Socrates Value Of Justice

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Plato's Republic uses dialogue between Socrates and fellow Athenians in order to tease out the complexities of the idea of justice. In Book II, the question of the value of justice is raised, through the dialogue between Glaucon, his brother Adeimantus, and Socrates. Socrates is challenged by the brothers to refute their view on justice, and to explain whether justice is good in and of itself or only for its results. Socrates fails to completely refute Glaucon and Adeimantus' view, by failing to answer one argument and relying on an incorrect premise for another. Glaucon makes the assertion that there are three categories of goods: instrumental, intrinsic, or both. The first category of goods, instrumentally valuable goods, are described …show more content…

Socrates does not prove the premise that health is inherently valuable. He merely takes it at face value. He does not explain how the placement of elements in their “natural relations” makes health intrinsically valuable. Yet Socrates claims justice to be the “health” of the soul and points to this as proof of the inherent value of the notion of justice. The fact that he is operating from an unproven premise (the inherent value of health) undermines his argument. The notion of, if health is valuable and justice is health then justice must be valuable only works if Socrates has definitively argued and proven that health is inherently valuable. Otherwise, his argument is not as sound as it could …show more content…

Sometimes health, though inherently valuable, does not have positive consequences. Take, for example, a tyrant. It may be beneficial for the tyrant to be healthy, but their continuing health is not beneficial for others, as this condition of continuing health allows for the opportunity for more tyranny. So, if health can be consequentially (instrumentally) bad, then the parallel Socrates makes between health and justice (which he views as instrumentally and intrinsically good) is incorrect. If justice is instrumentally and intrinsically good, always, then it cannot be health, which is not always instrumentally (consequentially) good. If the two concepts, health and justice, are fundamentally different, then they cannot be equated and thus held up as proof of the fundamental, intrinsic value of the

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