Each philosopher has his or her own belief concerning what an AI program should be able to do. Without a consensus as to what constitutes intelligence, it is impossible to determine with universal agreement whether or not AI has succeeded, is achievable, or is an unreachable dream. In considering the definitions and implications of Artificial Intelligence, many philosophers have reached extremely different conclusions. Alan Turing, author of the Turing Test, believed that an intelligent machine would be able to imitate perfectly a human. Margaret Boden, Professor of Philosophy and Psychology at the University of Sussex, contends that a machine is intelligent if it possesses and displays certain human values.
These functions are often taken for granted as part of human existence. Yet, when thoroughly investigated, these inner-workings of the human brain reveal patterns, methods, and, in general, a science behind the rather ethereal term “intelligence”. For this reason, cognitive psychology is of great interest to researchers in the field of artificial intelligence. If intelligence can be identified in human cognition, then there is a valid chance that that same intelligence can be transferred and re-created in a programmed computer. The development of cognitive psychology has lead to related fields of cognitive neurology, or cognitive neuro-psychology, wherein neurologists study the brain biology behind these cognitive human functions.
As a result this debate can be characterised being concerned with narrow human understanding of the concept of thought. This I will argue that this flaw characterises the various philosophical theories of artificial intelligence. On one hand functionalists, such as Fodor and Putnam, argue that “the psychology of a system depends” not on the physical architecture of a system, neurons in the mind brain or the wires in a computer, but instead how it is “put together.” (Fodor 1981 p 114) As they characterise mental states as functional states – inputs of stimuli and outputs of behav... ... middle of paper ... ...he Philosophy of Mind' in The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Computing. Floridi, Ludiano. (Ed.)
The term artificial intelligence is confusing and misleading however. Artificial intelligence is still a form of intelligence, but perhaps “synthetic intelligence” is a better name because it is not natural intelligence. This is why the name “computational intelligence”, or CI, is sometimes preferred. Artificial intelligence is used in many objects that we use everyday: cars, microwaves, personal computers, and videogames. There are many different goals for AI, depending upon your field or view.
Introduction Much interest has been raised recently in cognitive science and in the philosophy of mind by a debate that focuses on the nature of the cognitive mechanism that underlies our folk psychological practices. One side in this debate is represented by proponents of the reigning paradigm, the theory theory. Theory theorists say that our ability to give explanations, predictions and interpretations of intentional behavior is subserved by tacit knowledge of an internally-represented theory of commonsense psychology (Fodor 1987). The simulation theory challenges this view on the grounds that there is no evidence to support the suggestion that we have such know... ... middle of paper ... ...mith (eds. ), Theories of theories of mind.
2 2. David E. Wilkins, " Practical Planning" , Morgan Kaufmann publisher, 1988 3. Matt Ginsberg, "Essentials of Artificial intelligence", Morgan Kaufmann publisher, 1993 4. Nils J. Nilsson, "Principles of Artificial Intelligence" Tioga publishing, 1980. 5.
Selves and Identities. In: Social Psychology: Experimental and critical approaches. Maidenhead,GB: Open University Press/McGraw Hill. 229-240. Tajfel, H. and Turner, J. C. (1986).
Handbook of Psychology. 445–474. Rumelhart, D.E., Hinton, G.E., & McClelland, J.L. (1986). A General Framework for Parallel Distributed Processing.
Challenging issues in theoretical computer science arise in connection with the problem of detecting undesired behaviours among software potential executions and removing them. Model checking (Baier and Katoen 2008), a leading formal method devoted to this purpose, enables one to examine computational systems by means of a formal model of the system and of an algorithm that searches throughout the model for desired/undesired behaviours. This paper analyses model checking as an instantiation, in the computer science field, of the model-based reasoning approach characterizing the examination of complex empirical systems. Preliminary, it is shown how deductive and inductive reasoning are insufficient to determine whether a given piece of software satisfies the relevant properties it was designed for. Properties of this kind are called specifications.
Bibliography Winston, Patrick. Artificial Intelligence. Menlo Park: Addison-Wesley Publishing, 1988. Welstead, Stephen. Neural Network and Fuzzy Logic in C/C++.