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Strict liability in tort of negligence
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a) Introduction In the case of Mamo v Surace [2014] NSWCA 58 (13 March 2014) the appellant and passenger of the vehicle Jesse Mamo made an appeal against the respondent and driver of the vehicle, Steven Surace after his Honour Delaney DCJ decided in the preceding case that the respondent did not breach his duty of care after colliding with a cow . The appeal was heard in The NSW Supreme Court, Court of Appeal. The appellant appealed the issue of “blameless accidents” therefore providing new evidence, with the view that the preceding judge made an error recognising the content and scope of duty of care. He also noted the breach of duty of care and causation . b) Judgment details Mamo v Surace (2014) 86 NSWLR 275. The case was originally heard …show more content…
Any reaction to a potential risk could only be considered at the time that it affected the respondent aswas cited in Manley v Alexander. It was found in the respondents submissions that a duty of care was necessary. The issue of negligence he believed was unsustainable as the risks were minimal and it was not unusual to take one’s eyes off the road. Causation was not satisfied as the judge concluded that the respondent would not have had enough time in any circumstance to avoid a collision with the cow. Finally, the respondent submitted that without any contradiction from the appellant that any breach of duty of care could not be sustained and any issue of liability unlike in Jones v Dunkel would have no basis. f) The law The respondent (driver) is required to take reasonable care when operating his vehicle to ensure the safety of the appellant. The primary judge highlighted that "content of this duty depends on the circumstances of the case". However, the respondent breached his duty of care by taking his eyes off the road, violating s 5B and s 5C of the Civil Liability Act (NSW) 2002. The respondent nevertheless is not considered negligent as outlined in s5B (1) if he could prevent the outcome of a risk that was not …show more content…
The issue of whether reasonable care was implemented by the driver is not determined by whether or not he could have reacted differently so as to produce a different outcome. g) The reasoning His Honour held that at the time of driving, the low risk of coming across an object on the road that ultimately led the respondent to momentarily take his eyes off the road was not a breach of the respondent’s duty of care and was the type of behaviour that any normal driver was likely to carry out. As pointed out by Meagher JA in Marien v Gardiner it is not possible that the driver could foresee and react to any event that could take place within the area surrounding the vehicle. Therefore, the driver could not have breached his duty of care in any circumstance that an object by chance is to collide with a vehicle on the road. Given the facts of the case were not of contention, the events of that night the court heard were what appeared to be instantaneous and had the respondent not taken his eyes off the road for those mere 4 seconds the same outcome is likely to have
The appellant, Jesse Mamo, was a passenger in a vehicle driven by the respondent, Steven Surace. Whilst the respondent looked down to adjust the radio, a cow wandered on to the road, colliding with the vehicle . The appellant alleged that the respondent failed to use high beam or maintain a proper lookout. The respondent denied liability and pleaded contributory negligence. At trial, the Judge held that breach of duty of care had not transpired, as it was an unforeseeable risk causing an unavoidable accident, as the cow appeared too close to react. The Judge argued that the respondent acted appropriately toward ‘foreseeable risks”, which the cow was not part of.
This trend began to ebb with MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., and the ruling by an appellate court that favored MacPherson, the plaintiff. This case, however, was more a result of political expediency than a reasoned verdict based on fact. In this case, the plaintiff argued that his 1911 Baby Buick had a defective wheel that collapsed while traveling at a low rate of speed, hitting a telephone pole, and pinning him under, breaking his wrist and cracking several ribs; however, the facts of the trial revealed that the accident as it was recounted by the plaintiff was a physical impossibility, but due to the increasing pressures to dispense with privity rulings, the court imposed on the defendant the responsibility of inspecting and discarding defective wheels, implying causal negligence even though the plaintiff had driven the vehicle for more than a year in less than perfect road conditions without a mishap. (MacPherson Tort Story; MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company: Simplifying the Facts While Reshaping the Law, Pg.
They reasoned that since Barnett didn’t either argue against the dismissal of negligence claim at the time of its dismissal or include the claim in subsequent revisions, she had no support for her claim that the court had erred in dismissing her claim of negligence. The court also ruled that the language of section 3-108(b) of the Tort Immunity Act meant that complete, unconditional immunity was to be offered if supervision was present. As a result of this interpretation, the issue of if the lifeguards had committed willful and wanton misconduct was rendered irrelevant. Since the issues of material fact raised by the appellant weren’t actually issues of material fact, the Supreme Court affirmed the District and Appellate Court’s motion and subsequent affirmation of summary
Court of Appeal unanimously allowed the appeal on the ground that the standard could not be justified absent more empirical data from experimental studies; no form of safe testing that can measure one’s ability to deal with unexpected traffic situations (B.C. (Superint. Of mot. Veh.) v. B.C (H.R.C) p 878).
When a driver runs a red light and no accident occurs, the driver is still negligent, even though no one got hurt. Similarly, a doctor or other health care professional might deviate from the appropriate medical standard of care in treating a patient, but if the patient is not harmed and their health is not impacted, that negligence won’t lead to a medical malpractice case.
Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562 (House of Lords) is a seminal case to set out the general principles of duty of care. It isalso called neighbour test or neighbour principle. In Donoghue V Stevenson the house of Lords deemed it necessary to overcome the problems generated by the privity of the contract in order to provide an alternative route of claim for an injured party. It was Mrs Donoghue’s friend that purchased the ginger beer that ultimately caused her injury and therefore only her friend that had a right to sue under the contract. The house of Lords solved this problem by imposing liability in negligence on the owner of the café, specifying that such would be possible where a duty of care could be found to lie between the owner ( the tortfeasors) and the victim Mrs. Donoghue. Lord Atkin outlined he parameters of the duty of care in this field in the following often quoted terms:
On the morning of May 17th, 2005, Nola Walker was involved in a two-car collision. Police and Ambulance were dispatched and arrive on scene at the intersection of Kenny and Fernley Street. Ambulance conducted various assessments on Ms. Walker which revealed no major injuries and normal vital signs. Mrs walker denied further medical investigation and denied hospital treatment. Later on, Queensland police conducted a roadside breath test that returned a positive reading, police then escorted Ms. Walker to the cairns police station. Ms. Walker was found to be unconscious, without a pulse and not breathing. An ambulance was called but attempts to revive her failed (Coroner’s Inquest, Walker 2007). The standard of Legal and ethical obligation appeared by paramedics required for this situation are flawed and require further examination to conclude whether commitments of autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence and justice were accomplished.
Drivers do not fall asleep without warning. If a driver consciously decides to drive without the ability to remain alert they are putting themselves and others at risk in the same way that those who text and drive or drink and drive do, with the consequences just as devastating. Therefore, it should be treated the same by
The liability for negligent misstatement may arise from pure economic loss. According to Steele (2010), ‘Economic losses will be regarded as “pure” if they do not flow from any personal injury to the claimant nor from physical damage to his or her property’. The boundaries between “pure” economic loss and the loss which is “consequential” from damage were established by the Court
Unfortunately, even when you work to be a safe pedestrian or driver, others on the road may not be paying proper attention. If you were the victim of a car accident, either as a pedestrian or as the occupant of a vehicle, contact
We as a society need to all take responsibility when we are on the road and avoid the many temptations and distractions surrounding us. Distracted driving is dangerous plain and simple. Some may be willing to take the risk because they have never had an accident while behind the wheel. But it’s
The appellant was a signal man in the Signal Regiment of the Armed Services. He was serving out a sentence of 28 days rigorous imprisonment imposed on him by the Commanding officer of the Regiment for violating norms for presenting representations to higher officers. He was alleged to have committed another offence by refusing to eat his food on March 29, 1985 when ordered to do so. He was charged under section 41(2) of the Army Act, 1950 for disobeying a lawful command given by his superior officer. A sentence of rigorous imprisonment for one year was imposed by a Summary Court Martial. He was removed to the civil prison and he served out the
Defendants cannot take an excuse in negligence cases that they did not have the requisite skill or knowledge which would have allowed them to take more care, as also explained in the maxim imperitia non exculpatur. The question that arises is that what should be the standard of care that is expected from the defendants. In the majority of cases, the answer to the question is the objective standard of care because the courts usually apply the objective
There is a strict distinction between acts and omissions in tort of negligence. “A person is often not bound to take positive action unless they have agreed to do so, and have been paid for doing so.” (Cane.2009; 73) The rule is a settled one and allows some exceptions only in extreme circumstances. The core idea can be summarized in “why pick on me” argument. This attitude was spectacularly demonstrated in a notoriously known psychological experiment “The Bystander effect” (Latané & Darley. 1968; 377-383). Through practical scenarios, psychologists have found that bystanders are more reluctant to intervene in emergency situations as the size of the group increases. Such acts of omission are hardly justifiable in moral sense, but find some legal support. “A man is entitled to be as negligent as he pleases towards the whole world if he owes no duty to them.” (L Esher Lievre v Gould [1893] 1 Q.B. 497) Definitely, when there is no sufficient proximity between the parties, a legal duty to take care cannot be lawfully exonerated and imposed, as illustrated in Palmer v Tees Health Authority [1999] All ER (D) 722). If it could, individuals would have been in the permanent state of over- responsibility for others, neglecting their own needs. Policy considerations in omission cases are not inspired by the parable of Good Samaritan ideas. Judges do favour individualism as it “permits the avoidance of vulnerability and requires self-sufficiency. “ (Hoffmaster.2006; 36)
The majority of driving offences are contained in the Road Traffic Act 1988. This essay will mostly examine causing death by unlicensed, disqualified or uninsured driving (s3ZB) and causing death by careless or inconsiderate driving. (s2B) There is often a distinction between constructive and non constructive strict liability offences. These offences are considered to be constructive strict liability since the prosecution does not need prove there was any fault in relation to causing the death.