Nevertheless, society and cultures should not be relied on to indicate moral and immoral behavior because it is questionable to believe that our actions become moral just for the reason that our culture or society accepts them as normal. Despite the differences between The Divine Command Theory and Cultural Relativism, they both are theories that just fall short of their
Therefore, you are acting ethically. Although, if your action consists without a universal maxim, then your actions are not ethically correct. The reason behind this due to that practical reason has a value. However, people who disagree with the Categorical Imperative and the three basic forms. Harrison claims that these people are, “following Utilitarianism instead, which follows consequentialism”.
Therefore, even if casual determinism is true, there is no reason to believe that people cannot still be morally responsible for their behavior. Frankfurt even goes on to say that he believes that premise (A) should instead be phrased as such: a person is not morally responsible for what he has done if he did it only because he could not have done otherwise. This revision takes into account the invalid assumption that coercion makes moral responsibility
Furthermore in advocating that one treat others in differently when there are no factual differences is unjustifiable and makes this an arbitrary doctrine. Since there is no relevant factual difference between oneself and others, thus no real logic or reason, then the needs of others are equally important, which goes against the main principle of conduct for ethical egoism. Yet still the theory would not see the need to regard other individuals who may be affected by one’s actions, which again fails the minimum
Strawson argues that determinism, which is the idea that any and everything is predetermined and inevitable in nature, does not necessarily have to be true in order for us to claim that we are not morally responsible for any of our actions. In essence, whether or not there is an external force that determines our actions, we cannot be held morally responsible for being who we are. First, moral responsibility is deserving to be praised or blamed for one’s actions based on one’s moral obligations. By his standards, our predetermined fate is ultimately morally responsible for what we do and who we are. According to Strawson, free will is simply not real because that would result in us being truly responsible for our actions as a result of being able to exercise that will.
If the condition of control were to be true, then it would contradict many moral assessments we find natural to make, such as Kant 's notion of ethics which emphasizes that an act is morally right if and only if it is in accordance to duty and that it is founded on a good will. Needless to say, a Kantian would outright deny the importance of the condition of control because it contradicts their spectrum of how should morality be determined. Kant focuses on the importance of a good will, meaning that someone who has the volition to act morally is someone who is following reason and has the intentions to do what they consider to be right. Comparing this to Nagel 's condition of control would eventually contradict Kant 's notion of the principle of volition because according to constitutive luck, the way in which we decide our intentions or inclinations is not completely under our control. Thus, this would deny the capacities of a good will to act in accordance with duty because of numerous psychological factors that may influence the way we define what is right or wrong.
The issue of coherence and consistency in Rossian epistemology is the one which is controversial among Rossian intuitionists. According to these intuitionists, Ross thinks that both incoherency and inconsistency among moral convictions can give us negative reason/justification to discard at least some of these moral convictions. Although Ross did not explicitly consider the issue of the positive reason that coherence gives us reason to believe in some propositions, it is possible (cf. Ewing) to interpret his ethical theory as a theory that considers coherence as a positive reason. However, it seems that there is a problem here: is coherence or consistency compatible with intuitionistic foundationalism (self-evidence idea)?
Above all we desire a meaning to life. We can find meaning by acting morally. Therefore, one is not obligated to obey a law that contradicts morality. After all, it would be morally wrong of the government to deny anyone meaning in life. Works Cited * Singer, Peter.
I think that we have to look at the foundations first. And we have to look at the foundations that we know and if they’re where some reasons to doubt, then I will have to doubt the principles. And I think that knowledge does not depend upon things of whose existence I don’t have knowledge yet. So how can we say that if there isn’t enough evidence to support a claim, why is it considered wrong? I find it illogical because just because there still isn’t enough evidence, doesn’t mean its wrong, its just not considered right or wrong.
For Hume thought that moral judgments must be connected with action, while reason alone cannot lead to action. Had someone suggested that "moral judgment" be defined in a way not necessarily connected with action, Hume would no doubt have been prepared to grant that, so defined, moral judgments could be derived from reason. (Singer)