i) The plaintiff has a general fear of dogs. The defendants own a bullmastiff-kelpie dog. They invited the plaintiff and her companions into their house while it was inside. The plaintiff fled from the house as soon as she saw the dog move towards her, although it did not react to her in an aggressive manner. Her quick retreat caused her to slip and fall on the patio, sustaining personal injuries. ii) The primary judge of the district court concluded that the risk was not foreseeable and found in favour of the defendants. The plaintiff appeals on the grounds that the primary judge erred by failing to determine that: (a) the appellant’s response was foreseeable and reasonable, (b) the risk was significant, and (c) the respondents should have …show more content…
Due to the proximity of relationship satisfying the “neighbour” test, a recognised duty of care exists between an occupier and visitor . Therefore, as the respondents were the occupiers of the premises, they owed a duty of care to the appellant, provided that the appellant was using reasonable care for her own safety. This case raises the issue of negligence and whether or not the respondents breached the duty of care they owed to the appellant. Just because there were measures that someone could have taken to avoid the risk, it does not necessarily mean that they have breached their duty of care . The legal requirements for there to be a breach of duty of care are that: (a) the risk must be foreseeable and (b) not insignificant, and (c) a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would have taken precautions to prevent the risk in that situation . Whether or not the legal requirements were satisfied must be determined prospectively , not in hindsight …show more content…
Furthermore, as the respondents were prepared to let the appellant and her companions (one of whom was a child) into the lounge room, it can be inferred that the respondents thought the dog posed no risk to the entrants. Therefore it was unreasonable to expect the respondents to have foreseen that there was a risk the appellant would flee from the house when she saw the dog. Thus, it was not reasonable to expect the respondents to have foreseen that a visitor may have a general fear of dogs, or that the appellant would have reacted in that
It was found in the respondents submissions that a duty of care was necessary. The issue of negligence he believed was unsustainable as the risks were minimal and it was not unusual to take one’s eyes off the road. Causation was not satisfied as the judge concluded that the respondent would not have had enough time in any circumstance to avoid a collision with the cow.
Duty: The general rule for premises liability is that there is a duty to keep the premises in reasonably safe conditions. Vicky was a trespasser on the land because she had no express or implied consent to be there. In light of this relationship, because Vicky was a trespasser, under the traditional common law categories, there is no duty but to not willfully or wantonly harm the trespasser.
Summary Judgment should be granted only upon a showing that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Rairigh, 59 Md. App. 305, 313, cert. denied, 301 Md. 176 (1984). If there is a conflict between the inferences which may be drawn from the evidence before the court, summary judgment is not proper. Boucher v. Riner, 68 Md. App. 539, 543 (1986) (quoting Coffey v. Derby Steel Co., 291 Md. 241, 246-247 (1981)). Unless the facts are so clear as to permit a conclusion as a matter of law, it is for the trier of fact to determine whether a defendant’s negligent conduct amounts to gross negligence. Jacob v. Davis, 128 Md.App. 433, 465 (1999) (quoting Artis v. Cyphers, 100 Md.App. 633, 652 (1994)). Generally, exculpatory agreements otherwise valid are not construed to cover the more extreme forms of negligence-wilful, wanton, reckless, or gross. Winterstein v. Wilcom, 16 Md.App. 130, 136 (1972).
After a regular customer mixed up the cellar door to be the gentlemen’s toilets and after opening it fell down the concrete steps to his death.The man stayed undiscovered to anyone as the owner was away to attend a programme on wellbeing and security. The prosecution contended that the owner of the pub was culpable, notwithstanding him not being available at the time of the occurrence, as he had not put enough cautioning signs nor he did lock the cellar door. The court held that the defendant could have made obliged measures to diminish the crossing of customers through the basement door, which was just a step from the ladies’ restrooms. This was a fair instance of gross negligence manslaughter as there had been few incidents of clients being confused between the cellar door and the toilet door. Moreover, when the defendant had begun the business in 2009, he was mindful that the cellar door could be risky for customers coming to the
Ga code states that the owner of premises is liable to any damages to persons for injuries caused by failure to exercise ordinary care in keeping the premises and approaches safe. Ga. Code Ann. § 51-3-1 (2016). In Brownlee v. Winn-Dixie Atlanta, 240 Ga. App. 368, 523 S.E.2d 596 (1999), the court defined the concept of premises liability to depend on pre-existing conditions, the proprietor’s superior knowledge of the defects on the premises and a foreseeable knowledge that the proprietor’s actions or inaction would cause injury to the plaintiff. Based on the facts of our case it is clear that the apartment manager was negligent in keeping the premises safe. Ms. Traylor was informed that the premises were safe due to a number of factors that included a well-lit parking lot. However, after she complained to of the physical defects within the parking lot, no action was taken to fix the defect.
A police officer, Colin Allcars (Allcars), is suing Harry’s Ammo World (HAW) for his medical expenses, personal injuries, pain and suffering. HAW sold a rifle to Dakota D. West without checking West’s background for felonies or drug use. Federal law prevents the sale of firearms to anyone with a felony or to anyone that uses illegal drugs. Dakota had been convicted of a felony and was also a user of marijuana. Two months after the sale Dakota’s brother took the rifle and took hostages. When the police were trying to subdue and arrest Dakota’s brother he shot and wounded Colin AllCars. Allcars is suing HAW on the grounds of negligence.
CASE FACTS: Pingaro, gas meter reader (plaintiff) warned of dangerous dog’s presence, with caution proceeded to backyard, two dogs severely attack her. She sustained bites that needed stitches, ...
The appellant, Jesse Mamo, was a passenger in a vehicle driven by the respondent, Steven Surace. Whilst the respondent looked down to adjust the radio, a cow wandered on to the road, colliding with the vehicle . The appellant alleged that the respondent failed to use high beam or maintain a proper lookout. The respondent denied liability and pleaded contributory negligence. At trial, the Judge held that breach of duty of care had not transpired, as it was an unforeseeable risk causing an unavoidable accident, as the cow appeared too close to react. The Judge argued that the respondent acted appropriately toward ‘foreseeable risks”, which the cow was not part of.
The first point to note when analysing occupiers’ liability is that originally it was separate to the general principles of negligence which were outlined in Donoghue v Stevenson .The reason for this “pigeon hole approach” was that the key decision of occupiers’ liability, Indermaur v Dames was decided sixty six years prior to the landmark decision of Donoghue v Stevenson . McMahon and Binchy state the reason why it was not engulfed into general negligence, was because it “… had become too firmly entrenched by 1932 … to be swamped by another judicial cross-current” Following on from Indermaur v Dames the courts developed four distinct categories of entrant which I will now examine in turn.
McHale v Watson is decisive authority in the events of children facing liability for negligence. The question resided on whether a child’s age should be applied in determining the test for the standard of care. Counsel for the appellant originally framed the cause of action to be a matter of trespass or intentional assault, however, the trial judge, Windeyer J, found the defendant acted neither intentionally or negligently in throwing the dart. There is no previous authority which addresses the main concerns of the case, and therefore McHale v Watson adopts a large role in the procedures of future legal disputes. Counsel for the appellant made an application to withdraw the suit of contributory negligence from the jury.