paper is mixed with Unclassified (UCI) and For Official Use Only (FOUO) information. FOUO is annotated at the beginning of all For Official Use Only information, the rest of the paper is UCI. If you wish to share this information paper with others, please at a minimum; confirm identity of the person prior to providing (FM 380-5, 2000). For further handling instructions please refer to FM 380-5, or contact me, I will gladly answer all questions.
The Technical Escort Unit (TEU) now provides the Department of Defense and other federal agencies to include the Secret Service and the Federal Bureau of Investigation with an immediate response capability for chemical and biological warfare material. Its mission is to provide a global response for escorting, packaging, detection, rendering-safe, disposing, sampling, analytics, and remediation missions. This does not only include chemical weapons for which it was originally created, but now incorporates biological weapons, state sponsored laboratories, small independent laboratories and small non-weaponized radioactive materials. Most recently, they have been task organized to assist Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) as a force multiplier; the objective of this is to give the Battle Field Commander instant on the ground intelligence regarding Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) hazards within their Area of Operations (AO). With this new mission with the BCT, the TEU is becoming an expeditionary force.
I planned, coordinated and supervised the construction of a 35 Kilometer perimeter berm at FLB DOGWOOD, Iraq. This was the earliest complete fortifications around the perimeter of a base that housed more than eight thousand Soldiers. My engineering expertise was critical as units pursued the improvement of security of the Iraqi infrastructure in the Multi-National Division (South East) Area of Responsibility (AOR). I effectively mentored and worked with Base Defense Liaison Team of the 317th Rear Area Operations Center (RAOC). I provided guidance, oversight and design on perimeter Entry Control Points (ECPs) and conducted weekly checks and improvements to improve Force Protection (FP). I inspected mounted guard posts, initiated requests for
Rotfeld, Adam D. 1998. “Prescriptions for Improving OSCE Effectiveness in Responding to the Risks and Challenges of the 21st Century” Presented to the 3rd International Security Forum and 1st Conference of the PfP Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes. http://www.isn.ethz.ch/3isf/Online_Publications/WS5/WS_5B/Rotfeld.htm