Desert storm

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Officially, on August 2, 1990, the United Nations passed Resolution 660 which: Condemned the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Demanded that Iraq vacate its forces from Kuwait and called on Iraq and Kuwait to begin “intense negotiations for the resolution of their differences, and decides to meet again as necessary.” Eventually the United Nations passed Resolution 678, that authorized “Member States” to “use all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area.” Thus history, the fickle maiden that reveals truth but by the payment of blood, had postured the world for yet another war, one that would be a spectacle as well as a benchmark in warfare.
According to Rick Atkinson, author of “Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War,” the foremost miscalculation by Saddam Hussein was that “the industrialized West would turn the other cheek when a fifth of the world’s trillion-barrel oil reserve fell under Baghdad’s dominion.” In addition to Saddam Hussein thinking that the invasion and occupation of Kuwait, a relatively unknown country in the Middle East, would result in nothing more than annexation, Atkinson writes “Saddam failed to reassure Fahd [King of Saudi Arabia] of his benign intentions toward Saudi Arabia,” forcing Saudi Arabia to seek help from Washington. However, Hussein remained obstinate foregoing mediation endeavors from Arab, Soviet, and French states.
Thus, on January 17, the war begun with simultaneous Apache airstrikes against Spoonrest Advanced Warning Radar installations and F117’s dropping invisible death upon unsuspecting air defense centers. Tomahawk Cruise missiles launched from the USS Wisco...

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...the relentless air attacks from the Allies, and living on little rations, the Iraqi soldier was demoralized, exhausted tired and lacked a will to fight, proving that the pre-war strategy had worked.
G-Day +1 (February 25)
As the ground offensive matured in its objectives it became quite clear that the Corps of the Iraqi military was badly out matched, and suffering heavy loses. Atkinson writes, “Other than surrendering-or dying- the enemy was doing little,” a theme that would remain a constant up until the cease fire (Atkinson 401).
Although many Iraqi’s regiments had collapsed under the weight of the Allied superiority, on G-day +1, however, “the deep penetration of Coalition forces in the western side of the III Corps prompted several Iraqi battalion-size counterattacks from divisions along the flanks of the penetration. These units took heavy losses” (Rice 02).

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