The Cold War: The End Of The Cold War

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The end of the Cold War was one of the most unexpected and important events in geopolitics in the 20th century. The end of the Cold War can be defined as the end of the bipolar power struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union, which had existed since the end of the World War II. The conclusion of the Cold War can be attributed to Gorbachev’s series of liberalizations in the 1980s, which exposed the underlying economic problems in the Soviet Union and Eastern bloc states that had developed in the 1960s and 70s and prevented the USSR from being able to compete with the US as a superpower. Nevertheless, Reagan’s policies of a renewed offensive against communism, Gorbachev’s rejection of the Brezhnev doctrine and the many nationalities …show more content…

These subsidies prevented the USSR from internal reforms or modernizing their economy and eventually the subsidies were not enough to hold the bloc together. Another lost lasting problem was agricultural stagnation, which had existed since Stalin collectivized. Little was accomplished to improve the agricultural situation, despite evidence from Hungary in 1970s that modern American technology could revive communist agriculture (Friedmann 225). Declining food production led the USSR to begin importing more and more food from the West. “In 1972 the USSR increased its grain and soy imports from 8.3 to 22.8 million tons” (Friedmann 225). This created an interesting relationship where the USSR was trying to compete with US as a superpower, yet was receiving food aid. Simultaneously, as USSR could afford less and less to subsidize the Eastern bloc, it had turned to the West for help. “It was difficult for the Soviets to insist on bloc loyalty […] when the USSR was making its own deals with the West” (Friedmann 220). This led to stronger economic ties between communism and capitalism, which underscored the failure of communist autarky. It …show more content…

In the 1980s, President Ronald Reagan began pursuing what became known as the Reagan Doctrine: “Freedom is not the sole prerogative of a lucky few, but the inalienable and universal right of all human beings” (Smith 130). This renewed the US’s appeal to moral authority to fight Communism. Reagan backed up this doctrine with drastic increases in defense spending and massive projects like the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). This required the Soviet Union to also increase their defense spending in order to remain militarily competitive with the United States. However, the Soviet Union was in a much worse place to do so as they already had considerable debt and a much weaker economy. Paradoxically, the USSR’s push for new military spending ended up only weakening their power by destabilizing their economy further. SDI was particularly worrisome to the Soviets because it completely threatened the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) whose balance of power had prevented nuclear war for the past 40 years (Smith 133). The United States also used the CIA to funnel money and arms to rebels and dissenters in Communist countries (Smith 130). While in most cases only a minor cause of the end of Communism, this support was especially important in Poland where it helped keep Solidarity alive during its years underground and in Afghanistan where the United

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