On the fateful and unforgettable afternoon of June 17, 1972 Hotel Vendome experienced yet another fire. Actually it experienced several fires in different locations on this date. Electricians working on the first floor reported smoke coming from the upper floors, and a bartender reported smoke in the basement. All occupants in the basement café were safely escorted out, and 3 engine companies, 2 ladder companies, and 1 District Chief arrived on scene noticing ...
The Triangle Shirtwaist Fire not only affected the city of New York, but also the rest of the country. It forever changed the way our country would look at safety regulations in factories and buildings. The fire proved to America what can and will happen if we over-look safety regulations and over-crowd buildings. Unfortunately, 146 lives are taken before we fully understand this concept.
In West Warwick Rhode Island, on February 20th, 2003, during the performance of the band Great White, a fire broke out that eventually claimed the lives of 100 people and injured an additional 200. The band’s tour manager arranged for, and ignited pyrotechnic props, large fireworks designed to display a shower of sparks. The sparks ignited foam soundproofing near stage. The fire spread quickly. Most were killed either in the crush to exit the building or overcome by fumes while trying to find an exit. The immediate cause was well documented due to witness reports and a videotape that was taken during the concert. In the period that followed the tragedy there were many attempts to fix blame. Following a Grand Jury investigation, several of the parties involved plead guilty to violations of the law and served or are currently sentences in prison.
Hemenway, C. (2013). West fertilizer co. carried only $1m in liability insurance: authorities launch criminal investigation of explosion. Property Casualty 360-National Underwriter, 117(6), 14. doi: A339733708
This paper will examine the concepts of responsibility and blame through analysis of two scenarios involving explosions at plants in small communities. Both explosions result in the death of 100 people, injury to one thousand community members and property damage and medical expenses of over five hundred million dollars. The explosion in the first scenario was caused by a lightning strike that set off an unforeseeable chain of events. In the second scenario, the explosion was caused by a plant employee smoking near corroded pipes through which flammable vapors were released. To determine the level of responsibility and blame the plant should accept in each of these situations requires an understanding of the difference between these two terms.
Trouble began at about 1:00 a.m. on August 1st . A fire occurred behind a decorating store on Main St. in St. Catharines. By 3:00 a.m. strong winds aided the fire in spreading to an adjacent building. The fire burned for two more days, but not before it destroyed 38 buildings in the city’s commercial district. An investigation later revealed the reason how the fire started, it was either by careless smoking or an intentional act that ignited paint cans stored in the shed located at 1 Main St.
What happens when the never satisfied desire of fire meets the incredibly unsafe workplace of over seven hundred workers? The March 25th Triangle Fire had a casualty count of 146 and resulted in many more injured, physically and emotionally. Its origins lie in the workers strike that occurred a few months earlier in September 1909. Long hours of back-breaking work in a sweat shop like environment which only resulted in a meager paycheck that was constantly docked for fines dominated strike complaints (Dutcher 97). Women of all classes protested for months until an uneven settlement was reached between the strikers and the factory owners. This all boiled down to no
On the morning of March 25, 1911, the Triangle Waist Company had a fire breakout. This breakout was one of the most tragic events that occurred in Manhattan, New York. Because of this company and the rules’ that they broke and failed to enforce, many men and women suffered severely before their deaths. This incident brought attention to the world and revealed how dangerous the conditions were for the working people. The Triangle Waist Factory Fire resulted in a variety of laws to further prevent any horror incidents, such as this one, and to better protect the safety of all workers.
The temperatures had reached the mid-30°C and wind speeds around 90kph, leading to the fire in the area to start spreading. Another fire began from the sparks of a downed power line which then spread across farther distances by engulfing the areas’ vegetation. The third fire came from an explosive training mishap by the Australian Defense Force in the State Mine region: these three sparks, fueled by the dry live fuel and wind gusts, allowed the fires to spread (“NSW Bushfires…” 2013). The area was suffering from a drought causing dry vegetation, which allowed the fire to rage until October 28th before firefighters made headway (Murphy 2013). At its high there were 100 fires that the NSW Rural Fire Service were fighting. To ease the damage, firefighters from the surrounding areas came in to assist the teams in extinguishing the fires (“NSW Bushfires: Live Updates” 2013). Finally, cooler weather allowed authorities to handle the fires and on November 13 they were declared controlled (“Bushfire New South Wales” 2013). In the end, the only thing left were the effects on
is vicarious liability. Vicarious liability essentially is when someone is held responsible for the tortious act of another person, typically seen in the workplace where an employer is generally held responsible for his/her employee’s action during their course of employment [3]. In the case study, this liability is evident as an employee of Acme Underground did not fully test the conditions of the sub-surface [6]. This indicates a vicarious liability may be possible because the employee was simply following order to conduct test for sub-surface conditions of the bridge site. In fact, Dutton V. Bognor Regis United Building Co. Ltd. case in 1972 [5] can effectively show such liability is indeed present in the case study. Summarizing the precedent case, a house was built on a rubbish deposit which requires larger foundation [5]. The foundation must be approved by an inspector by law, however, the inspector failed to properly inspect the foundation and part of the building collapsed [5]. The final verdict of this case was that the building inspector and the building authority are both liable [5]. This case clearly indicates that although the higher up was not directly related to the incident, he/she may still be responsible for the employee’s mistake which is a matching circumstance to the facts given in the case study. Thus, the employee of Acme Underground may have made a mistake in his work, but since it is in the
Power lines, Lighting, machinery and Arsonist are confirmed causes of the Black Saturday Bushfires. The drought, the hot temperatures, strong winds and the other factors are said to be the cause of the black Saturday bushfires
In the case of Michael Buckley, it seemed to be a difficult situation to remedy; however, it would seem that clearly Buckley had experienced a situation of exposure. The exposure was evident, Mr. Buckley’s body covered in a substance known to cause illness and death, e.g., Cancer (Montgomery, 1998) . Nevertheless, Buckley did not seek any help in understanding his situation therefor, he did not show signs of a traumatic experience. Buckley would later file suit under the direction of federal employer liability act (FELA) (Montgomery, 1998; Twomey, Jennings, & Anderson, 2011). The lawsuit was based primarily on the belief that Mr. Buckley had indeed encountered a traumatic episode that rendered Buckley emotionally distressed. However, according to the readings, Buckley did experience and exposure to a harmful substance, e.g. asbestos it would be difficult under the terms of the law to prove he experienced a traumatic event being that Buckley refuses any assistance from the psychiatrist or medical personnel determine his State of mind at that time. Still under the law as it's reviewed by the second court Buckley had only to express concern as stated in the court preceding e.g., Metro – North Transit Inspector General, Supervisor,
The work and safety conditions were terrible for these young women. Work environments were cramped, many of these young women were teenagers, and they would work 12 hours a day, everyday only getting paid $15/week. 4 elevators had access to the factory, but only one was fully working, and just to use that one they had to climb down a ladder just to reach it. If they ever needed to get out of the building in case of an emergency it would have taken them hours just to do so. This was an extremely unsafe environment for all these girls to be in.
Although Donald Blankenship claims he is innocent and that the mine disaster just happed to happen, I truly think that Donald Blankenship and the Massey Energy Corporation should be held liable for the twenty-nine lives that were lost on April 5th, 2010. Donald Blankenship and Massey Energy both knew that the equipment they had down in the mines were faulty and had many chances to correct it. Miners themselves complained about their safety and yet nothing was done about it besides shutting the miners up. In my opinion the government should have been more proactive about getting the mine to safe standards but all they kept doing was giving the Upper Big Branch fines and violations when they should have been shut down. The government turned an eye because there was an inside between the managers and the government regulators. Donald Blankenship should be in jail and held accountable for the twenty-nine miners who lost their lives on April 5th,
Different flame mischances including the Daegu metro fire in 2003 and the Austria mountain passage fire in 2001 have demonstrated that fire mishaps in underground passages are a greater number of unsafe than those over the ground. Numerous studies have been directed to suspect and examine passage fire wonders. In any case, research on railcar fires as flame sources that focus the sort and attributes of a train passage flame stays deficient. Specifically, the attributes of a traveler railcar flame change contingent upon the structures and inside materials of the railcar. Past studies on railcar flames incorporate Amtrak's full-scale traveler railcar flame test [1] by the NBS (National Bureau of Standards) in 1984, the EUREKA 499 test [2] program