US Intelligence Failure In The Korean War

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This is short discussion of the policies and analysis that led to U. S. Intelligence failures in the Korean War. Unfortunately, no one believed North Korea had the guts to risk war with the U.S. and invade the South. Politicians and Senior leaders silenced anyone who dared to challenge this world view.
Policy – Korea a Low Priority
The year was 1949, and in the years after World War II (WW II), U.S. and Soviet forces were withdrawing from the Korean peninsula. American intelligence capabilities and responsibilities of the area were piecemeal (Finnegan, 2002). This drawdown reflected Korea’s low priority on the world stage.
Troop Withdrawals.
According to P. K. Rose with the Central Intelligence Agency’s Directorate of Operations, “[By] January …show more content…

Army’s intelligence capabilities in the ROK were lacking as with the whole of the Intelligence Community (IC). On the other hand, a few organizations remained. This included some Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) offices and the Korean Liaison Office (KLO), a small organization maintained by FECOM’s head of intelligence (G-2). The Army dismantled most of their intelligence training programs by this time, and were neither prepared nor equipped to anticipate North Korea’s invasion. General James Van Fleet noted, “we have lost through neglect, disinterest, and possible jealousy, much of the effectiveness in intelligence work that we acquired so painfully in World War II (Finley, 1995).” Although these small offices monitored the North Korean/Soviet/Chinese threat, they didn’t have the full complement of intelligence disciplines. Instead, they relied on Human Intelligence (HUMINT) and Imagery Intelligence …show more content…

The National Security Agency stood up in 1952 with the mission of decoding radio transmissions. One benefit of SIGINT is that it sometimes gives analysts closer access to source information (first/second-hand information vs. second/third-hand info) as well as more insight into the target’s intentions. Other reforms included a complete restructuring of the CIA to include offices dedicated to producing intelligence estimates and coordinating with other agencies. One reform to consider is what a 35Q could’ve brought to the intelligence effort. While it would be an interesting thought exercise, it would be better to consider what lessons can and should apply to the work of a 35Q today.
Cyberspace Intelligence operations should take away a few lessons from the Korean War. First, is the acknowledgement that cyber will only provide one perspective of information; not everything exists in cyberspace and intelligence analysis should call upon multiple domains/perspectives. Also, question assumptions. Determine ways to test and validate hypotheses. Lastly, invest in people and equipment. Several organizations were ill prepared or equipped for the warfighting task. Luckily, today’s analysts can learn from the past to prepare for the

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