In Defence of Amoralism

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The problem of moral motivation is one that, as Scanlon correctly identifies, every competent moral theory must recognise. While chapter 4 of Scanlon's What We Owe to Each Other, `Wrongness and Reasons', is praiseworthy in its extended and subtle inspection of why we should be provided with a satisfactory reason for being morally good, there are elements of this piece that I find difficult to swallow, regardless of the tenacity with which I ruminate; in particular, Scanlon unsatisfactorily addresses the problem of the amoralist in his framework. I feel this is due to an incorrect charaterisation of those `left cold' by morality, and, as a result, Scanlon's conclusions concerning amoralist position are incorrect as a result. This essay hopes to provide a more phenomenologically accurate description of the psychology and sociological footprint of the amoralist.

While it would be customary to begin an essay such as this with an account of what I interpret the term `morality' to mean, permit me to start with an account of a few archetypical conceptions of the amoralist that either float around or are derived from the literature, for it is my hope that, pending an appeal to my position, my formulation of morality will appear far less the creation of a fevered imagination and, moreover, something that could be entertained as tenable.

At first glance it seems to be the case that there are two possible kinds of amoral character: what I will call the Amoral Sceptic and the Amoral Extremist. The Sceptic accepts that there is such a thing as morality and that it may well constitute a set of obligations for other agents, but believes that morality does not provide a good enough (if any) reason to perform their own `obligations'. This i...

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...e, profound and complete appreciation of morality. This constitutes one aspect of the deontological nature of morality; its other deontological aspects can be brought forth (and its previous aspects reinforced) by considering how I construe that one comes to learn about morality: in effect, through a primitive Wittgensteinean language game; what I will call a morality game. The original language game, in its basal form, runs as such

`The language is meant to serve for communication between a builder A and an assistant B. A is building with building-stones: there are blocks, pillars, slabs and beams. B has to pass the stones, and that in the order in which A needs them. For this purpose they use a language consisting of the works ``block'', ``pillar'', ``slab'', ``beam''. A calls them out;---B brings the stone which he has learnt to bring at such-and-such a call.'

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