Judge Posner's Challenge to the Philosophy of Law

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Judge Posner's Challenge to the Philosophy of Law

ABSTRACT: This paper presents a conceptual analysis of Richard Posner's empirical theory of judicial behavior. His theory opposes the conventional view which holds that judges are insulated from external pressures so their judicial decisions will be based upon a disinterested understanding of the law. Since economics holds that all people — including judges — attempt to maximize their utilities, Posner thinks that the conventional view is an embarrassment which presumes judges are not rational. His theory holds that the judicial insulation has actually left judges maximizing their utilities by trading judicial utility against leisure utility. Posner's theory presents a challenge to the hope for a disinterested judiciary. It threatens as well to eliminate the philosophy of law by reducing it to what he calls antecedent conditions.

The Judge's oath requires him to judge according to the law, not according to his pleasure. — Plato, Apology

The hard fact is that sometimes we must make decisions we do not like. We make them because they are right, right in the sense that the law and the Constitution, as we see them, compel the result — Justice Kennedy concurring, Texas v Gregory Lee Johnson

In the context of his experience on the bench and his interest in the general theoretical approach of "Law and Economics," Richard Posner has developed an important empirical theory about judicial behavior which has significant national and international implications. In the economic analysis of law, economics, understood roughly as capitalism, is taken as fundamental to the understanding and application of law. Posner's theory is presented as a further development of the general progra...

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...hey disinterestedly understand it. Justice Kennedy's qualification of "as we see them" forsakes a notion of platonic objectivity.

(5) Ibid, p. 10.

(6) Qua academic, I would note the parallel to university professors and teaching, though the university achieves the outcome with distribution of reward and punishment devices not applicable to the Article III judges.

(7) Along with the use of stare decisis, Posner cites others such as "... the multitude of devices, most judge-invented, for ducking issues ... : the issue is moot or unripe, or calls for an advisory opinion, or presents a nonjusticable political question, or the party pressing it lacks standing, or the appeal was filed a day late, or the appellant had failed to exhaust some administrative or judicial remedy. These devices enable judges to reduce their workload, ..." Ibid, p. 21.

(8) Ibid, pp 2-3.

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