Can We Make People More Reasonable In Their Morals

More and more it seems that people are becoming increasingly polarised in their views. Political debates, and discussion on controversial topics such as gay marriage and climate change, appear to split people into highly opposed groups. Responses to such topics are often imbued with strong emotions, and individuals on both sides of these moral arguments routinely demonize their opponents, which only sharpens the divide. In this essay, I shall discuss this real world problem, a question which cognitive science can help answer. Namely, can we make people more reasonable in their beliefs, specifically, their moral beliefs? In doing so, I will describe the problem and why it is important to solve, focusing on current literature in the area. Interestingly,

For example, he presented a scenario in which adult siblings engage in consensual sex, an event which the imagined siblings both enjoy, and where a pregnancy is not possible – a harmless affair. When Haidt asked people to give a moral judgement, most immediately declare the actions of the brother and sister to be wrong. However, when asked why, participants, after fumbling for an answer, end up admitting that they do not know why it is wrong (Pinker 2002: 270). Psychologists refer to this as 'moral dumbfounding', where subjects pronounce scenarios in which no-one is harmed to be morally wrong, without being able to say why (Haidt et al. 1993). With dual-process theory in mind, we can account for moral dumbfounding. Our emotion based system provides us with automatic judgements, judgements that we have not reached through rational reflection. As such, when asked to discuss the details underlying our judgement we are unable to give an answer, because we have nothing to give, we are merely expressing an automatic emotional response. That said, basing our moral opinions on our evolved 'gut feelings' which played a role in the reproductive success of our distant ancestors, would seem to lead to a raft of morally condemnable judgements. Indeed, given that our moral emotions play a significant role in polarisation and in-group out-group conflict, we have sufficient reasons to question and challenge the opinions they produce. It is problematic to declare that an act, which causes no one any harm, is morally wrong. Just because we have evolved an intuitive aversion to particular acts and an inclination for others, or, an intuition to discriminate based on perceived group membership, it does not follow that such intuitive judgements have moral value, or,