Saboteur Force Training Case Study

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The fact that the Red Army was able to identify exactly how this new capability would be used was a boon for airborne development in the Soviet Union. Russian air assault theory was growing at such a fast pace that December 1932 the Revoensovet (Revolutionary Military Soviet, meaning council) called for the creation of an air assault brigade in response to papers calling for air assault at the divisional, corps, and even army levels. As such, the Soviets were able to conduct their first airborne exercises in the fall of 1933. By contrast, the Wehrmacht only stood up its first paratroop battalion in 1937, and certainly no concrete doctrine existed to guide its employment nor development. American development was retarded even further, with the first experimental platoon being formed at Fort Benning in August 1940. Thus, the Soviet …show more content…

After assuming leadership of Germany’s airborne development, Student quashed this concept immediately. He stated “I could not accept the saboteur force concept. It was a daredevil idea but I did not see minor operations of this kind as worthwhile. In my view airborne troops could become a battle-winning factor of prime importance.” The distinction to be made here is that these raids or saboteur missions are conducted as strategic harassment, not in support of another operation. Examples of this would be destruction of bridges to harass supply chains, destruction of radar stations, or any other small action which does not directly contribute to an offensive. The “raid” on the Eben-Emael fortress in Belgium, one of the most famous German airborne successes of the war, would therefore fall under the second category of close-in direct tactical support rather than a

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