The tenets of analytic functionalism worked well at attempting to align the philosophies of behaviorism and the identity theory, and though there are many objections to the theory’s method of formulaic definition of mental states, I find that analytic functionalism is a plausible theory that describes the mind. I find that in determining a means in which to define mental states, analytic functionalism demonstrates an ontological method in which one can characterize the mind using statements that can endure more rigor than “folk psychology” alone. I will argue this by first describing the progression into functionalism and the specifics behind analytic functionalism. I will then describe some of the prominent objections of functionalism including Ned Block’s “Nation of China Brain” argument , John Searle’s “Chinese Room” argument , and those that address the whether or not analytic functionalism falls under the realm of ontology. Beyond these arguments, I will provide my counterexamples for these claims and provide reasoning for analytical functionalism’s reasonable credibility as a proper philosophy of the mind.
In the development of the philosophy of mind, many had come to rely on Descartes and his Meditations on First Philosophy. Dualism and the understanding of the causal relationship between the mental realm and the physical world had been widely accepted. Though, doubts had begun to sprout as considerations of the exclusivity of a person’s mental realm came into question. With developments in the field of psychology in the late 19th-century, Sigmund Freud had theorized on the idea that the mind is not always aware of its mental state and that humans tend to ignore or deny the underlying thoughts that are taking place under t...
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...s leaves analytic functionalism as a standing theory. Following this discussion, I find that analytic functionalism is a plausible theory of the mind because of its function as an ontological method for describing the characteristics and presence of the mental states.
Works Cited
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The Absent Qualia Argument’s counterexample suggests functionalism is susceptible to similar problems behaviorism faces. The additional requirement functionalism holds, namely functionally equivalent internal states, mental states possibly differ. Block argues it is plausible to not only have type identical behavior states, but also functionally equivalent mental states. However, functionally equivalent functional states cannot ensure equivalent mental states. So, functionalist theories of mental states are insufficient theories of the nature of mental
The mind-body problem has kept philosophers busy ever since Descartes proposed it in the sixteenth century. The central question posed by the mind-body problem is the relationship between what we call the body and what we call the mind—one private, abstract, and the origin of all thoughts; the other public, concrete, and the executor of the mind’s commands. Paul Churchland, a proponent of the eliminative materialist view, believes that the solution to the mind-body problem lies in eliminating the single concept that allows this problem to perpetuate—the folk psychological concept of mental states. Churchland argues that the best theory of mind is a materialistic one, not a folk psychological one. Unlike other materialist views such as identity theory, Churchland wants to remove the idea of mental states from our ontology because mental states cannot be matched 1:1 with corresponding physical states. This is why Churchland’s view is called eliminative materialism—it is a materialistic account of the mind that eliminates the necessity for us to concern ourselves with mental events. At first this eliminative materialism appears to be a good solution to the mind-body problem because we need not concern ourselves with that problem if we adopt Churchland’s view. However, there is a basic flaw in his argument that raises the question of whether we should actually give up folk psychology. In this paper, we will first walk through the premises of Churchland’s argument, and then we will explore whether Churchland does a suitable job of justifying our adoption of eliminative materialism.
This radical separation of mind and body makes it difficult to account for the apparent interaction of the two in my own case. In ordinary experience, it surely seems that the volitions of my mind can cause physical movements in my body and that the physical states of my body can produce effects on my mental operations. But on Descartes's view, there can be no substantial connection between the two, nor did he believe it appropriate to think of the mind as residing in the body as a pilot resides within a ship. Although he offered several tenatative suggestions in his correspondence with Princess Elizabeth, Descartes largely left for future generations the task of developing some reasonable account of volition and sensation, either by securing the possibility of mind-body interaction or by proposing some alternative explanation of the appearances.
Wiley Backe, A. (2001). John Dewey and early Chicago functionalism. History of Psychology. 4(4), 323-340. Retrieved from PsycARTICLES 3, February 2010.
Jaegwon Kim thinks that multiple realizability of mental properties would bring about the conclusion that psychology is most likely not a science. Several functionalists, specially, Fodor, take up the opposing stance to Kim, supporting that the multiple realizability of mental states is one of the reasons why psychology is an autonomous and justifiable science. Essentially, Kim think that in order for mental states to be multiply realizable then psychology must be fundamentally broken; with human psycho...
Functionalism is a theory on the relationship between the mind and the brain. Functionalists argue that all psychological properties are multiple realizable. This means that not every psychological property has an identical physical property. For example, most functionalists agree that in the future, robots could potentially be functioning members of society. Although humans and robots are different physically, they could have a mental or psychological process tha...
This is the way experience comes to man, organizing it into a significant structured form. Lets first understand the historical perceptive, from where its role started. While behaviorism was becoming the dominant psychological theory in the US, along with Freud’s theory of psychoanalysis, the Gestalt perspective gained influence in Europe around the same time.
Functionalism is a materialist stance in the philosophy of mind that argues that mental states are purely functional, and thus categorized by their input and output associations and causes, rather than by the physical makeup that constitutes its parts. In this manner, functionalism argues that as long as something operates as a conscious entity, then it is conscious. Block describes functionalism, discusses its inherent dilemmas, and then discusses a more scientifically-driven counter solution called psychofunctionalism and its failings as well. Although Block’s assertions are cogent and well-presented, the psychofunctionalist is able to provide counterarguments to support his viewpoint against Block’s criticisms. I shall argue that though both concepts are not without issue, functionalism appears to satisfy a more acceptable description that philosophers can admit over psychofunctionalism’s chauvinistic disposition that attempts to limit consciousness only to the human race.
Sigmund Freud known to be the father of Psychoanalysis , contributed a large deal of this research on the construct of the unconscious mind. Freud valued the effect that the id, ego and superego had on a pe...
Westen, D. (1998). The scientific legacy of Sigmund Freud: toward a psychodynamically informed psychological science. Psychological Bulletin, 124(3), 333.
Functionalism is the doctrine that what makes something a thought, desire, pain (or any other type of mental state) depends not on its internal constitution, but solely on its function, or the role it plays, in the cognitive system of which it is a part. More precisely, functionalist theories take the identity of a mental state to be determined by its causal relations to sensory stimulations, other mental states, and
New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers. Nairne, J. S. (2009). The 'Second Psychology. The.
While the great philosophical distinction between mind and body in western thought can be traced to the Greeks, it is to the influential work of René Descartes, French mathematician, philosopher, and physiologist, that we owe the first systematic account of the mind/body relationship. As the 19th century progressed, the problem of the relationship of mind to brain became ever more pressing.
There are many criticisms of functionalism and their theories: Ø Functionalist ideas almost portray humans as being autonomous and that only socialisation determines our lives. They do not really see humans as the unpredictable creatures they are, not possible to stray away from the predictable ideas that functionalists have of people. Too much stress is placed on harmony and the potential for conflict and its affects are generally ignored. Ø There is no recognition of difference by class, region or ethnic group. The functionalist picture is simply reflective of happy middle-class American families.
Gilbert Ryle’s The Concept of Mind (1949) is a critique of the notion that the mind is distinct from the body, and is a rejection of the philosophical theory that mental states are distinct from physical states. Ryle argues that the traditional approach to the relation of mind and body (i.e., the approach which is taken by the philosophy of Descartes) assumes that there is a basic distinction between Mind and Matter. According to Ryle, this assumption is a basic 'category-mistake,' because it attempts to analyze the relation betwen 'mind' and 'body' as if they were terms of the same logical category. Furthermore, Ryle argues that traditional Idealism makes a basic 'category-mistake' by trying to reduce physical reality to the same status as mental reality, and that Materialism makes a basic 'category-mistake' by trying to reduce mental reality to the same status as physical reality.