In pursuit of effectiveness, the Botswana Defence Force (BDF) has set itself a decent vision of “a professional prompt and decisive force.” The debate is whether the BDF can attain the level of military effectiveness espoused in its model vision. A capability appearing lethally effective in parade will not translate into an effective military or a cure for national security. Strategists such as Allen Millet, Williamson Murray, and Kenneth Watman, define military effectiveness as a process by which armed forces transform resources into fighting power. A fully effective military is one deriving maximum combat power from available resources physically and politically. Defense acquisition or procurement, as it’s otherwise known, plays a central role in military effectiveness. Linda S. Brant and Francis W A’ Hearn describe it as “a process whereby the military avail itself capabilities through expenditure of national treasure.” The BDF is not disposed to transform its resources proficiently enough to realize its envisioned effectiveness. Specifically, attainment of their vision is undermined by a mismatch between its missions and capabilities, deficient policies and a defense management framework and procurement system too duplicitous to attend the real needs and peculiarities of its military. The BDF’s vision of a light highly mobile force resonates well with missions dominated by action against non-state actors; poachers, border security, and peace enforcements operations. However, this has not been matched with the requisite capabilities (they tended to be heavy weapon platforms suited for interstate conflicts). Additionally, the BDF’s rapid development meant there wasn’t a corresponding growth in defense policies and strategies t...
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...0-70s technology most countries retired at the end of the Cold War, opting for modern lighter and faster technologies. Two security writers, Peter Batchelor and Susan Willet, explained why the BDF made such a move: years of economic growth enabled Botswana’s leaders to purchase prestige symbols, going against the current trend of disarmament and security cooperation of the region. There was no clear connection between capabilities acquired and challenges the country faced against poachers, border security, and aid to civil society and escalating demands for peacekeeping in the continent. This mismatch naturally invites questions about the focus and influences associated with force development. For a force structure and acquisition process not based on the security realities and expectations of the nation may render the BDF irrelevant as the country becomes frugal.
War is the means to many ends. The ends of ruthless dictators, of land disputes, and lives – each play its part in the reasoning for war. War is controllable. It can be avoided; however, once it begins, the bat...
...in technology and tactics have made Special Forces units more reliable. For example, the raid on Osama bin Laden’s compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan and the incident with the Somali pirates of the coast of Somalia show the capabilities of today’s Special Forces. The author asserts that, in the future the United States will shift away from major combat operations. These large engagements have proven to be costly in lives and treasure. For that reason, she infers that the US Military will choose the “go small, go long” model for future engagements in the Middle East. Special operation forces are uniquely suited for this model. Their conspicuous nature and low cost make them politically and strategically ideal. The author also suggests that future large scale operations may look like the conflicts in Libya and Somalia rather than the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Shalikashvili, J.M. (n.d.). Shape, Respond, Prepare Now -- A Military Strategy for a New Era. National Military Strategy. Retrieved September 14, 2004, from http://www.dtic.mil/jcs/nms/index.html#Top
Reisman, W. Michael, "War Powers: The Operational Code of Competence" (1989). Faculty Scholarship Series. Paper 742.
Williams, Charles F. "War Powers: A New Chapter in a Continuing Debate." Social Education. April 2003: 128-133. SIRS Issues Researcher. Web. 07 May. 2014.
Recent technological advancements on show in the recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq have indicated, to some, that there is a new American way of war. Scholars, however, do not seem to have reached consensus on what a new way of war for the United States would embody. Depending on the scholar, their beliefs are underwritten by the American ability to wage war with highly interconnected, agile, precise, and extremely damaging methods or because the United States is capable of waging war with a small, Special Forces centered footprint. Other scholars argue that there is not a new American way of war because traditional methods are still necessary in many kinds of conflict. Scholars who address this question focus on conflicts that they believe to be important indicators of how the United States will act in the future, but miss the forest for the trees. The choice of a particular method of combat in any given war is not the result of some national tendency, but rather the result of the political object desired. The political object is the ultimate arbiter of the choice of strategy in war, and that is certainly not new to how the United States wages war.
Berkowitz, Bruce D. The New Face of War: How War Will Be Fought in the 21st Century. New York, NY: The Free Press, 2003.
In a recent verbal bout with my History of the Military Art professor, I contended that the true might of a nation may be inversely proportional to the size of its military during peacetime. My thinking, though perhaps idealistic, was that the maintenance of a large military during relative international tranquility is an overt admission of weakness and increases the likelihood of unnecessarily employing that force—it is contextually irrelevant. Instead, I proposed that a strong and stable economy is the best metric of national prowess, for such an economy can resource many opportunities as they arise. On the contrary, a robust standing military has a much narrower utility. To be sure, this author is not one that intentionally seeks to take an interdisciplinary approach to academia, but the connection seems relevant given the nature of this assignment. Whereas a nation may accomplish a strategic goal through military force, a leader may accomplish a task relying upon coercive power; whereas a nation may transform and develop the world through its economic strength and versatility, a versatile leader may transform others through the employment of one or many leader development principles—both theoretically based and experientially acquired. This piece serves to describe acquired PL499 course concepts and their relevance to my project team and the West Point Leader Development System (WPLDS). Only through a...
Arnold, S.L. and Stahl, David T., “A Power Projection Army in Operations Other Than War (Winter 1993-94)
Maxwell, Hilary. “Warfare Plans of Countries.” Monta Vista High School, Cupertino. 26 Jan. 2014. Lecture.
Military involvement in the country’s politics has become a common feature of modern states. This history of military-government relationship traces its roots back to hundreds of years during the wars of freedom and independence. In some countries, the military is heavily involved in political affairs while others keep politics out of the military. The differences in this relationship among states arise from underlying historical factors of the modern states. This paper considers two states, Germany and Nigeria where military is heavily involved in politics owing to a long history of political warfare fuelled by ethnic pressures and economic challenges. These states are used as a reference point for military involvement in politics and the conditions under which this happens. These examples show that historical and recent conditions make the relationship between government and military very different in African and European context. In the former, weak governments are unable to control military power, while on the later, even in countries with strong military, the political leadership put limits on military power.
The military is tasked with the duty and responsibility of protecting the nation from external attacks and managing any attacks that may happen. Over the years, countries across the world have engaged in conflicts originating from differences in policies and invasion of privacy and unfair treatment of citizens in foreign countries. In...
Current military leadership should comprehend the nature of war in which they are engaged within a given political frame in order to develop plans that are coherent with the desired political end state. According to Clausewitz, war is an act of politics that forces an enemy to comply with certain conditions or to destroy him through the use of violence. A nation determines its vital interests, which drives national strategy to obtain or protect those interests. A country achieves those goals though the execution of one of the four elements of power, which are diplomatic, informational, military and economical means. The use of military force...
" Journal of International Affairs 52.2 (1999): 691. Academic Search Elite -. Web. The Web. The Web.
When comparing and contrasting U. S. military operations and capabilities with regard to regular versus irregular warfare it is important to understand the definition of irregular and the spectrum of conflict. In recent history, the term “irregular warfare” has been used interchangeably with or alongside insurgency and counterinsurgency warfare. This usage and comparison is too narrow. ...