Reus-Smit’s conclusion has revealed to me the holes through which our class has criticized his arguments. Putting aside my personal bias toward the alternative nature of Reus-Smit’s tone, the claims he makes and causal mechanisms he identifies do not seem to be supported by the historical record (Reus-Smit, 193). Instead, the author seems to obscure the weaknesses of his argument by including excessive, irrelevant explanation. However, as has been mentioned before, Reus-Smit is careful to constrain his analysis within factual bounds. As a result, a few of his positions are compelling; the author’s acknowledgement of the importance of debate to academic thought and his discussion of ‘multiple modernists’ are especially compelling (Reus-Smit, …show more content…
Certain pieces of this conclusion were extremely useful, yet oddly misplaced. Reus-Smit’s juxtaposition of ‘configurative’ and ‘purposive’ change was enlightening, but would have been more easily incorporated into either the introduction or one of the theoretic chapters (Reus-Smit, 199). Later, the author defines his branch of political thought as ‘agentic constructivism,’ which focuses on how real people and organizations promote novel ideas and practices (Reus-Smit, 201). Again, this information would have been more useful to the reader if placed at the beginning of the book. Reus-Smit’s main analytic weakness lies in his ambiguity, which might have been at least partially abated had these definitions been explored earlier in the work. Furthermore, Reus-Smit uses this chapter to explain-away the relationship between contemporary disregard for human rights in the developing world and his rights-centric constructivist history (Reus-Smit, 210-211). Unfortunately, his consideration of the political dimension of the 1945 decolonization wave and its ties to the individual rights movement is unclear. In my opinion, Reus-Smit’s lip-service does not resolve the problem the hypocrisy of the developing world’s insincere commitment to the international rights regime poses to his theory. This conclusion is therefore both illuminating and confounding,
were not as radical as the transformation to democratic thought. It is here that Wood points out the “uncontrolla...
Petrou, Micheal. “Inside A Revolution.” Maclean’s 127.9 (2014): 20. MAS Ultra - School Edition. Web. 5 Mar. 2014
In recent years, human rights scholarship has received much attention by various scholars, including by historians. More than other specialists, they have been particularly concerned with trying to comprehend the origins of modern human rights discourses. Some like Laurent Dubois in his Avengers of the New World: The Story of the Haitian Revolution have even suggested that:
...). Therefore, if liberty rights and rights to goods and services are violated in various states, then how can Nussbaum expect to see the central capabilities guaranteed in such states? Another negative aspect about placing obligations or establishing guarantees from states is that some may lack the power to fulfill those obligations (O’Neill 435) For example, underdeveloped states or the deemed failed states lack the economic resources and political stability to do so. Others don’t necessarily need to be in a similar situation for failing as duty-bearers. States regarded as being strong in the international community may encounter enforcement problems. Even so when they cannot guarantee liberty rights to their constituents as do many authoritarian regimes. As a result, O’Neill suggests reconsidering whether all second-order obligations should be assigned to states.
... An American History of the World. 4th ed. of the book. W.W. Norton, 2012, 671. 2.)
This journal article, “Cultural Relativist and Feminist Critiques of International Human Rights - Friends or Foes?” by Oonagh Reitman seeks to rouse discussion about the similarities between two critiques of universal human rights: cultural relativists and feminists, despite the antagonistic position both groups tend to take against each other. In the beginning, he lays out the basis of critique of international human rights by each camp. Cultural relativists argue that the universal human rights which are earned simply ‘by virtue of being human’ (Donnelly in Reitman 1997, 100) are insensitive to the diversity of culture. Feminists, on the other hand, criticize that universal human rights guarantee only men’s rights and that ‘gender equality and freedom from discrimination for women is given a low priority in the international arena’ (Reitman 1997, 100).
Perry, M., Davis, D., Harris, J., Laue, T. V., & Warren, D. J. (1985). A history of the world (Revised Edition ed.). Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
...tain, this argument has been shown to be flawed, as it without motivation and analysis, and disregards many critical factors, such as the culture of non-European societies. A more compelling case has been made that, instead, the Great Divergence had very little to do with European superiority, and instead occurred because of geographic advantages.
Third, institutions consist of a new type of power, so that all individual relations constitute a power relationship. (Foucault, “Truth and Juridical Forms” 82-83) A relationship of power may be described as a mode of action that acts upon an individual’s actions through which the behavior of an active subject is able to inscribe itself. (Foucault, “The Subject and Power” 342) Institutions work through an authority network of individuals, and power is employed and exercised by individuals through a netlike organization. “Not only do individuals circulate between its threads; they are always in the position of simultaneously undergoing and exercising this power.
Some theorists believe that ‘power is everywhere: not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere… power is not an institution, nor a structure, nor possession. It is the name we give to a complex strategic situation in a particular society. (Foucault, 1990: 93) This is because power is present in each individual and in every relationship. It is defined as the ability of a group to get another group to take some form of desired action, usually by consensual power and sometimes by force. (Holmes, Hughes &Julian, 2007) There have been a number of differing views on ‘power over’ the many years in which it has been studied. Theorist such as Anthony Gidden in his works on structuration theory attempts to integrate basic structural analyses and agency-centred traditions. According to this, people are free to act, but they must also use and replicate fundamental structures of power by and through their own actions. Power is wielded and maintained by how one ‘makes a difference’ and based on their decisions and actions, if one fails to exercise power, that is to ‘make a difference’ then power is lost. (Giddens: 1984: 14) However, more recent theorists have revisited older conceptions including the power one has over another and within the decision-making processes, and power, as the ability to set specific, wanted agendas. To put it simply, power is the ability to get others to do something they wouldn’t otherwise do. In the political arena, therefore, power is the ability to make or influence decisions that other people are bound by.
On December 10th in 1948, the general assembly adopted a Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This declaration, although not legally binding, created “a common standard of achievement of all people and all nations…to promote respect for those rights and freedoms” (Goodhart, 379). However, many cultures assert that the human rights policies outlined in the declaration undermine cultural beliefs and practices. This assertion makes the search for universal human rights very difficult to achieve. I would like to focus on articles 3, 14 and 25 to address how these articles could be modified to incorporate cultural differences, without completely undermining the search for human rights practices.
While on one hand there is a growing consensus that human rights are universal on the other exist critics who fiercely oppose the idea. Of the many questions posed by critics revolve around the world’s pluri-cultural and multipolarity nature and whether anything in such a situation can be really universal.
Charney, E., (1999) Cultural Interpretation and Universal Human Rights: A Response to Daniel A. Bell. Political Theory. 27 (6), 84. [online] Available from: [Accessed 28 February 2011]
Brooks attempts to disprove the formalist critics and makes good points among the way in anticipating and devaluing their criticisms. Yet, he fails to prove that formalist criticism should be the only way in approaching literature, especially when contradicting himself.
The role that globalization plays in spreading and promoting human rights and democracy is a subject that is capable spurring great debate. Human rights are to be seen as the standards that gives any human walking the earth regardless of any differences equal privileges. The United Nations goes a step further and defines human rights as,