Summary Of Richard Immerman's The Hidden Hand

Richard Immerman bookends his monograph, The Hidden Hand: A Brief History of the CIA, with reflections on the role of public expectations in the shaping of the CIA’s image, both externally and internally. In-between, Immerman attempts to reconcile the antagonism between the CIA’s actions and its fundamental task. Stated otherwise, Immerman reveals a history of the “competition between covert, particularly paramilitary operations, and its core mission of collection and analysis.” Immerman, who currently serves as a Professor of History at Temple University, has held multiple positions within the intelligence network which has granted him access to privy material. He identifies his main questions in regard to the CIA as: What it does and has

It is clear from Immerman’s work that he strongly believes in the influence of individual psychology on history. Peppered throughout the book are references such as “Dulles’s leadership […] were vital,” “Nixon was predisposed toward covert operations,” “Reagan had a visceral hatred of all things communist,” “Ford, with Bush as his agent, signaled policy makers,” “Turner’s combative leadership style,” and “Carter’s incoherence,” and the like. Immerman demonstrates how leadership’s priorities and foreign policy concerns differed and the way in which this affected the CIA’s institutional structure and initiatives. While compelling, however, this at times appears to contradict his statements concerning historical influences on the organization. Early in his work Immerman states that “historical circumstances, organizational interests, and bureaucratic politics, not institutional planners or risk-tasking adventurers, drove the CIA’s transformation from an agency established to collect, analyze, and disseminate intelligence to an instrument for engaging in covert, frequently paramilitary operations.” Immerman’s attention to individual personality traits does nonetheless leave his audience wondering whether leadership might not also fall into the category of

Since, as he establishes, leadership’s political priorities were critical to the ultimate decision in the CIA’s actions, the degree to which the CIA actually concentrated on this mission of collection and analysis depended on the perceived threats from the top. Consequently, the actual level of reliable analysis deteriorated as demonstrated by the example of ORE analysists who were “normatively risk averse” and trying to “get it right,” and provide analysis that fit into the view of their leadership. Lacking trust in their analysists’ conclusions, the CIA proved unable to supply reliable intelligence and forge “collaboration and integration.” Rather than addressing institutional problems the CIA developed a pattern that continued throughout its entire history. Even though it refers to the Reagan era, Immerman’s conclusion that in a time of crisis the CIA deemed that they “required a change in leadership more than an institutional adjustment,” could easily apply to any other period. This application of psychology to history while enlightening does detract from the reader’s understanding of a formation of a CIA “culture” that limited its intelligence analysis efficiency. Without this fundamental comprehension of a CIA “culture,” some of Immerman’s later