Finally, the country’s passions must be pushing in the same direction. A war trying to operate outside of these principles will not achieve its ends. This paper begins by addressing the argument that superior technology is the sole factor in conventional war victory because of revolutionary military advances. Next, the paper discusses how a state’s level of commitment is a major factor in determining a conflict’s outcome. Finally this paper will consider other dimensions that lead to a war victory.
Certainly leaders of countries with a history of political involvement of the military will rightfully be wary to utilize the military for anything other than war-fighting. However, with many developing countries still struggling with basic service and infrastructure provision, among a host of other development problems, leaders cannot ignore the vast potential contributions an organization like the military can make. If civil-military relations are properly controlled, militaries can be a domestic source of capital that can catalyze socioeconomic development. AHMAD AKMAL BIN AHMAD SALIM Kapt KAPJ/33/14 Bibliography: Distribution:
With that being said, the big question remains “The most important factor in whether or not states get their way is always the amount of their military power” is true or false. My position on this statement is that military power has been the primary instrument nation-states have used to control and dominate each other and subtly use force to obtain their interests except in cases of asymmetric warfare. Asymmetric warfare provides states with weaker military power and alternative way to retaliate against adversaries which is a stumbling block for states with military power. However, apart from the asymmetric strategy, states usually inflict their strong military force to achieve certain goals. The significance of the military in state power is a legacy of the era of wars, expansion of territories and clash of ideologies.
Grand strategy is an intellectual architecture of state’s foreign policy. There is an ongoing debate on the relevance of the notion of grand strategy. On the one hand, it should be reasonable for all the states to conduct their foreign policies with a clear and functioning grand strategy. On the other hand, there is a belief that countries cannot craft (construct, create, design) grand strategies because it is too complicated, expensive and hardly achievable. In my essay, I will argue that superpowers should always have a grand strategy in order to manage their foreign policies, but small and less powerful countries do not have a capability to create grand strategies for themselves.
Realism and Complex Interdependence are theories that are not completely followed by any country or organization. Since neither are the optimal way to be successful in today’s globalized world, both theories are often better identified when looking at specific characteristics of each individually. Understanding, the strength and weaknesses of both theories to construct a better balance for today’s world. The idea of Realism says that a state’s behavior is driven by the desire to survive and become more powerful. Also, Realism emphasizing that foreign policy must be settled on national interest rather than moral and ideological ideas.
These events are here to stay and will be significant in the future conflicts. The third lesson learned discusses America’s poor planning and preparation for stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations (SSTR) and demonstrated the need to avoid stovepiped, single agency planning. The apparent lack of planning for SSTR operations severely complicated and extended the United States mission in Iraq. Fourth, America must always strive to be on the cutting edge and maintain technological superiority over our adversaries in order to secure great advantages. However, the United States cannot solely rely on technological savvy military to achieve success.
Due to the prestige of the military and those who have served within, their endorsements are a premium on Capital Hill. One could assume that lawmakers believe that if the military endorses a particular piece of legislation, it therefore has increased credibility. However, due to the apolitical nature of the military it is socially unacceptable for current service-members to give such an endorsement. Herein lies the paradox of prestige. This paradox plays an important role as prestige is gained from remaining neutral in a highly politicized system.
If a state has military power, and to a lesser extent economic power, they are able to defend themselves and even influence other states. Realism stresses the importance of one state being more powerful than its competitors. In realism, states are seen as rational, unitary actors. Realists assume that the actions of a state are representative of the entire state’s population, disregarding political parties, individuals, or domestic conflict within the state (Goldstein & Pevehouse, 2010). Any action a state takes is in an effort to pursue national interest.
Any deviation in decision making during the peace time and the war time is jeopardous to the state. I advocate that no one is superior or inferior. They are like strings on the lyre to work equally. Peter D. Feaver proposes ambitiously a new theory that treats civil-military relations as a principal-agent relationship. Here, a principal is the government and agent is a military man, capable of carrying out the duty.
Thesis The American Revolution, Algerian, Irish and Peruvian Terror Wars, Vietnam and Afghanistan are perfect examples of how great powers, like the United States, France, and Britain can be defeated by weaker adversaries who employ irregular warfare. It is not the irregular warfare that defeats powers that are greater in number, skills and resources; it is how the great powers prepare and respond to such tactics. Nor does the weaker adversaries use of irregular warfare solely responsible for its success; great powers lose to weaker adversaries by first, not understanding the nature of the war; secondly, becoming a cooperative adversary; and lastly, their inability to reassess and adapt to the war. Irregular Warfare Defined The Army Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, defines Irregular Warfare as "a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over a population. Furthermore, IW consist of various methods such as terrorism, guerilla warfare, and insurgencies.