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Deontological moral conflict
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The problem of moral motivation is one that, as Scanlon correctly identifies, every competent moral theory must recognise. While chapter 4 of Scanlon's What We Owe to Each Other, `Wrongness and Reasons', is praiseworthy in its extended and subtle inspection of why we should be provided with a satisfactory reason for being morally good, there are elements of this piece that I find difficult to swallow, regardless of the tenacity with which I ruminate; in particular, Scanlon unsatisfactorily addresses the problem of the amoralist in his framework. I feel this is due to an incorrect charaterisation of those `left cold' by morality, and, as a result, Scanlon's conclusions concerning amoralist position are incorrect as a result. This essay hopes to provide a more phenomenologically accurate description of the psychology and sociological footprint of the amoralist.
While it would be customary to begin an essay such as this with an account of what I interpret the term `morality' to mean, permit me to start with an account of a few archetypical conceptions of the amoralist that either float around or are derived from the literature, for it is my hope that, pending an appeal to my position, my formulation of morality will appear far less the creation of a fevered imagination and, moreover, something that could be entertained as tenable.
At first glance it seems to be the case that there are two possible kinds of amoral character: what I will call the Amoral Sceptic and the Amoral Extremist. The Sceptic accepts that there is such a thing as morality and that it may well constitute a set of obligations for other agents, but believes that morality does not provide a good enough (if any) reason to perform their own `obligations'. This i...
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...e, profound and complete appreciation of morality. This constitutes one aspect of the deontological nature of morality; its other deontological aspects can be brought forth (and its previous aspects reinforced) by considering how I construe that one comes to learn about morality: in effect, through a primitive Wittgensteinean language game; what I will call a morality game. The original language game, in its basal form, runs as such
`The language is meant to serve for communication between a builder A and an assistant B. A is building with building-stones: there are blocks, pillars, slabs and beams. B has to pass the stones, and that in the order in which A needs them. For this purpose they use a language consisting of the works ``block'', ``pillar'', ``slab'', ``beam''. A calls them out;---B brings the stone which he has learnt to bring at such-and-such a call.'
Approximately three hundred years separate the earliest of these works, The Prince, from the most recent, Utilitarianism, and a progression is discernible in the concept of morality over this span. Machiavelli does not mention the word "morality," but his description of the trends and ideals of human political interaction allow for a reasonable deduction of the concept. Locke, too, does not use the word, but he does write of "the standard of right and wrong." In contrast, Mill writes explicitly and extensively of morality in its forms, sources, and obligations. A logical starting point in this examination is a look at their relative views of human nature.
One objection to deontological moral theory is that the theory yields only absolutes and cannot always justify its standpoints. Actions are either classified as right or wrong with no allowance for a gray area. Furthermore, the strict guidelines tend to conflict with commonly accepted actions. For example, lying is always considered morally wrong--even a “white lie.” Therefore, one must not lie even if it does more good. In our society although individuals accept lying as being morally wrong, “white lies” have become an exception. Only having absolutes creates a theory that is extremely hard only to abide by, especially when deontological though permits you from making a choice when that choice would clearly be optimal...
Morality is not something that should be easy to comprehend, and philosophers such as Mackie and McDowell are taking the wrong approach when trying to describe morality in natural terms. People need to understand that morality is something supernatural that we don’t have the capacity to comprehend. However, this does not mean that all moral judgments are false. There is a right choice in every scenario, however the variety of scenarios in this world is so grand that one cannot judge it by one code of
Westermack, Edward A (1906-8): The origins and development of the Moral Ideas, 2 vols., London: MacMillan & Co.
Aristotle’s psychological types, as described in “Nichomachean Ethics,” are a categorization of different internal moral characters. These categories are a comprehensive attempt - for ancient philosophy - at identifying which internal psychologies manifest virtuous or morally bad behaviour. His moral categories are somewhat obsolete in a post-modern world, where science and politics are far more developed than in Ancient Greece. However, moral psychological ethics and normative debate still holds a relevant position in the moral undercurrent of society – it is dispersed through legal, political, military and medical activity, in relationships and familial function. It is for this reason, that Immanuel Kant examined a similar issue in “Pure Practical Reason and the Moral Law,” and that it still makes for interesting philosophical discussion.
In his article "The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories," Michael Stocker argues that mainstream ethical theories, namely consequentialism and deontology, are incompatible with maintaining personal relations of love, friendship, and fellow feeling because they both overemphasise the role of duty, obligation, and rightness, and ignore the role of motivation in morality. Stocker states that the great goods of life, i.e. love, friendship, etc., essentially contain certain motives and preclude others, such as those demanded by mainstream ethics.11 In his paper "Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality," Peter Railton argues that a particular version of consequentialism, namely sophisticated consequentialism, is not incompatible with love, affection and acting for the sake of others. In the essays "War and Massacre" and "Autonomy and Deontology," Thomas Nagel holds that a theory of absolutism, i.e. deontology, may be compatible with maintaining personal commitments. The first objective of this paper is to demonstrate that despite the efforts of both Railton and Nagel, consequentialism and deontology do not in fact incorporate personal relations into morality in a satisfactory way. This essay shows that Stocker’s challenge may also hold against versions of Virtue Ethics, such as that put forth by Rosalind Hursthouse in her article "Virtue Theory and Abortion." The second objective of this discussion is to examine criticisms of Stocker made by Kurt Baier in his article "Radical Virtue Ethics." This essay demonstrates that in the end Baier’s objections are not convincing.
After more than two thousands years, the same discussion topic is among the philosophers world. Until today, no one can be sure and give an exact answer on the question concerning the foundation of morality. With John Stuart Mill, there will have a whole new view of the concept of morality and its implications and applications.
The following analysis deals with the nature and source of evil and whether, given our innate motives and moral obligation, we willingly choose to succumb to our desires or are slaves of our passion. From this argument, I intend to show that our human nature requires that we play into our desires in order to affirm our free will. This is not to say that our desires are necessarily evil, but quite the opposite. In some sense, whatever people actually want has some relative value to them, and that all wanted things contain some good. But given that there are so many such goods and a whole spectrum of varying arrangements among them, that there is no way we can conceive anything as embodying an overall good just because it is to some degree wanted by one or a group of persons. In this light, there arises conflict which can only be resolved by a priority system defined by a code, maybe of moral foundations, which allows us to analyze the complexities of human motivation. I do not intend to set down the boundaries of such a notion, nor do I want to answer whether it benefits one to lead a morally good life, but rather want to find out how the constructs of good and evil affect our freedom to choose.
To begin, “On Morality'; is an essay of a woman who travels to Death Valley on an assignment arranged by The American Scholar. “I have been trying to think, because The American Scholar asked me to, in some abstract way about ‘morality,’ a word I distrust more every day….'; Her task is to generate a piece of work on morality, with which she succeeds notably. She is placed in an area where morality and stories run rampant. Several reports are about; each carried by a beer toting chitchat. More importantly, the region that she is in gains her mind; it allows her to see issues of morality as a certain mindset. The idea she provides says, as human beings, we cannot distinguish “what is ‘good’ and what is ‘evil’';. Morality has been so distorted by television and press that the definition within the human conscience is lost. This being the case, the only way to distinguish between good or bad is: all actions are sound as long as they do not hurt another person or persons. This is similar to a widely known essay called “Utilitarianism'; [Morality and the Good Life] by J.S. Mills with which he quotes “… actions are right in the proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness.';
Kant's argument that good will is the supreme purpose of man's existence based on observations of the influence that reason exerts on the will is inconsistent with what may be observed in nature. It presupposes an intentional cosmos wherein an organized being's purpose, and thus its standard of value, can be extracted from an examination of its constitution and faculties. While this presupposition is logically consistent with the rest of Kant's moral theory it does not coincide with what we can actually observe in nature. The following essay will examine, one, the idea of an organized being, secondly, why Kant proposes it, then we will contrast this idea with what we observe, and finally, analyse the extent of the harm done to the overarching theory of morality presented in the Groundwork if this concept is impaired.
It is a striking project; comprised of three essays- each with the aim of stripping the reader’s pre-conceptions of morality, and instead offering the reader an account of the true nature of morality. In this essay I will particularly focus upon the first essay of Nietzsche’s On The Genealogy of Morals that, through the use of metaphoric and dramatic language, cites ‘ressentiment’ as the catalyst of our modern day morals. I will primarily outline Nietzsche’s argument (with particular focus upon his metaphor of the workshop in section 12), secondly identify some internal inconsistencies in his argument (looking in particular at his slightly confusing portrayal of ‘masters’ and ‘slaves), and finally attempt to salvage Nietzsche’s argument through a re-evaluation of how to interpret his writing (appealing to Christopher Janaway’s interpretation of the Genealogy of Morals).
Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals can be assessed in regards to the three essays that it is broken up into. Each essay derives the significance of our moral concepts by observing
The purpose of this paper is to argue for the idea that even without a God, there can be a basis for morality. The structure of my argument will proceed as follows. I will begin my paper with the background information of the idea that without a God, specifically the Christian God, there is no moral basis. After detailing this false belief, I will go on to explain why it is indeed untrue due to various reasons. I will bring forth the conflicting views of St. Thomas Aquinas and the natural law theory before countering the arguments brought up by them.
Philosophical musings on the nature of morality are often expressed by thinkers who focus on human nature. Among the factors which determine human behaviour, a moral analysis of the concepts of right and wrong is often prominent. In investigating human behaviour through the relationship between reflection and action, this morality is often observed. Therefore, in the course currently entitled Human Sciences 101: Reflection and Action, both phiolosophy and morality are key themes. However, the calendar description for the course is as follows, “What is the relationship between thinking and action? Do they pull us in different directions? Can they be integrated? This course investigates how our own dialogue with core texts, from antiquity (e.g., Homer, Plato, Christian Scriptures) to the present (e.g., Joyce, Arendt), offers ways of understanding the dilemmas and issues raised by these texts and present in our culture” (Waterloo 2013). The description lacks a mention of the philosophical concepts of morality within the course's content. One of the core texts of the course where morality can be seen is Saint Augustine's Confessions, where Augustine explores a theological philosophy. The theme of morality is also seen in René Descartes' Discourse on Method and Related Writings, where Descartes proposes a scientific moral philosophy. Hannah Arendt's Eichmann in Jerusalem also explores morality through a philosophical examination of the relationship between thinking and committing evil. Therefore, the writings of Augustine, Descartes and Arendt each exhibit a philosophical perspective on morality which can be tied to the course's central theme of reflection and action. [END OF INTRODUCTION]
The two concepts of Morality and Immorality can be discussed in many different ways, although Glaucon, brother to Plato and Adeimantus, and apprentice to Socrates takes a unique approach to showing the implications of both notions. Glaucon does this through his three-step argument that challenges Socrates by evaluating the benefits of being an immoral person versus one holding onto their morality. Glaucon’s argument dives into three separate segments, which in result leads to Glaucon’s conclusion that immorality is more beneficial than morality.