Direct Utilitarianism

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Charity should not be compulsory, it is arguably morally correct to do so if the exceptions’ are met. Although in a globalized world, the gifts given are not often times charitable. Voluntary work is a charitable manner, and ought to be reasonable successful. Many corporations have granted non-profit community organizations to make charity a non-compulsory means but more of a voluntary aspect. Grants are funded in order to boost economic opportunities.
Looking at a Deontological perspective, which bases ethics on an ideal of duty. Morality stems from mankind’s freedom revealed in our freedom. If it was voluntary, we wield ought to conceiving of our duties. At first glance, one might believe they ought to be charity. Voluntarily makes it self-improvement …show more content…

Ordinarily, we think a person is morally entitled to favors herself or her family (to some extent) over other people, but direct (or acts) utilitarianism claims that our obligations depend on an impersonal assessment of the consequences of our actions, and if we have a choice between doing more for strangers or less for ourselves and/or our friends and relations, then we must give preference to the strangers. Ordinary morality is ‘agent-relative’ and allows each person to favor those near and dear to him, but for utilitarianism each person is fundamentally morally equal to every other, and any favoritism must be justified by overall good consequences for people generally. This ends up making direct (or acts) utilitarianism a rather demanding moral doctrine, and opponents of such utilitarianism often criticize it for being too demanding. But this charge can be evaded or rendered less damaging if one adopts a form of direct utilitarianism that doesn't require the production of as much good/pleasure as possible as a condition of right action. Utilitarian’s must hold that producing more good is always better, but Bentham (in his earlier years), Karl Popper, and (more recently) Judith Lichtenberg, Michael Slote, and Michael Stocker have all formulated versions of act-utilitarianism allowing for an act to count as morally (all) right if it produces enough on-balance good/pleasure, even if the agent could have produced more on-balance good/pleasure. Such ‘satisficing’ utilitarianism allows for moral supererogation and is, therefore, less demanding than more standard optimizing/maximizing versions of act-utilitarianism. But recent theorists such as Peter Railton, Samuel Scheffler, and Shelly Kagan have questioned whether the charge of over-demandingness really can be made to stick against standard forms of act-utilitarianism (and

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