After World War II American intelligence had the need to be transformed. The inexperience along with bureaucracy and poor coordination among American intelligence officers obligated the United States intelligence community to change dramatically in order to confront the new challenges that emerged after the end of WWII. From Early America through WWI the intelligence system of the United States of America was involved in operations in which they had to construct intelligence systems virtually from scratch (Andrew 1995). Human intelligence was already developed, but with certain limitations and other intelligence disciplines were underdeveloped and very seldom sophisticated. After WWI America recessed and settled in a period of peace. The United States faced no threat to its security from its neighbors, from powers outside of the Western Hemisphere (Lowenthal 2006). That caused a visible absence of intelligence activities, leaving America out of sight for any international conflicts; the United States of America focused and limited its activities beyond its own borders. In later years the Japanese attack to Pearl Harbor, America rushed to reactivate their military forces, moving from a passive country to full participation into a another international conflict; WWII. As a consequence, the United States engaged in activities that improved its intelligence system increasing its capabilities needed to address seriously the future threats of the Cold War. For the American intelligence community, George Washington is considered the father of intelligence. The introduction of the intelligence concept and its application in some missions during the early days of America helped America’s Founding Fathers to succeed against t... ... middle of paper ... ...lins Publisher, 1995. donmar.org. The Growth of American Intelligence Between Wars. http://donmar.org/6911rgm/crypto.htm (accessed Mar 5, 2011). Erickson, Ryan. History of U.S. Intelligence: Revolution-WWI. Nov 10, 2008. http://ryanerickson.com/2008/11/10/history-of-u-s-intelligence-revolution-wwi/ (accessed Mar 02, 2011). Hughes-Wilson, John. Military Intelligence Blunders and Cover-Ups. New York: Carrol & Graff Publishers, 1994. Lowenthal, Mark M. Intelligence. Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2006. McCormick, James M. American Foreign Policy. Boston: Wadsworth, Cengage Learning, 2010. Prados, John. Safe for Democracy The Secret Wars of the CIA. Chicago, IL: Ivan R Dee, Publisher, 2006. Richelson, Jeffrey T. The US Intelligence ommunity. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2008. Schmitt, Abraham N. Shulsky Gary J. Silent Warfare. Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, Inc., 2002.
The American Revolution saw the rise of the American spy, and the father of these spies was George Washington, commander in Chief of the Continental Army. The siege of New York demonstrated the importance and dire need for an intelligence to General Washington. Unfortunately, the difficulty, at least initially, lay with finding people willing and able to serve in this manner.
Since, as he establishes, leadership’s political priorities were critical to the ultimate decision in the CIA’s actions, the degree to which the CIA actually concentrated on this mission of collection and analysis depended on the perceived threats from the top. Consequently, the actual level of reliable analysis deteriorated as demonstrated by the example of ORE analysists who were “normatively risk averse” and trying to “get it right,” and provide analysis that fit into the view of their leadership. Lacking trust in their analysists’ conclusions, the CIA proved unable to supply reliable intelligence and forge “collaboration and integration.” Rather than addressing institutional problems the CIA developed a pattern that continued throughout its entire history. Even though it refers to the Reagan era, Immerman’s conclusion that in a time of crisis the CIA deemed that they “required a change in leadership more than an institutional adjustment,” could easily apply to any other period. This application of psychology to history while enlightening does detract from the reader’s understanding of a formation of a CIA “culture” that limited its intelligence analysis efficiency. Without this fundamental comprehension of a CIA “culture,” some of Immerman’s later
Espionage was vital in the war effort of both the allied and axis powers during World War II. Espionage can take many different forms. Deception, leaking of false information, coding and encryption of information, sabotage, and sending spies in to gather intelligence are all were all used during the war and were all effective. Many of the turning points for the allied forces occurred due to various forms of espionage and deception. Depending on which side of the fence you're sitting on, espionage was either a blessing or a curse.
“INSTITUTE FOR HISTORICAL REVIEW.” Propaganda and Disinformation: How the CIA Manufactures History. N.p., n.d. Web. 14 May 2014.
‘The wink and the nod’ that was all somehow acceptable to your primary sponsor caused many a dictator to adopt these methods to take and maintain power. Only recently have internal CIA documents become available, allowing researchers to begin to look inside the CIA itself. Partial as these releases are, they supply valuable insight into the machinations of this secretive organization. These documents outline the beginning of the Terror; let's hope we are seeing the end of it.
“There is one evil I dread, and that is, their spies. I could wish therefore the most attentive watch be kept… I wish a dozen or more honest sensible and diligent men, were employed… in order to question, cross-question, etc., all such persons as are unknown, and cannot give an account of themselves in a straight and satisfactory manner… I think it a matter of importance to prevent these [Tory spies] from obtaining intelligence of our situation. ” – George Washington
Trahair, R. C., & Miller, R. L. (2009). Encyclopedia of Cold War espionage, spies, and secret operations (1. pbk. ed.). New York: Enigma Books.
In this paper, I will do a case study on the Bay of Pigs and why the United States tried to conduct this attack. I will find out what intelligence led to this invasion attempt as well as what intelligence failures were made which resulted in the failure of the invasion. I will discuss what impact the Bay of Pigs had on the United States Intelligence community and what changes was made. I will end this paper with any findings I have concluded to if the failure has any affect on how the U.S. conducts intelligence in today’s world.
Tiedemann, Joseph S. "Washington's Spies: The Story of America's First Spy Ring." The Journal of Southern History 73.3 (2007): 685-6. ProQuest. Web. 30 Mar. 2016.
The United States has involved itself in several covert operations throughout the nation’s short history. Operations, like the Iran-Contra Affair, and the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) role in Afghanistan are just two examples of these types of secret government missions, which have become divulged to the American public. Both of these operations occurred under President Regan, who listed strict executive goals to fight the Soviet social influence, Communism, from spreading across the world. Moreover, other similarities are observed between the two covert missions, like providing armaments and training to foreign rebel forces (National Security Archive 2006, Johnson 2011). Moreover, different agencies were used in the missions for distinct
Congress’s answer to the problems set forth in the commission’s report was to expand the intelligence community to private contractors to fulfill the war time need for more intelligence. When this occurred ...
Probabilistic reasoning is difficult. People prefer to reject ambiguity and demand that concrete predictions be made. However, intelligence is inherently ambiguous. In intelligence forecasting, it is difficult to determine what information constitutes a signal, and what constitutes noise. In “Connecting the Dots: The Paradoxes of Intelligence Reform”, Malcolm Gladwell analyzes several high-profile “intelligence failures”, such as the Yom Kippur War, September 11th, Pearl Harbor, and the Bay of Pigs fiasco, as well as several psychological studies, and comes to the conclusion that: (1) there is no such thing as a perfect intelligence system - all systems require tradeoffs; (2) failures do not constitute the limitations of the intelligence community,
The DIA started in 1958. The organizational structure of the DoD and U.S. foreign intelligence came to a new shape with the establishment of DIA. It was Robert McNamara, then Secretary of Defense, who came up with the concept of DIA in 1961. DIA gathers human source intelligence, analyzes technical intelligence, distributes intelligence/reports to the intelligence agencies, provides advice and support to the Joint Chiefs of Staff with foreign military intelligence, and provides military intelligence to combatant commands as its operational functions. A DIA director is supposed to be a three-star military general and DIA is believed to have employed at least 7,500 staff worldwide today. The DIA is a defense intelligence agency that prevents strategic surprises and delivers a decision advantage to warfighters, defense planners, and to policymakers. This paper will try to evaluate DIA’s role in US national security in present condition of massive budget deficits and increased congressional oversight, plus the intelligence capabilities of the Regional Combatant Commanders and the individual services like CIA and NSA.
Before examining the six processes of the intelligence cycle as they may work within an intelligence community as illustrated above, it is necessary to first understand what their respective functions are meant to carry out. The compartmentalization of the six areas may suggest each process is specialised, may use different methods to reach their goals, or may need varying levels of security clearances . To decipher a starting point within the intelligence cycle, it has been argued that the sole purpose for initiating and m...
Counterintelligence (CI) is defined as, “information gathered and activities conducted to identify, deceive, exploit, disrupt, or protected against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassination conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations or persons, or their agents, or international terrorist organizations or activities. ” The citizenry of the United States on the U.S. Government is the focus of the examination of counter intelligence of citizenry on its national government. Data collected and research performed by James Riedel seeks to establish the citizens as a network of spies on the U.S. Government. The spying of citizens on the government is referred to as “espionage” . Counter Intelligence as acts of espionage committed by U.S. citizens is described by Riedel as short in duration and “poorly paid” .